Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War. By Larry J. Daniel. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.

            Before April 1862, both Northerners and Southerners clung to a romanticized yet sterilized view that this would prove a short-lived and relatively painless Civil War.  According to Larry J. Daniel, Shiloh changed all that. After this battle, which both sides claimed as an unqualified victory until the casualty reports trickled in, the combatants recognized the war would be destructive and lengthy.
            Daniel utilizes the first one-third of his book to demonstrate the various contingent forces and factors that conspired to bring action to Shiloh; none of the events were preordained. In this, Daniel spares few actors from his critical view. CSA President Davis’s decision to prioritize territorial integrity was theoretically defensible, but his indecision in providing reinforcements along the 400-mile long Western Front was indefensible. Union General Grant wins Daniel’s praise for his decisiveness at Fort Donelson, but he criticizes Halleck and Buell for failing to coordinate their forces with Grant’s in a massed attack on Corinth that might have sliced the Confederacy in half. Nevertheless, Grant pressed forward with William T. Sherman’s command at the edge of the Union spear. Daniel teases the reader with the implication that rousing Union success at Fort Donelson had bred dangerously high levels of overconfidence.

            Indeed, neither Grant nor Sherman placed a high priority on fortifying their positions near Pittsburg Landing. Thus, when the Federal line met Confederate advances in the early morning hours of 6 April, it was not the pitched offensive Grant and others envisioned. Still, Daniel does not offer praise for the Confederate offensive, noting that pre-dawn probes of the Union line had spoiled any element of surprise they may have had. Furthermore, “Cleburne’s brigade was wrecked in utterly useless attacks upon the wrong flank” (163). Still, failures in Union planning and response meant they could not take advantage of early Confederate tactical blunders such as this. Only Sherman’s “steady and cool” (171) demeanor mitigated this situation in favor of the Union; his defense of the center of the Union line, around Shiloh Church, delayed the Confederate advance and also baited Albert Sidney Johnston into sending too much of his force to the Confederate left flank.

            Initially, it appeared that Johnson’s gamble paid off as first the Union right broke and Johnson’s right – reinforced with virtually his entire reserve – pushed back the Union left. Yet, the Union center held thanks to the tangled brush of the Hornet’s Nest, from which Federals repulsed Confederate attacks rising up from the Sunken Road. Around 2:30 P.M., Johnston died from a heavily bleeding leg wound; although offensives typically fall into disorganization with the loss of their commander, Johnston’s predilection for leading from the front had led him to place P.G.T. Beauregard in tactical command at the rear. Beauregard’s familiarity with the overall situation allowed him to rather seamlessly assume command. Late in the afternoon, Confederate guns unleashed on the Union center the most massive artillery barrage recorded to that point in the history of the North American continent. While Daniel does not dispute its effect on the morale of the Confederate soldiers trying to take the Hornet’s Nest, he does argue that this Union stronghold had already broken. Although Grant from this day on repeatedly berated Prentiss for the manner of his retreat, Daniel suggests that Prentiss here offered the Federals valuable time to reform their lines; later captured, Prentiss may have saved Grant’s army a second time by convincing his Confederate captors that Grant had withdrawn his force from the field – whereupon Beauregard determined not to press the attack.

            Daniel articulates the “Lost Opportunity” thesis of William Preston Johnston, which posits that had Beauregard ridden to his right flank to observe the situation for himself, he might have massed his forces and pressed an attack that could have wiped Grant off the field. Daniel points out that, although Bragg and other officers were disappointed with their orders to halt, their troops were exhausted and nearly out of ammunition. Daniel instead blames A.S. Johnston’s obsession with cleansing the Hornet’s Nest, as well as developing an imbalanced front line, for the inability of the Confederates to consolidate their early gains. Through the night the Union lines received multiple reinforcements, and the Confederates, none. Both Buell and Grant, although independently, mounted counterattacks the following morning. Exhausted, over-stretched, and poorly commanded, the Confederate troops gradually withdrew from the field. Grant’s failure to pursue the fleeing Confederates, according to Daniel, constitutes the “final Federal blunder” (294) of Shiloh. Still, the battle cemented the working relationship of Grant and Sherman – important later in the war – and shattered forever the “romantic innocence” of both the North and the South; “the war had at last turned vicious” (305).

Matthew A. McNiece

 

Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War. By Larry J. Daniel. 1997.

In his book, Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War, Larry Daniel attempts to describe this famous battle within its larger political and strategic context.  As the title suggests, Daniel also contends that Shiloh raised the conflict to higher level of intensity and brought both sides to the stark realization that this would be a vicious and lengthy war.  Daniel accomplished these goals while providing a focused account of the battle itself.  Additionally, we receive incisive assessments of the character of many illustrious leaders including Halleck, Grant, Buell, Johnston, and Beauregard. 

            Daniel explains how Jefferson Davis’s policy of cordon defense contributed to a series of defeats that occurred in the western theatre during 1861-62.  For political reasons, Davis found it necessary to distribute his forces throughout the Confederacy.  The Union forces won this string of victories west of the Appalachians because of their ability to concentrate forces against selected targets.  As a result, they experienced victories at Somerset, Fort Henry, and Fort Donelson.  The northerners gained strategic advantage and a new national hero, Ulysses S. Grant, because of these successes.  Among southerners, blame for these failures focused on Albert Sidney Johnston who received criticism from politicians and pundits alike.  The leadership in Richmond, and to a lesser extent Washington, had been fixated on the eastern theatre until the Union victory at Fort Donelson.  This changed the strategic situation and Davis recognized the need for remediation, although his options had become somewhat limited. 

            Both North and South struggled with the issue of command relations in the western theatre.  Lincoln moved from having a divided command to a unified command and back to divided during the crucial year of 1862.  At the time of the battle of Shiloh, the Union army in the west operated under the command of Henry W. Halleck, with Grant commanding the Army of the Tennessee and Don Carlos Buell the Army of the Ohio.  Johnston held unified command in the west for the Confederate Army, but due to his ineffectiveness, Davis dispatched P.G.T. Beauregard to assist him.  Beauregard began organizing the southern army in the area of Corinth, Mississippi, while Johnston remained with the main force in the area of Nashville.  In the aftermath of the victory at Fort Donelson, Halleck perceived a “golden opportunity” for decisive action against the Confederacy in the west.  To some extent the North squandered this opportunity by time-consuming politics and command conflict relating to the role of both Halleck and Grant in the future war effort. 

            While Halleck established himself as the unified commander in the west, Davis and Johnston recognized the vulnerability of their position in the Tennessee valley and began to reinforce.  Johnston moved his main army from Nashville to Murfreesboro as Buell began to move south from Kentucky.  The Army of the Tennessee under C.F. Smith—and then Grant—had already began moving south along the Tennessee River to conduct a “grand raid” on the Memphis and Charleston railroad.  Halleck’s new role as senior commander allowed him to turn the “grand raid” into a major offensive action.  With two Union armies moving south and Jefferson Davis reinforcing Johnston, the situation became a race to concentrate forces.  Southern reinforcements poured into Corinth where Beauregard organized the army and awaited Johnston’s arrival.  Halleck’s actual intention is less clear, but the center of his focus was in the area of Pittsburg Landing, Crump’s Landing, and Savannah along the Tennessee River.  For Albert Sidney Johnston, the objective was to concentrate his forces and strike Grant before he could link-up with Buell.  That is exactly what he accomplished at the battle of Shiloh. 

            Throughout his book, Larry Daniel is very critical of both Union and Confederate leadership.  He tends to focus on their weakness and failures rather than their strengths and successes.  He is particularly antagonistic toward Johnston, Beauregard, Halleck, and Buell.  In keeping with current thinking, he is more generous to Grant although he raises questions about his character.  He is also critical of the physical movement of the armies—both tactical and administrative—and the logistical support efforts.  Certainly much of his criticism is valid and it is not the role of the historian to paint a rosy picture of people and events.  But he seems to think that people and operations should work like neat little video games, and the unruly nature of real operations appears beyond his ability to grasp. 

            When Johnston arrived at Corinth with his main force, he had won the race for concentration.  Johnston knew he must act fast to locate and attack Grant’s army before the arrival of Buell.  Grant had his army disbursed among several locations including Pittsburg Landing, Crump’s Landing, and Savannah, with large size reconnaissance elements probing the countryside.  Daniel believes that the location of most of Grant’s army on the west bank of the Tennessee made it more difficult to reinforce and placed it in danger of isolation.  Daniel is highly critical of this fact, noting the danger of the situation while failing to recognize that Union control of the river provided maneuver advantage to Grant.  This capability proved its value during the actual fighting.  He also fails to recognize the fact—born out in the actual battle—that Grant’s force was on the west bank in strength and could defend itself against a powerful enemy.  Having the river to his back proved in no way to be a disadvantage to Grant during the battle.  Daniel’s valid criticism of Grant and the Army of the Tennessee is that the attack came as a complete surprise.  Without doubt, the “fog of war” entered into the equation for both sides up to the evening of April 5, 1862.  But a combination of Johnston’s boldness and Grant’s inadequate intelligence efforts is what caused disaster on the first day at Shiloh.  Daniel recognizes these factors, yet tends to focus his criticism on the deployment of Grant’s forces. 

            Daniel is also critical of the actions of Johnston and Beauregard in the period leading up to the battle of Shiloh.  He recognizes that Beauregard did a good job of organizing the army as it concentrated at Corinth, but is critical of the operation plan he created, and of Johnston for accepting it.  Yet he is vague about why he considers it “horrid without dispute.”  At the time Beauregard created it, the enemy situation was still unclear.  Later, Daniel is critical of Johnston and Beauregard for not following the plan during the battle.  He fails to recognize that enemy actions and unknown terrain features often necessitate altering a plan during combat.  Daniel may be right in his views about the Confederate operation plan, but he does not address the issue well enough to be convincing.  The matter of Beauregard’s battle plan and its implementation at Shiloh is a good subject for further research and perhaps a scholarly article. 

            Despite Daniel’s criticism of Albert Sidney Johnston as theatre commander, he acknowledges that on the day before, and the day of, the battle of Shiloh Johnston’s leadership was dynamic and impressive.  Yet even here, Daniel is critical of Johnston for leading from the front while leaving Beauregard in the rear to direct the introduction of forces.  On this point, Daniel is entirely wrong and Johnston had it right.  The rear area command post is a combination of tactical and logistical headquarters.  The second in command belongs at the command post while the commander’s place is wherever he can have the greatest impact on the course of battle.  That place differs with various battles and even in the course of a single engagement.  During the era of the American Civil War, that position was often at the scene of fighting rather than a rear area command post.  In the case of Shiloh, Johnston not only had a capable assistant in Beauregard, but one that knew the army very well and had written the battle plan.  Despite shortcomings in his leadership prior to Shiloh, Johnston was dynamic on the day of battle in a manner far beyond the capability of Beauregard.  Daniel’s recommendation that Beauregard should be forward, and Johnston in the rear completely miss casts them given their personalities and the capabilities they brought to the battlefield. 

            If the Confederates had the right command structure on the field, had beaten the Union army in the concentrations of forces, and had caught Grant by surprise at Pittsburg Landing; one might ask why they did not win the battle.  The answer is relatively simple.  Grant’s forces at Pittsburg Landing were too strong to be annihilated, and they became stronger as the battle progressed.  Daniel is correct in suggesting that the goal of destroying Grant’s army before Buell could arrive was beyond the capability of Johnston’s force.  All speculation and counterfactual imaginings must fall victim to this reality.  Far from having a vulnerable element isolated west of the river, Grant had a powerful force that withstood a vicious attack by the best the Confederacy could muster, and then drove them from the field. 

            Larry Daniel explains the aftermath and ramifications of the battle of Shiloh with good insight.  The death and destruction of Shiloh shocked the leaders and citizens of both North and South.  All became aware that this war would not be a quick rush to glorious victory.  It would be a long and brutal fight between two determined adversaries.  In the North, Grant reemerged as a hero at first.  But as facts of the battle surfaced, he became the center of a firestorm of controversy that came close to ending his career.  Ultimately, it required President Lincoln’s political slight of hand to retain Grant for a future role of high responsibility.  The South lionized Johnston, and posthumously restored his credibility and fame.  The belief that Johnston’s death in the heat of battle denied the Confederacy its just victory became part of the lost cause myth.  Even Jefferson Davis believed it immediately after the battle and throughout his life. 

It is somewhat difficult to realize the enormity of Shiloh as we look back through a historical lens that includes Antietam, Gettysburg, Cold Harbor, and other major battles.  But in April 1862, Shiloh was the greatest battle ever fought in America with casualties larger than the combined total of all previous American wars.  Daniel makes this point very well and demonstrates the impact of the war on the political and strategic landscape of the times. 

            Larry Daniel’s book is a good scholarly work on the battle of Shiloh.  The research and organization of material is first-rate and supported by an engaging writing style.  He provides excellent political and strategic context for the battle as well as a superb and detailed description of the fighting.  His understanding of tactics, logistics, and command relationships is less impressive.  And his gleeful criticism—often disparagement—of great men goes beyond that needed for valid analysis.  In balance, this is an important book on the American Civil War and should be in the library of every serious scholar on the subject. 

Gary J. Ohls