Battle Tactics of the Civil War. By Paddy Griffith. (New Haven: Yale University Press, c. 1987. Pp. 239).
Situated directly between the classical Napoleonic Wars and the more modern warfare of World War I, the Civil War owns a reputation for being central to the transition between differing styles. In his book, Battle Tactics of the Civil War, Paddy Griffith examines the tactics and technology that were pervasive during the War, and comes to a different conclusion. Griffith is unconcerned with the war’s larger strategic decisions, instead drawing broad conclusions about the war’s battles by examining and comparing accounts across multiple battles. Using primary source material such as battle recollections of soldiers and tactical training manuals of the day, Griffith attempts to reconstruct the Civil War battle and examine its many component parts.
The most important point Griffith makes revolves around the level of training and leadership found in Civil War armies, or rather, the great lack thereof. The armies lacked real experienced leadership, which revealed itself in poor battlefield tactics. Some of this deficiency stemmed from a lack of trained general staff. The mid-nineteenth century United States did not have any apparatus for properly training staff members, which led to poor communication between officers across the battlefield. Griffith also discusses the general feeling among American commanders against learning and using traditional tactics. He contends that this did not force the leadership to design new and more creative tactics, but instead only to poorly execute Napoleonic concepts. Though occasional new ideas arose, such as the so-called “Indian Raid” style of assaulting fortified positions, these tactics suffered from under-prepared troops and the aforementioned poor communication.
Griffith does not universally deride all Civil War generals, pointing out those who he feels best accomplished their goals. He is particularly kind to Phil Sheridan for the general’s effective use of Union cavalry in the war’s later years. Griffith’s complements though, are more commentary on the respective generals’ ability to properly follow the Napoleonic precepts that Americans attempted to reject. Even the effective generals, such as the reputedly barbaric Sherman, took a lighter hand than most commanders of the earlier wars. For the most part, Griffith is unimpressed with the style of battle. He does not see anything particularly noteworthy about the use of trenches during the Civil War, suggesting that soldiers dug as a matter of protection, and did so in trenches no more advanced than the French used during the Crimean War.
One of the most common arguments for characterizing the Civil War as “modern” rises from the supposedly new technology. Griffith contends that Civil War rifles did not represent any great advancement in firearms technology. Instead, he cites that Civil War armies tended to fight no further apart than before, suggesting that the gap in technology was not as great as perceived. Griffith also examines artillery and finds similar shortcomings. It was not until the Prussian campaigns of the 1870s, Griffith says, that truly long-range artillery comes to the field and forces noticeable differences in tactics.
In addition to technology, Griffith suggests that historians overestimate the difference between wars fought in American and in Europe, especially as regards terrain and ferocity. Griffith finds wanting the standard contention that American terrain is somehow less adaptive to Napoleonic warfare, one of the driving forces behind the rejection of Napoleonic tactics. Griffith does not find this persuasive, as he contends that Europe is not the open plain that many Americans seem to believe. Many of Napoleon’s victories came on ground no more conducive to open battle than anything in America, especially in the Civil War’s Eastern theatre. Griffith also rejects the idea that the Civil War achieved some kind of ferocity or size unheard of in warfare. Civil War armies were not appreciably larger than European armies of prior wars, and that was before sickness and desertion thinned the ranks even more considerably. Though he concedes a particular ferocity in the Western theatre, he all but characterizes that fighting as barbaric, and almost less worthy of serious military study.
Griffith examines the contention that the American Civil War represented a new kind of warfare from that of Napoleon. Instead, the argument suggests, the Civil War more closely resembled World War I in terms of technology and tactics. Griffith finds this characterization to be unfounded. He takes the undoubtedly unpopular and controversial contention that the Civil War was far closer in tactics and technology to the Napoleonic wars of the early nineteenth century. By looking at the armies, commanders, weapons and the field of battle itself, Griffith concludes that very little about the Civil War fits under the categorization of “modern.” He is unconvinced that the Civil War represented the kind of strict departure from Napoleonic warfare that many make it out to be.
Texas Christian University Keith Altavilla
Battle Tactics of the Civil War. By Paddy Griffith. ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. p239)
Within the historiography of Civil War battle tactics, most historians have taken the stance of the war being the first of the modern era of warfare. Historians have pointed to the wars utilization of the rifled musket, mines, railroads, steamships, submarines and superior artillery as proving the Civil War’s modernity. In his work Battle Tactics of the Civil War, British historian Paddy Griffith takes a new controversial look at this accepted belief. Paddy Griffith intends to prove that while the American Civil War did employ new technologies and tactics, it was essentially a continuation of the Napoleonic Wars and an extension of European battle tactics.
Griffith begins his book by examining the historiography of Civil War tactics, and where the origins of modern warfare truly can be found. He also, attempts to persuade the reader into believing that his view on the Civil War should be given special consideration as he is a British national looking in on the conflict from outside of the United States. Griffith believes that this fact gives him credibility over others who may disagree with his opinions. Paddy Griffith divides his work into eight chapters, each examining different aspects of Civil War tactics. The first chapter examines how the armies learned to fight. Griffith gives a brief summary of the overall tactics of the different theaters of the war. He comes to the questionable conclusion that a straight on offensive attack could have proven beneficial if implemented more often in the war. Griffith uses the example of Napoleon’s army to demonstrate what the frontal attack could accomplish. The second chapter explores the command and control structure of both the Union and Confederate forces. According to Paddy Griffith, the Civil War had very little in common with later wars like World War I. He believes that the Civil War commanders had very little experience, which caused the battles to be run inefficiently. Griffith believes that if the commanders on both sides would have had more command experience, their offensives would have proven to be more successful and decisive. In Chapter three, Griffith examines the use of the rifled musket and its effect on warfare. Griffith attempts to down play the importance of the rifled musket. He tells his readers that the ratios of casualties for the offensive and defensive positions were nearly equal, thus demonstrating that the rifle had little tactical effect. In chapter four, Paddy Griffith examines the importance of drill in the Civil War, and how it often broke down in the heat of combat. Chapter five looks into the battlefield where the fighting took place both its geography and fortifications. According to Griffith Civil War soldiers, often “coward” behind fortifications rather then making a decisive frontal assault. In chapter six, Griffith speaks of the methods used by the infantry in firefights. He has concluded that most battles took place at distance with armies trading shots until they ran out of ammunition or until night came. In the last two chapters, Calvary and artillery are examined. Griffith concludes that both tools of war were never implemented correctly and had no real effect on the Civil War.
Overall, Paddy Griffith’s work is thoroughly enjoyable, if not easily accepted as fact. The entire work seems to overlook the effect of modern weaponry on the war. He also attempts to disregard the effect that both rail and steam had on the war, as a whole. Throughout the book, Griffith attempts to prove that the Civil War was not a new modern war, but an extension of the Napoleonic era. Griffith does neither very well and proves nothing. He actual proves that the war was a new style war, by his arguments. When he speaks of fortifications and static positions being used extensively in the war, he proves that the war was indeed modern. His very descriptions seem to describe battles later taking place across Europe in WWI. Paddy Griffith’s suggestions that frontal assaults could actually save lives is also hard to accept for the knowledgeable reader. It is also hard to believe that the rifled musket did not play a significant role in the war. The ability to actually aim rifle fire accurately was surely devastating in nature. Although this work is hard to accept, it is entertaining in every chapter and it gives the reader new ways of looking into Civil War tactics. Anyone who enjoys Civil War tactics would benefit from reading this controversial work.
Christopher Draper