Richmond Redeemed

Richmond Redeemed: The Siege at Petersburg. By Richard J. Sommers (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981. Pp. xxiii + 670. Maps. Illustrations. Appendices. Bibliography. Index.).

No event in the Civil War has been given recent scrutiny on the same level as the Siege of Petersburg. Novels and films such as Charles Frazier’s book and film Cold Mountain, MacKinlay Kantor’s Pulitzer Prize winning Andersonville, and Jeff Shaara’s Last Full Measure all have brought the Siege of Petersburg into the popular conscious. Yet the longest continuous siege of the Civil War remains a mystery to many and a historical footnote to historians. True, the Confederate Army did defend the city of Petersburg under the most trying of circumstances, but the Federal Army ultimately broke the siege and captured Petersburg and Richmond, leading to Robert E Lee’s surrender in southwestern Virginia in April of 1865. Even though the Confederate defenses broke, the episode deserves study and reverence, given the horrifying conditions endured by both the besieging and the besieged armies. Richard Sommers capably and tediously sorts out the mystery in his magisterial and encyclopedic Richmond Redeemed.

The siege of Petersburg began in June of 1864. The more sensational episodes of the Siege of Petersburg (such as the Battle of the Crater) occurred that same summer in 1864. Sommer’s work is actually the history of one of ten Union attempts to break the siege. In September and October of 1864 Ulysses Grant launched his fifth assault on the trenches surrounding Petersburg. Although the action does not merit a particularly memorable historical name, Chafin’s Bluff, one of the smaller engagements within the Union offensive, has retained a measure of fame throughout the years.

Sommer’s book is a military history in the strictest sense of the word. He describes in minute detail the compositions and dispositions of the opposing armies. He gives excellent biographies of the two supreme commanders (Lee and Grant) and their subordinates. Sommer also includes biographies and service outlines for lesser-known Federal and Confederate generals. Confederate cavalry commander Wade Hampton III figures prominently in the battles and Sommers takes the time to explain his considerable contribution to the Confederate defense. The intellectual realty of military history is expounded upon in great detail and Sommers’ profile of the generals fighting ability anchors much of the book. Robert Lee emrges as a audacious general, and Grant receives traditional press as a consistent although not brilliant general; Grant’s willingness to fight hard is expressed in Sommer’s work quite nicely. Strategy and tactics are not ignored (we learn, for example, that the Confederate army relies on railroad lines to escape; the Federal armies objectives include cutting the same railroads). The Federal strategy was to move from the eastern reaches of Petersburg west, surrounding the South side of the city. A key component of the strategy was Grant’s decision to divide his army and to fight the Confederates with two wings or prongs. On several occasions Federal troops overran the Confederate lines; on more than one occasion they came very close to entering the city of Petersburg.

The book’s title comes from Sommer’s assertion that in the fall of 1864 the Federal army’s inability to break through totally (they did break through on several occasions) allowed the Confederate state to rally. The Confederates redeemed Richmond and the war lasted for another six months. Sommer’s argument (if you can find a true argument in a book that feels for like a dictionary of the Petersburg Campaign) is orthodox; if the Federals had broken through in the fall of 1864, the War would have certainly ended then.

The military historiography of the Civil War is massive, so any book begs the questions: Why is it necessary? Richmond Redeemed justifies its own existence by the caliber of its author and ostensibly whom the book is written for. Richard Sommers was the historian in residence at the Carlisle Barracks, the site of the prestigious Army War College. Sommers’ book could easily be used in a military environment. The comprehensive and detailed treatment of the Federal offensive during the fall of 1864 will interest military intellectuals and Civil War scholars.

Miles Smith Texas Christian University

Richmond Redeemed: The Siege at Petersburg. By Richard J. Sommers. Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1981, ix-449.

In Richmond Redeemed, Richard J. Sommers gives a detailed account of General Ulysses’ S. Grant’s Fifth Offensive. In applying his tactics, Grant sought to weaken General Robert E. Lee’s defenses around Petersburg and Richmond. From September 29^th through October 2^ndin1864, Grant looked for ways to secure Richmond for the Union. Lee, his subordinate generals, and his troops successfully defended these cities. Although Richmond was eventually captured by the Union in April of 1865, in 1864, this outcome was not guaranteed. Sommers believes that Generals Grant and Lee were both shortsighted when planning their strategies. Sommers contends that Lee spent too much time when he attempted to retake Fort Harrison. Sommers further believes that Grant should have looked for other opportunities to weaken Lee’s forces. By attacking cities beneath Petersburg, Sommers feels that Grant would have been assured other victories. Because Grant failed to take Richmond, Sommers shows that the Confederacy’s capital, for a time, was out of danger. (1-449).

At times, Sommers gives an understanding of the Union’s first attempts to secure Richmond for the Union. Before Grant commanded the Army of the Potomac, General George B. McClellan sought to take Richmond in 1862. McClellan lacked confidence in his ability to command his troops and in his capability for formulating successful strategies. McClellan failed to take the Confederacy’s capital. Despite his failings, Sommers notes that McClellan had the look of a general, and his men deeply respected him and continually supported him. Although McClellan received resounding approval from his troops, General Grant commanded a different form of attention from his men. Grant did not resemble a commander, and his men did not vocally praise him, in the ways that they had done for McClellan. According to Sommers, “Grant initially encountered only silence. But it was the silence of deepest respect as the [Black] brigade of the X Corps stood in awe before their chieftain. ‘As soon as Grant was known to be approaching … every man was on his feet & quiet, breathless quiet, prevailed. A cheer could never express what we felt’” (75, from Henry Brown’s October 5, 1864 Letter).

Throughout his study, Sommers seeks to understand the presence of black Union soldiers. Sommers demonstrates that the North began to rely on these brigades of black troops more frequently. Although the formation of corps of black troops were becoming commonplace, Sommers notes that Southerners usually sought to kill and severely injure these soldiers.

Because Grant’s strategy afforded him no decisive wins, Sommers notes that Grant began to lack faith in his Fifth Offensive. On October 2^nd, he reasoned that other measures were needed to aid him in weakening Petersburg and were required before he could take Richmond. Sommers believes that Lee won slight victories during the siege around Petersburg. According to Sommers, “The Fifth Offensive had shown once more that Lee sought to make his own fate. No matter how dire the threat, he fought bravely, skillfully, and unyieldingly to hold on to his capital and its rail center. Hold them he did.” (449)

Because his book predominantly covers Grant’s Fifth Offensive, Sommers sometimes loses the reader in the details. A military historian and employed as an archivist for the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Sommers, obviously knows a great deal about the Union’s attempts to weaken Petersburg and Richmond. Thankfully, Sommers sometimes reiterates his points, so the reader understands the main events that transpired in 1864. Sommers notes that Grant, as a general, was accustomed to winning. He especially was victorious in his campaigns to liberate Tennessee in the Western theater. While in the Eastern theater, Grant soon realized that taking Richmond and defeating the Confederacy would be more difficult than he originally believed. (418-449).