To the Gates of Richmond

To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. By Stephen W. Sears. (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. Pp. xii, 468).

By the spring of 1862, Union Major General George McClellan had overseen the formation of an enormous army on the outskirts of Washington, D.C. Known as the Army of the Potomac, McClellan’s forces stood ready to smash the rebellion and end the American Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln had been waiting since the previous November to see McClellan take his grand army into action. As the weeks ticked by with no action, Lincoln and his cabinet became increasingly disenchanted with the man the press had dubbed “the young Napoleon.” Finally in March, 1862, McClellan moved his army by water to Fort Monroe at the tip of a Virginia peninsula formed by the York and James Rivers. This movement initiated the Peninsula Campaign which had the goal of taking the Confederate capital at Richmond and defeating the Rebel forces in an American Waterloo. In To the Gates of Richmond, Stephen W. Sears examines the key events and personalities of the Peninsula Campaign and provides an engaging narrative of one the Civil War’s key events.

After landing at Fort Monroe, McClellan slowly moved his army into action as it crept up the peninsula towards Confederate positions at Yorktown. Possessing few troop in comparison to the Union force, the Confederates fooled McClellan into thinking that the Southerners had a massive army along the defensive line at Yorktown. McClellan delayed while he gathered troops for a siege thereby allowing the Confederates to reinforce their army on the Peninsula. Just as McClellan finished his siege preparations, Southern General Joseph Johnston decided to fight closer to Richmond and withdrew his army. Thus, the Union Army took Yorktown without a fight but had suffered a large delay which allowed the Confederates to amass a formidable army around Richmond. McClellan slowly approached the new Southern position at Richmond exasperating Lincoln with his slow progress. More aggressive than the Union commander, Johnston launched an attack against one wing of the Federal force at the crossroads of Seven Pines in late May. Poorly coordinated and cursed by miscommunication, the attack failed but convinced McClellan to further delay his attack on Richmond while he amassed supplies and strengthened his lines.

General Robert E. Lee replaced Johnston as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia and immediately began planning to launch an attack against McClellan. In a series of battles known as the Seven Days Battles from June 25 to July 1, Lee and McClellan led their forces in a vicious fight for the Confederate capital. Lee’s army won some of the battles and lost others but managed to penetrate the Union lines and force McClellan to retreat to bases further down along the James River. Disgusted with McClellan’s performance, Lincoln sent General Henry Halleck, chief of all Union armies, to review the situation on the Peninsula. Eventually, Halleck ordered the Union army to withdraw from the Peninsula and prepare to renew the war in Northern Virginia despite vigorous protests from McClellan. McClellan chose to believe that enemies in Washington, not his dismal performance, had undermined his Peninsula Campaign.

Sears conducted thorough research on the battle using personal papers, official records, diaries and published memoirs. Managing the large volume of material very effectively, Sears crafted an entertaining and informative account of the Peninsula battles. His portrayal of the major commanders is particularly interesting. McClellan had few peers when it came to training an army, but his nature proved too cautious to be an effective field commander. He wasted opportunities and did not seize and maintain the offensive initiative. In addition, McClellan spent more time massaging his public relations and spewing invective at his enemies than studying his mistakes and learning from them. Johnston proved more aggressive than McClellan but he also showed a propensity to retreat until backed against Richmond. At Seven Pines, he crafted a complicated battle plan and failed to properly coordinate and communicate with his subordinate commanders. Unfortunately for the Confederates, he would display these traits again at Atlanta in 1864. Obviously, Lee emerges with a more solid reputation but Sears does not spare the legendary commander from criticism. During the Seven Days, Lee had to learn how to manage a large army. Despite problems with inept subordinates and a complicated battle plan, Lee learned from his mistakes and efficiently prepared his army for future battles.

Overall, Sears has written an excellent book on the Peninsula Campaign. It covers the events thoroughly without drowning the reader in detail. This work would be ideal for anyone who needs an introduction to the battles as well as for Civil War experts who need a refresher.

Johnny Spence Texas Christian University

To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign. By Stephen W. Sears. New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992.

Perhaps no other campaign said as much about its chief architect as did the Peninsula Campaign about Union General George McClellan. From the beginning, McClellan – self-styled a Young Napoleon – planned “to lead his grand army…toward his vision of an American Waterloo” (9). By marching down the Virginia Peninsula with a large and perfectly-drilled force, McClellan could lay siege to the Confederate capital – Richmond – and, indeed, to the Confederacy’s very hopes for survival. As the campaign crumbled in July 1862 due largely to his consistently “hallucinatory” overestimation of his enemy’s strength, McClellan not only lost this opportunity for an historic strike at Richmond but also his command of the Army of the Potomac.

The Young Napoleon planned his campaign’s first great strike for the Confederate stronghold of Yorktown. While in truth the Union army greatly outnumbered the defenders under John Magruder, Sears credits Magruder’s “play-actors” for inducing McClellan’s timidity. Faking desertion, they told Pinkerton interrogators that the Confederates had as many as 100,000 men at Yorktown; this was the first of many times in the campaign that McClellan relied on faulty intelligence to rationalize his own worst fears. Never more than half that number, the Confederates withdrew on 3 May, just as McClellan was finalizing the placement of his siege guns. As in March, when Joe Johnston slipped away unchecked from his overextended position at Manassas, McClellan’s lack of a plan for pursuit cost him a key tactical opportunity.

According to Sears, his mistakes did not end there. At the Battle of Williamsburg on 5 May, McClellan left the field action to his underlings while he personally micromanaged the loading of a division onto their riverboat transports. This almost inexplicable trend continued throughout the campaign. Even so, by 9 May McClellan’s presence had forced Johnston to retreat to within twenty miles of Richmond, and on the 11^th the Union gained unfettered access to the York River with the destruction of the Merrimack. As McClellan massed his forces and planned for a traditional siege on Richmond, General “Stonewall” Jackson’s renewed offensive in the Shenandoah Valley forced Lincoln to demand McClellan either attack Richmond or return to defend Washington; while Sears clearly does not subscribe to the theory, this gave McClellan another reason to believe Lincoln conspired toward his failure.

Yet, McClellan chose to carry forth; meanwhile, wounded by shrapnel at Seven Pines, Johnston bowed out of command to be replaced by Robert E. Lee. Next followed the “Seven Days” of the campaign that determined its outcome. Sears implies McClellan stood little chance for success with plans fundamentally premised, as at Yorktown, on the erroneous assumption that he faced a foe greatly outnumbering his own. On 25 June, McClellan gained 600 yards of territory at the cost of over 1,000 casualties at the Battle of Oak Grove. The following day, Confederate errors (A.P. Hill’s impatience and, especially, Stonewall Jackson’s inexplicable tardiness in bringing his army south to join Lee’s flank) gave McClellan a nominal victory at Mechanicsville. Thereafter, Magruder’s innovative, theatric demonstrating convinced McClellan that his was the strength – though in truth it was the weakness – of the Confederate line; thus, McClellan mistakenly thrust forward into the costliest battle of the entire campaign. At Gaines’s Mill, over 96,000 personnel joined the combat, and although McClellan’s defeat was costly it could have been catastrophic. Sears again raises Jackson as missing-in-action; had his force appeared on the battlefield in timely fashion, they might have rolled up the Union flank and cut the Army of the Potomac in two.

Convinced – typically – that his force lacked the numbers for a continued assault on Richmond, the Young Napoleon again determined he should “change his base” – or, retreat – to the York River. By 30 June, Robert E. Lee clearly possessed the initiative and at Glendale and White Oak Bridge again might have split McClellan’s force. Sears blames equally Jackson’s uncharacteristic timidity and Lee’s all too characteristic ambiguity in issuing orders. This cost the Confederates again on 1 July at Malvern Hill, the final battle of the Seven Days. Lee’s ambiguity led to misunderstood and misinterpreted orders, and then to a near-catastrophically disorganized assault on the strong Union batteries on the high ground. Although Lee had repulsed the threat on Richmond, it cost him 22 percent of his Army of Northern Virginia. McClellan lost over 30,000 small arms and 40 artillery pieces but – in a show of his vanity – saved his personal printing press. This campaign forced Lincoln to replace McClellan atop the Army of the Potomac, and allowed Lee to determine where the war in this theater next turned. Yet, both results came at high costs, and the war’s outcome ultimately hinged on which side might replenish such losses.

In his book, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign, Stephen Sears recounts the largest and most complex campaign of the American Civil War. The Peninsula Campaign introduced two of the Civil War’s most significant leaders—George B. McClellan and Robert E. Lee—to their first experience with large scale combat operations. In evaluating these leaders, Sears goes beyond accessing decision-making and leadership skills. He attempts to understand their character and personality, and determine how these attributes affected their actions on the battlefield. In this regard, Sears focuses more on McClellan whom he believes should have achieved greater results from the magnificent army he created and brought into combat. McClellan’s concept and initial actions were bold and well executed. Yet when he made contact with the enemy, McClellan's powers seemed to abandon him and he ceased being a strong leader. His decision-making skills became erratic and his ability to interpret intelligence information—never particularly good—completely failed him.

After weeks of planning and political maneuvering in Washington, McClellan and Lincoln finally agreed on a plan for offensive action during March 1862. Their intent was to move McClellan’s army to Fort Monroe on the peninsula for a drive against Richmond from the southeast. Concern for the security of Washington caused Lincoln to withhold Irvin McDowell’s first corps, causing consternation for McClellan. The loss of McDowell’s corps coupled with inaccurate intelligence which overstated the strength of Confederate forces, caused the already cautious McClellan to resort to a form of siege warfare against Yorktown and John B. Magruder’s defensive line. As McClellan dallied, the Confederates continued to strengthen their position on the peninsula and consolidate their forces into the Army of Northern Virginia under command of Joseph E. Johnston. When McClellan attacked the Confederate positions on May 3, Magruder slipped away leaving the Yankees with an empty bag.

As Johnston began his retrograde movement from Yorktown, he feared Union forces getting behind him by moving up the York or Pamunkey Rivers. He therefore conducted a fighting retreat allowing him to keep Union forces engaged while maintaining his movement into defenses around Richmond. The result was a series of sharp engagements including the battles of Williamsburg, Eltham’s Landing, and Hanover Court House. On May 11, the Confederate navy destroyed the much-vaunted Merrimack to ensure it did not fall in Union hands, and lost control of the James River up to Drewry’s bluff. Despite the fact that Johnston now had his army closer to Richmond where he had always wanted it, his options were more constrained in both time and space. Robert E. Lee did not like the situation on the peninsula nor the threat poised by Union forced from the direction of Fredericksburg and Washington. In Sears’s words:

As Lee viewed the strategic situation, the most immediate and most dangerous threat posed by this combination of enemy forces was an advance southward from Fredericksburg by McDowell’s corps to join McClellan before Richmond. Possibly Banks might join this advance, or at least reinforce it. Should this happen, the odds against Joe Johnston would lengthen alarmingly and the chances of holding Richmond would diminish accordingly. Lee’s sole weapon to prevent this from happening was Stonewall Jackson’s little Army of the Valley.[1]

The strategic role that Lee envisioned suited the aggressive Jackson very well. It would start him on the path to immortality, and begin one of the most successful leadership teams in the history of warfare. In time, Lincoln would see through this strategic ploy. But it provided just enough Union hesitation to free Johnston’s hand on the Richmond front.

Having isolated the battlefield from outside reinforcement, Lee had set the stage for the Army of Northern Virginia to strike a blow against McClellan. At just this juncture, McClellan presented Johnston with the opportunity he had been seeking. The Army of the Potomac set astride the Chickahominy while Johnston’s force was concentrated for action. Johnston acted with boldness in attacking McClellan’s left on the near side of the river, on May 31, 1862. This initiated the Battle of Seven Pines also known as the Battle of Fair Oaks in the North. Although the attack enjoyed some initial success, it fell short of expectations. Due to poor leadership by his subordinate commanders, unclear operational orders, and his own lack of direct involvement, Johnston’s plan miscarried from the first. Johnston himself suffered severe wounds at the end of the first day of fighting, and command fell to the most senior officer present, Gustavus W. Smith. Smith attempted to continue the fighting the second day, but it was a pathetic effort bringing no advantage to the southerners. Except for the courage and determination exhibited by individual soldiers, neither side demonstrated much skill during the Battle of Seven Pines. The most significant result of the battle was the appointment of Robert E. Lee to command the Army of Northern Virginia.

After the Battle of Seven Pines, both Lee and McClellan reorganized their forces and conducted intensive planning for the upcoming battle for Richmond. McClellan planned to conduct an “active defense” and gradually reduce Richmond through siege warfare. Lee conducted an aggressive intelligence gathering campaign and concluded that a strike north of the Chickahominy would turn McClellan’s flank and drive him from the environs of the city. The famous reconnaissance in which Jeb Stuart rode completely around McClellan’s army and the reinforcement of Jackson in the valley constituted preliminary elements to this offensive, known as the Seven Days Battle. McClellan initiated the first day of action at Oak Grove in an attempt to improve his position for the siege of Richmond. Lee struck the next day, June 26, in a series of disjointed attacks on McClellan’s right flank in the area of Mechanicsville. Lee’s initial battle as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia proved a tactical failure, due to Fitz John Porter’s triumphant defense of Beaver Dam Creek. Contributing to this defeat was Stonewall Jackson’s failure to arrive and give battle according to Lee’s expectations. McClellan at first rejoiced, but later wavered as he learned that Jackson’s army had not been on the field during the day. Although successful on both June 25 and 26, McClellan feared he had lost the initiative and began to waiver in his determination. The next morning, McClellan and Porter evacuated their positions on Beaver Dam Creek.

On June 27, Lee resumed his attack with the help of Stonewall Jackson who, at last, arrived for battle at 10:00 a.m. By about 1:00 p.m. Porter’s V Corps had established strong positions near Gaines’s Mill as Lee’s army moved into position for an assault. A.P Hill conducted attacks against Porter’s Corps throughout much of the day but Jackson moved slowly and failed to support these attacks until late in the day. Just as the light of day began to fade, Jackson and his army arrived in force and joined the attack against Porter’s compact and strong defenses. Lee’s renewed attack pounded Porter’s line all across the front with the entire force that Lee had north of the Chickahominy. Finally, as night started to settle over the field, the Union line broke and the Confederates begin driving the Yankees from the field. Gaines’s Mill proved to be the largest and costliest battle of the entire Peninsula campaign and was a major defeat for McClellan. Had Jackson arrived on the field earlier allowing Lee to mount his full strength attack at 3:00 rather than 7:00, McClellan’s defeat would likely have been a true military disaster. As it turned out, McClellan and Porter were able to get part of the V Corps across the Chickahominy as Lee contemplated the next move. There followed several days of pursuit punctuated by the battles of Savage Station and Glendale. At the Battle of Glendale, Lee came close to his goal of destroying the Army of the Potomac. But at the crucial moment, he was unable to bring enough forces to bear and the opportunity escaped him. Ultimately, McClellan got his army across White Oak Swamp without significant additional loss and into concentrated defensive positions at Malvern Hill.

The Battle of Malvern Hill started as an artillery duel and ended in a series of bloody assaults that progressed without effective coordination. It was clearly a battle that Lee did not intend to fight in the manner in which it developed. Lee had not yet come to know his army or the capabilities of its leaders. Neither had he established the communications systems needed to ensure a victory. Despite his bloody repulse at Malvern Hill, it is hard to fault Lee after considering all the circumstances. McClellan ordered his army to continue its retreat into a strategic enclave at Harrison’s Landing. In seven days, Lee had driven the Army of the Potomac from the gates of Richmond to the protection of Union gunboats. As Lee’s pursuit closed in on McClellan’s army at Harrison’s Landing, it was clear that he could not attack to advantage. The Army of the Potomac remained at Harrison’s Landing in miserable conditions for nearly two months and then ingloriously evacuated giving up the peninsula campaign. In Sears’s words:

So a new campaign began and the Peninsula campaign came to an end. For Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia it ended with victory and Richmond delivered. For George B. McClellan and the Army of the Potomac it ended in defeat and ignominious retreat. From the first arrival of the Federals at Fort Monroe on March 20 to their final evacuation on August 26, the campaign lasted 160 days, or five months and one week. In that time some 250,000 men participated in it, on land and at sea (and in the air), more than any other single campaign of the Civil War. In volume of war material too it was unmatched.[2]

Sears points out that the Seven Days Battle was a learning experience for both Robert Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee never faulted any of his subordinates for shortcomings or failures during the battle, although there were many. Lee accepted full responsibility for the performance of his army. But Lee did take note of the capabilities and weaknesses in his officers and the army itself. He took strong and quick action to correct deficiencies. He replaced general officers who he did not consider adequate, and structured the organization and training of his army for the battles to come.

Stephen Sears’s assessment of this campaign and its leaders is one of balance and integrity. He does not shy from criticism, yet he offers it in an analytical manner without evidence of personal bias. He explains the complexity of the campaign, and its battles, in a way that permits the reader to appreciate the ambiguities and difficulties facing the commanders. Reading To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign will not change commonly accepted perceptions of such leaders as McClellan, Johnston, Porter, Magruder, and Lee. But it does clarify the difficulties they faced and the personal qualities they brought to the struggle. It is easy to sympathize with their difficulties, even while recognizing their imperfections as combat leaders.

[1] Stephen W. Sears. To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1992). 97.