Training, Tactics, and Leadership in the Confederate Army of Tennessee. By Andrew Haughton. (London: Routledge, 2000).
In this book, Andrew Haughton postulates that deficiencies in training, tactics, and leadership led to the Army of the Tennessee’s abysmal battlefield performance. Both the Union and Confederate armies utilized William J. Hardee’s outdated 1855 treatise, Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics (hereafter cited as Tactics), when the war broke out in 1861. Yet, the Union armies in the West, realizing the theoretical limitations of the manual, tweaked its proscriptions and achieved tactical evolution. The Army of Tennessee, meanwhile, continuously adhered to antebellum military doctrine and focused on strategy thereby allowing their tactics to stagnate. This, ultimately, led to the army’s poor battlefield performance and eventual defeat in 1865.
Haughton utilizes “new military history” techniques in order to establish the context surrounding the army’s creation. According to Haughton, both the North and the South believed that the latter contained a unique martial culture. The author, however, stresses that this constituted a perceived reality. Thus, the South entered the war believing in an artificial martial superiority that did not translate into combat reality (Haughton 26-37).
Subsequent to Haughton’s dabbling in new military history, the author establishes antebellum military theory and experience. Hardee’s Tactics constituted the primary tactical manual in 1861. With its theories rooted in Napoleonic doctrine, the manual attempted to incorporate the new light infantry tactics that the French currently employed in North Africa. Hardee, however, designed the manual to supplement Winfield Scott’s tactical treatise published during the 1830s. Ergo, American tactical doctrine on the eve of the Civil War was outdated. Yet, Hardee alone did not create the base of the antebellum military experience. Many southern officers relied upon the training that they received at the United States Military Academy and their wartime experiences in Mexico. Tactical training at West Point, however, remained a small part of the overall curriculum. In addition, the Mexican War shared more commonalities with the earlier Napoleonic Wars than it did with the future transitional American Civil War. As such, the Confederate Army of Tennessee, much like its northern counterparts marched to war in 1861 strictly adhering to what was soon to become outdated tactical principles.
The book goes on to address the army's military performance, on the tactical level, from the battle of Shiloh through its defeat at Nashville. According to Haughton, “Shiloh is the starting point for understanding the transmission of training to tactics, and to combat performance” (Haughton, 60). The battle highlighted the tactical inflexibility that would characterize the Army of Tennessee throughout the war. Haughton astutely recognizes that this engagement, being the first major battle in the West, was bound to contain tactical problems. Yet, the author blames the Confederate leadership’s inability to learn from the lessons of Shiloh. Their unwillingness to adapt their outmoded tactics to the transitional Civil War battlefield becomes the subject of Haughton’s criticisms. By the time the Army of Tennessee faced Sherman’s more modernized Union armies in Georgia, their tactics had become predictable. Sherman’s troops utilized heavy skirmish lines and offensive entrenching in order to outmaneuver Johnston’s army and, when Sherman met Johnston in Georgia, the former’s evolved army faced a tactically stagnant Confederate force.
While it appears that Haughton overtly criticizes the Army of Tennessee, he does acknowledge its attempts to combat battlefield inefficiency. For example, the army gradually implemented training by brigade, creating sharpshooter battalions, and establishing examination boards for officers. By 1864, the army even conducted mock battles in order to practice battlefield maneuvers. Yet, “Changes to the training and organization of the army could be described as incremental at best” (Haughton, 89). Ergo, combat ineffectiveness did not reside at the individual level, but rather extended from the officer corps’ inability to coordinate its units in a larger effort to achieve tactical victory (Haughton, 117).
Haughton provides interesting conclusions and adequately displays the academic integrity of Civil War military history. He concludes that the Army of Tennessee’s poor combat record resulted from faulty tactics. “Without direction from above, the training and tactics of the Army of Tennessee were allowed to drift and stagnate in a war which was constantly evolving” (Haughton, 185). Although both sides began the war with deficient military doctrines, this Confederate western army’s inability to evolve tactically resulted in its own demise thereby contributing to the Confederacy’s fall. Significantly, Haughton demonstrates the intellectual merits of tactical studies. His emphasis on historiography, military theory, and society parries those who criticize the intellectual dynamics of Civil War military history. All serious Civil War scholars will benefit from reading this book.
Texas Christian University Justin S. Solonick
Training, Tactics and Leadership in the Confederate Army of the Tennessee: Seeds of Failure. By Andrew Haughton. Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2000.
In the history of the Civil War the Army of the Tennessee, the Confederates primary army in the western theatre, represents perhaps the most unsuccessful fighting force of the war. Traditionally historians have attributed its lack of success to incompetent generals, logistical problems, and the extensive territory under its supervision. In this study, amateur historian, Andrew Haughton challenges these assertions claiming that the losses of the Army of the Tennessee should be attributed inadequate training and tactics. More specifically, he argues that the failures resulted from the inability of its commanders to adapt or alter training and battle tactics to account for the prevailing environmental and technological challenges of the western theatre.
Haughton begins with a discussion of the “Southern martial tradition” (11). The prevailing opinion prior to the Civil War was that southern culture was inherently reckless, violent, and militaristic as a result of the practice of slavery and the cultural significance of hunting. The author argues that based upon the experiences at southern military academies, the South was not as martial as it is purported to have been. These schools focused upon peripheral military subjects such as mathematics and engineering. Haughton also notes that these academies reveled in the visual trappings of military show rather than drilling and disciple.
As such, at that time of the Civil War, the author argues, the South was ill prepared to create a competent army. This also resulted from a lack of experienced generals, weapons, and ammunition. Haughton notes that enlisted men did not readily adapt to military life. Most found it difficult to abide by the chain of command and were unwilling to take orders. The first field experience came at the Battle of Shiloh in the spring of 1862 under the command of P. T. G. Beauregard. For Haughton the army’s decimation at this battle revealed several fundamental problems with the army. The use of close-order linear tactics was apparently unsuitable to the difficult terrain on the battle field. Due to the inexperience of the soldiers and officers, the battle lines lost cohesion. Moreover, the due to the lack of training the soldiers were unable to alter tactical formations to meet the challenges on the field. The lack of discipline and inflexibility of the army led to high casualties.
In the summer of 1862, following the defeat at Shiloh, Braxton Bragg took over command and began drilling the army extensively. To some extent the emphasis on drilling resulted from the experiences at Shiloh. However, these drills were based upon William J. Hardee’s tactical manual published in 1855. Haughton faults Bragg for his slavish devotion the linear tactics promoted by Hardee and for failing to alter tactics to account for difficult terrain and the Minie bullet. The losses during the Kentucky Campaign in the fall of 1862 and the Battle of Stones River in January 1863 demonstrate the need for tactical alteration. Despite these failed campaigns, Bragg failed to change tactics. Haughton also faults Bragg for focusing to heavily upon strategy and for only recognizing drilling as a means to create higher levels of discipline. Moreover, the author also blames the officer corps for failing to initiate changes in tactics.
The author’s argument that the losses of the Army of the Tennessee can be attributed to inflexible tactics based upon devotion to Hardee’s tactics continues under Joseph E. Johnston and John B. Hood. And to some extent he repeats his argument ad nauseum. Unfortunately, Haughton’s arguments are non-conclusive. Though Haughton appears to be presenting a valid contention for the losses of the army, he does not compare the Army of the Tennessee with the Federal armies in the West or with the Federal or Confederate armies in the East. Did these armies adapt and is that the reason for their success on the battle field? Without such comparisons Haughton’s only represents an interesting theory.
Jacob W. Olmstead