One War at a Time

One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War. By Dean B. Mahin. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999. Pp. x, 343.)

Although the American Civil War consisted of entirely internal fighting between Americans, international relations played a major role in the conflict. Despite the topic’s importance to Union president Abraham Lincoln’s and Confederate president Jefferson Davis’s administrations during the war, few historians have attempted a comprehensive overview of foreign affairs in the Civil War. Dean B. Mahin, a specialist in international relations, centers One War at a Time on the foreign relations of the Union and Confederate governments. In this study, Mahin provides a solid narrative of the international dimensions of the conflict and provides a solid base for future studies on the topic.

Mahin attempts to write a “comprehensive study of the foreign relations of the United States during the Civil War” (p. viii). In order to do so, he follows the international relations of the Union and Confederate governments chronologically through the war, even including two epilogues to show the lingering issues of foreign relations that developed during the war and Secretary of State William H. Seward’s dealings with them. Through this process, Mahin focuses on numerous well-known events that created problems in foreign relations during the conflict, such as the Trent crisis in 1861, British considerations for intervention in 1862, and French intervention in Mexico starting in 1862. This allows Mahin to focus on specific issues that arose during these crises and the development of solutions from the beginning of the war through the end of the conflict and the years after.

Mahin shows how the Union and Confederacy dealt with their foreign affairs during the conflict. Throughout, the Lincoln administration attempted to create a policy that followed the idea of fighting “one war at a time” where the Union would threaten the use of force if there were foreign interference, but attempted to avoid any conflicts with Britain and France, primarily, during the Civil War. The Confederates implemented a cotton embargo to try and coax Britain and France into supporting their effort, believing “King Cotton” would eventually win the foreign powers over. Though Mahin mainly centers the examination on the relations between the American governments and France and Britain, he also includes an entire chapter on how other Europeans viewed the American Civil War, which shows the full extent of the international dimension of the conflict. Throughout the monograph, Mahin fulfills his purpose in constructing a comprehensive overview of foreign affairs in the Civil War.

In addition to providing an overview, Mahin states he wants to challenge the view of Lincoln’s role in foreign affairs. Primarily, he argues, Lincoln biographers and historians of the Civil War believe Lincoln ignored foreign affairs leaving these issues entirely to Seward. Yet, Mahin asserts that Lincoln’s “role in U.S. foreign relations was much more substantial and important than has been assumed by historians and biographers” (p. x). Yet, Mahin’s challenge seems to fall flat in his study. Although he provides a number of very interesting quotes from Lincoln on foreign relations, the evidence he implements does not fully support his claim. This, however, could provide a skeleton for future studies on Lincoln’s role in foreign affairs.

Mahin’s examination of the Americans’ reactions to the French Intervention in Mexico starting in 1862 is the most important effort of this monograph. Both the Union and Confederate governments had to keep a watchful eye on the French in Mexico throughout the conflict. This even led Lincoln to push further for a campaign into Texas to hopefully secure the border against any possible French invasions and to threaten the French with a united Union and Confederate effort against them if they did not abandon their attempt to establish a new empire. Although an important aspect of foreign affairs for both sides, most historians have overlooked the French Intervention and Union and Confederate reactions to it, which Mahin attempts to correct in this book.

Although a valuable tool and solid effort at creating a comprehensive overview of foreign relations during the Civil War, One War at a Time contains a number of problems. First, it is mainly based on printed primary sources and secondary works. Mahin incorporates little archival research and rehashes a number of arguments provided by previous studies. Second, since his challenge against previous Lincoln biographers falls short, he does not provide a clear picture of Lincoln’s influence over foreign affairs. Finally, although he attempts to incorporate both the Union and Confederate governments in his study, Mahin mainly centers on the Lincoln administration, dedicating only five out of twenty total chapters to the Confederacy’s diplomatic efforts. Despite these problems, Mahin’s study provides a solid base for future works on foreign affairs in the Civil War.

Mike Burns Texas Christian University

Dean B. Mahin. One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War. Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999. x + 342 pgs.

Among the various aspects of the War Between the States, the international dimensions of the conflict are certainly some of the least comprehensively chronicled. Assorted case studies, episodic narratives of many major events, and biographies of key shapers of foreign policy have been written; yet comprehensive overviews of foreign policy in the Civil War are largely lacking. As Dean B. Mahin points out, there have been major studies of Confederate foreign policy, most notably Frank Owsley’s classic King Cotton Diplomacy, as well as a few analyses of aspects of Union foreign diplomacy, but no comprehensive overview of both sides’ foreign policy and affairs in one convenient package. Addressing this historiographical gap is Mahin’s main goal. His secondary goal is to “assemble and evaluate all the available evidence on the international interests and roles of Abraham Lincoln (ix),” a particular aspect of the Union’s foreign affairs that according to the author has received mistreatment during the war itself and in the history books documenting it.

The author’s first goal is the most easily accomplished and generic. One War at a Time includes narratives and interpretations of Union and Confederate foreign policies, and the affairs of each nation in regards to Britain and France specifically. Mahin includes an introductory chapter each on both United States and Confederate foreign policy aims and strategies, summarizing what is already known about each. Union diplomacy consisted of Lincoln and Secretary of State William Seward’s policy of fighting only “one war at a time,” or avoiding the actuality of war with any European nation while actively using the bluff of possible war as a threat to deter European intervention in the Civil War. Confederate foreign policy aims consistently included seeking European diplomatic recognition by military victory and cotton shortage, just as consistent denial of foreign recognition. Britain looms large in eleven of the book’s eighteen chapters, which include standard narratives and analyses of episodes involving Britain in both Union and Confederate foreign policy, from the Trent affair, Confederate attempts at gaining recognition by diplomatic appeal and unofficial cotton blackmail, blockade running and privateering, armament shipments to the Confederacy, and British involvement in manufacturing and supplying of Confederate Navy warships. Mahin’s treatment of France is a most compelling aspect the work. His analysis of the French Intervention in Mexico during the American Civil War and the dramatic possibility of French intervention in the American conflict is a fresh departure away from the traditional ignorance of any intersection between the two wars, which should be further taken up by historians. Missing from the book is a critical analysis of the role of Russia in the foreign affairs, a player which seems more important than has often been recognized in the foreign affairs of the war. Notable, however, is the book’s fourteenth chapter, in which Mahin briefly describes the reactions of politicians and peoples of the German States, Russia, Austria, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland to the American Civil War.

Mahin’s most interesting contribution to the historiography of the Civil War is his treatment of Abraham Lincoln’s role in Union foreign policy. Mahin points out that while Lincoln has been the subject of scores of biographies, none “have painted a full and accurate portrait of the International Lincoln. (p.257)” Chapter eighteen defines Lincoln’s role in shaping Union foreign policy, which has traditionally been said to have been the domain of William Seward almost exclusively. To the contrary, Mahin uses original research in primary sources to argue that instead of leaving Seward to his own devices, Lincoln and his Secretary of State together “forged one of the most effective partnerships in the history of U.S. diplomacy. (p.258)” Mahin sees Lincoln not as an ignorant backwoodsman concerning foreign policy, as many of his European contemporaries did, but as an equal force with Seward in the formulation of Union foreign policy during the Civil War. This is a distinct departure from the traditional assumption that Lincoln essentially gave Seward free reign in determining Union foreign policy, which Mahin quite directly charges as incorrect. Conversely, Mahin’s analysis of Jefferson Davis’ role in Confederate foreign policy is shallow at best even when the author actually addresses the man, which is rare.

All things considered, One War at a Time has the most merit as an effective primer of foreign affairs and policy during the Civil War. First-time students of the Civil War could gain a great depth of the conflict as an international event in world history through a proper reading of the book. Mahin’s epilogues on the finale of the French intervention in Mexico and the “Alabama Claims” also adds an interesting depth and length beyond 1865 to his examination of a topic that has been poorly addressed in Civil War studies, even if his favorable analysis of the “international” Lincoln is a departure from the consensus view of Lincoln as a domestic president.

- Jonathan Jones

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One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War. By Dean B. Mahin. Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999.

Although embroiled in internal strife, the Union had to maintain an effective foreign policy throughout the American Civil War. Often scholars have written Abraham Lincoln off as concerned merely with domestic matters while Secretary of State William H. Seward dictated foreign policy with a free hand. In One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War Dean B. Mahin refutes the notion that Lincoln had little to do with diplomacy. Unfortunately, Mahin does not make the strongest case for this argument throughout the book; however, he does open doors for further research. One of the positives of this book is that it provides a brief overview of the United States’ entire diplomatic agenda during the Civil War, including that of Confederate agents. Although some portions may be erroneous, the general story does come to light.

As the major player in foreign affairs, Great Britain claims the most space within this volume. Here, one will find the often retold stories of Anglo-American diplomacy during the war. Beginning with Seward’s supposed boasts to British diplomats that the United States may benefit from a war with a European power, the book slowly moves toward the Trent Affair. The author provides nothing new to this story, but gives a competent rehashing of the capture of John Slidell and James Mason, along with the outcries from Lord Palmerston for redress. Outrage over the outfitting of commerce raiders – the next hill to cross for American diplomats trying to prevent war – is summed up primarily around the story of the C.S.S. Alabama. The reader may skip this lackluster chapter and pick up works by either Raimondo Luraghi or Frank Merli to satisfy their hunger for knowledge on the subject. Finally, after 1863, Mahin notes that Lincoln’s policies became more reconciliatory towards the British. Although Mahin seems to skip the fact that British/American relations were improving because the British began cracking down on Confederate shipbuilding and British courts began ruling favorably towards the Union in cases involving violations of the Foreign Enlistment Act.

Although Mahin has a questionable rehash of British/American relation, the reader will take away much from his overview of French relations. The author seems more concerned with the French invasion of Mexico, and creates an interesting picture of American diplomacy aimed at the southern border. When the French, Spanish, and British invaded Mexico in 1861 to force payment of debts, the French refused to leave with their allies, and subsequently marched upon Mexico City to overthrow Republican Benito Juarez. When Mexico City fell to Emperor Louis Napoleon’s troops, he installed Maximilian upon the throne of the Mexican Empire. Seward continually used firm terms with the French in order to pressure them to withdraw from Mexico. Additionally, the United States refused to recognize Maximilian’s government. However, Lincoln plays little part in these measures, he does insist on operations against Texas during the Civil War that would, if successful, help secure the border from possible French invasion.

The role of Lincoln in Foreign Policy is unclear throughout the book, although the author believes that he is painting a clear picture. What seems to remain constant is the Union policy of peace, unless pushed – or as the title suggests, “one war at a time” – which allows the United States to keep both Great Britain and France in check during the war. Whether or not this diplomacy came from the mind of Lincoln or Seward cannot be determined by what the author presents. By the way Mahin chooses to write two epilogues that recount Seward’s post-Lincoln diplomacy, which consist of a fifth of the book, one wonders if the author truly believes his own posturing about Lincoln’s roll in foreign affairs. Mahin does scour the sources for good Lincoln quotes that help prove that the President did look outside of the United States at various points in his administration. Unfortunately, this book does not seem to utilize many primary sources. The author has read many secondary works, and summarized their arguments, but has seemed to leave out much of the primary work needed to validate the claims he has made.

Still, Mahin’s attempt to piece together diplomacy during the Civil War can be beneficial to any student starting out in Civil War literature. He provides an interesting read and a general overview that one can build off of. Although his case for the “International Lincoln” – a Lincoln who was diplomatically wise and influential outside the United States – does not fully bloom, it will give scholars something to posit as they read this work.

Dan Vogel Texas Christian University

One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War. By Dean B. Mahin. (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 1999), 324 p.

There is an abundance of books whose focus is the Civil War. These works discuss everything from exact regiments and personal accounts to grand campaign studies. Sadly, one area that continues being overlooked, most likely due to the intrinsic nature of the war itself, is the international scope of the Civil War. Dean Mahin attempts to examine all areas of the international character of the Civil War with his work One War at a Time. His efforts are the result of a three year review of primary source materials and numerous secondary sources. A major goal of Mahin’s research was to assemble and evaluate all the available evidence on the interests and roles of Abraham Lincoln. Mahin contends that that evidence demonstrates Lincoln’s role in United States foreign relations was much more substantial and important than historians and biographers have assumed. Using all the sources at his disposal, the author constructs a well written, if at times tedious, study of the international aspect of the American Civil War.

The text discusses almost every facet of international dimension that the Civil War had an effect on. The work examines official relations between the United States and other countries; abortive efforts of the Confederate States of America to establish diplomatic relations with other nations; the reactions to the conflict in America by important groups (political and economic leaders) in foreign countries; the impact of the Union blockade on the cotton supply in Europe; the British roles in the blockade running system; the claims of retribution from the Union due to the Alabama; and American reactions to the French military intervention in Mexico.

The title of the book reflects the uncertainty Lincoln and William Seward, Lincoln’s secretary of state, deliberately created to serve their policy objectives. The phrase, “One war at a time”, was widely regarded during and after the war as Lincoln’s dictum for United States diplomacy. It indicated a strong desire to avoid a foreign war while the nation was embroiled in a great internal dispute, yet it also contained a threat that unacceptable actions by England and France could lead a war with the United States during or after the Civil War. It shows that both men were farsighted in their foreign policy and focused on not only the Southern states’ rebellion but also continental disputes that could eventually affect a strong re-united Union or a split, much weaker North American continent.

Mahin develops the international nature of the Civil War chronologically. While this makes sense in some respects, at times the text becomes tedious. In some areas, the author is simply providing more in-depth information to a point, which he earlier stated in some other part of the book. The style of the book might flow better had Mahin categorized all the issues pertaining to Britain, or France, or blockade running, or Mexico in separate chapters and developed the facets more fully in those chapters. The text also takes on a decided Union and European tone with much of the work focused on these participants. The Confederacy seems to be the tag-along in Mahin’s discourse. For the most part, the strength of the book lies in its discussions of the United States and its foreign relations with Britain and France. Despite this, there are merits to the work and it easily achieves its purpose of providing more in-depth knowledge of the international dimensions of the Civil War. The text also sheds new light on Lincoln’s interest and performance in the international arena of politics.

Mahin’s effort is a well-written and well-researched work on the different international aspects that affected and in turn found themselves affected by the civil war in the United States. A worthy entry into the abundant literature examining the Civil War, any student of the Civil War or discussions of diplomacy would do well to read this.

Halen J. Watkins