And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860–1861. By Kenneth M. Stampp. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950. pp. xi, 331.
In the aftermath of Abraham Lincoln’s election in November 1860, seven southern states seceded and created the Confederate States of America. By April 1861, tensions had grown to the point where reconciliation became impossible for the two sections, resulting in the American Civil War. Kenneth M. Stampp follows northerners’ reactions to southern secession and the early stages toward Civil War in his monograph And the War Came. Primarily a narrative presentation of the Secession Winter of 1860–1861, Stampp provides an interesting perspective on how northerners perceived the election of Lincoln, subsequent southern secession, and politicians’ failures at reuniting the two sections through compromise. Based on an array of primary sources of personal correspondences, newspapers, and memoirs, Stampp shows that northern ideology, southern distrust of northerners, and both sections’ interpretation of the Constitution pushed the nation into the Civil War.
Although one can find this argument throughout Stampp’s book, he does not provide a single overall thesis for his work. Instead, he attempts to use his narrative to illustrate “why the war came, especially why Northerners were unwilling to acquiesce in disunion” (p. vii). Starting with Lincoln’s election and ending with the reaction to the firing on Fort Sumter, Stampp follows the political debates in the North to answer this question. Throughout the nineteenth century, political, economic, and social differences, Stampp suggests, had created an atmosphere of distrust and anger between North and South. With this constant pressure on politicians to fight for the betterment of their individual sections, the differences between them intensified, which pushed Southerners into secession once Lincoln, a representative of an unapologetically Northern-biased party, had become president.
Once South Carolina seceded in December 1860, Northerners responded in three stages. First, with some exceptions, Northerners hoped to compromise to save the union, even including supporting the Constitutional protection of slavery through the Thirteenth Amendment. This included a number of President James Buchanan’s cabinet members and general in chief of the U.S. Army Winfield Scott. After South Carolinians fired on the Union supply ship the Star of the West in Charleston Harbor in January 1861, Northerners split into two groups of support. One group believed the federal government should allow the Southern states to leave the union peacefully. This included Union forces abandoning Fort Sumter, Fort Pickens, and other coastal fortifications, which Major Robert Anderson supported, in an attempt to avoid bloodshed. Others pushed for a military response believing that the Constitution forbade secession once the states ratified it. Lincoln’s attempt to resupply Fort Sumter and the subsequent bombardment of the fort, however, ended this separation and caused Northerners in general to back military intervention.
Through his narrative, Stampp challenges a number of assumptions that historians had about the Secession Crisis prior to his publication. For example, he questions the arguments against James Buchanan’s actions as a lame-duck president. Where previous historians argued that Buchanan had failed the United States in the aftermath of secession, Stampp believes Buchanan followed a responsive policy that prevented war, avoided further movements of disunion, and would have forced the Confederates into the role of aggressor in any early military actions. This provides an interesting perspective on Buchanan’s administration during the Secession Winter and challenges the standard interpretation of Buchanan’s character as president.
Although Stampp indicates slavery as central to nineteenth-century sectionalism early in his study, he primarily overlooks the “peculiar institution” in his ensuing discussion. Instead, he treats slavery as an outlier in the sectional debates and mainly focuses on the political and economic debates that occurred rather than the moral conflict that emerged between abolitionists and slaveholders. In his conclusion, he returns to the issue, but downplays the centrality of Union victory to the freed slaves in the war’s aftermath. This weakness, however, indicates the era in which the book was published rather than an extension of the author’s ignorance.
Despite being dated, And the War Came still contributes to our understanding of the Secession Winter of 1860–1861. Stampp’s perspective on Buchanan complicates the common understanding of his time as a lame duck president and his arguments built a foundation for future works on the Secession Crisis. For those interested in nineteenth century Northern politics and public and political reactions to Southern secession, Stampp’s book provides an excellent overview.
Mike Burns
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861. By Kenneth M. Stampp. (Louisiana State University Press, 1950. Pp. viii, 331.)
Kenneth M. Stampp’s And the War Came is a fascinating and detailed narrative of the Northern reaction to the Secession Crisis from November 1860 to April 1861. Drawing upon a wide variety of primary source materials, Stampp demonstrates that the Civil War was not the unavoidable and determined fate of the Secession Crisis, but rather was a decision arrived at after a long process of deliberation, political debate, and failed attempts to bring about a compromise. Although he is careful to note the existence of exceptions, Stampp demonstrates the progression of Northern sentiment from an attitude of patient conciliation and compromise towards one of general support for military coercion. Further, he underscores the numerous social, political, and economic reasons that motivated this transformation, concluding that Northern economic interests played the defining role in moving the country towards the conflict. While now being somewhat dated, And the War Came continues to represent a significant contribution to our understanding of the causes and meaning of the American Civil War, as well as being a vital component of the subject’s long historiography.
Skillfully written in narrative fashion, the book begins with the election of Lincoln and culminates with the first shots of the Civil War at Fort Sumter. Stampp counters the argument that the war was created by the propaganda created by Northern and Southern agitators by suggesting that the war was the result of differing viewpoints regarding the economic implications of slavery. Following a brief discussion of the general attempts to remedy the crisis, Stampp outlines the compelling Constitutional arguments both for and against secession. He ably demonstrates that the questions over the constitutionality of secession were both unclear and confusing, marked by significant arguments both for and against the different points of view. This discussion of the complexity of the constitutionality of secession undergirds the book’s argument by making plain the fact that war and coercion were, by no means, the only possible outcome of the crisis.
Throughout the book, Stampp discusses three possible solutions to the Secession Crisis: political compromise and reconciliation, peaceful separation, and coercion. Stampp skillfully details the failed attempts of Northern politicians to effect a compromise. While he is generally unfavorable towards such efforts, Stampp praises the ineffective efforts of James Buchanan to preserve the Union during his last months in office. As the efforts toward compromise and reconciliation failed, some like William H. Seward and Major Robert Anderson hoped and even pushed for a peaceful separation of the two entities. But as Stampp notes, Lincoln, in particular, and the Northern public, in general, opposed the idea of peaceful separation and became increasingly convinced of the need for coercive measures. According to Stampp, these considerations were highly motivated by a consideration of the North’s economic self-interests and the potential disaster that the loss of the South would mean for the Northern economy. Even as Lincoln moved the nation toward coercive measures, however, he was insistent that the South fire the initial shots, thus justifying a military response.
Although highly informative, the book treats slavery as something of a secondary topic, rather than the critical issue of the Secession Crisis. While slavery is frequently spoken of throughout the book, it is viewed mainly as the vehicle for the economic and political differences that separated the North and the South, rather than a moral divider and a justification for the war. At the end of the book, Stampp concludes that, “Among the masses of Americans there were no victors, only the vanquished,” a sentiment which most slaves would likely have disputed (298). Such a statement is clearly reflective of Stampp’s pre-Civil Rights Movement world, providing a stark contrast to contemporary thoughts on the long-term meaning and importance of the Civil War. While economic and political reasons played a crucial role in the conflict, Stampp undervalues the importance of slavery in the road to the Civil War.
Despite this periodized deficiency, however, And the War Came is an important contribution to the historiography of the Secession Crisis. The book’s vast array of sources, particularly its exhaustive use of newspaper articles, allows the reader to gain a detailed understanding of the events of the crisis and the attitudes that shaped Northern observers. While the insights into Northern thought tend to exclude the views of regular Americans in favor of the views of politicians and social elites, the are woven together into a fascinating narrative that deepens our understanding of how the country arrived at the crisis that began at Fort Sumter.
Brett D. Dowdle
Stampp, Kenneth M. And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950.
Kenneth Stampp argues that the North’s policy during the secession crisis evolved from inactivity to proactive resolve to enforce federal laws in the South and preserve the Union. Northern attitudes toward secession changed as sectional tensions intensified during the five months between the election of Lincoln in November 1860 and the outbreak of war at Fort Sumter. Sidestepping the question of whether or not the civil war was inevitable, Stampp examines northern reaction to southern secession in order to understand why the war came. Relying on newspapers, personal papers of politicians, and government documents, And War Came outlines the key developments and debates that emerged in the months following Lincoln’s election. During this period of congressional impotence and stalemate in the sectional crisis, northern policymakers increasingly came to terms with the need for decisive action to maintain the Union. Lincoln, during his inauguration, expressed the North’s decision to deny the South a peaceful separation. Stampp organizes his book chronologically, identifying the origins of sectional conflict and tracing the development of Northern policy. Key themes in the book include the failure of compromise and the unwillingness of the North to accept disunion.
Stampp begins with an overview of the long history of sectional hate, rooted in sectional differences, and the early northern responses to southern threats of secession. He skillfully analyzes the importance of how each side understood key terms and concepts. For example, it was important for the North to engage in a defensive war. Northerners, therefore, framed southern actions like the occupation of forts and arsenals as acts of aggression. Furthermore, the North conceptualized its policy towards the South in terms of enforcement of laws rather than coercion. Initially, the North responded to southern threats of secession by remaining calm and avoiding further provocation of southern disunionists. Stampp opines that advocates of “masterly inactivity,” including President Buchanan and Republican William Seward, misunderstood and overestimated the strength of unionist sentiment in the South. As a result, the approach of passively waiting for the crisis to blow over ultimately failed.
The core of the book deals with the various attempts to compromise during the secession winter of 1861 and examines the reasons why unionists were unwilling to let the South secede. President James Buchanan, like many others, was torn between southern sympathies and unionist ideals and he continued to pursue “masterly inactivity.” Moderate Republicans, meanwhile, were especially eager to find a compromise with southerners. Stampp shows, however, that the compromise rhetoric was little more than a ruse, concluding that, “At best the work of northern compromisers was superficial; at worst it was fraudulent” (158). Northerners sought a compromise based on their own terms, and were frustrated that southern terms were equally one-sided. Stampp suggests that, in the end, a compromise between unionists and disunionists was highly unlikely.
A central question that Stampp attempts to answer is why the North was unwilling to let the South secede, a seemingly peaceful solution to the sectional crises. In two insightful chapters, “Yankees Take Stock,” and “Components of a Crusade,” Stampp outlines the practical and ideological reasons that the North was determined to save the Union. Westerners and many Northerners believed the secession of the South would mean the dissolution of the rest of the Union. Northern capitalists believed disunion threatened their property and future profits. Finally, Republicans worried that secession would destabilize their party.
In addition to economic and political factors, Stampp explores the ideological reasons for preserving the Union, observing that “Economic motives…were translated, unconsciously perhaps, into such elusive or romantic concepts as ‘national interest’ and ‘Manifest Destiny’” (239). Issues like patriotism, the destruction of slavery, or bringing “civilization” to the South motivated some northerners. Lincoln, initially a supporter of “masterly inactivity,” increasingly favored a belligerent approach. His speeches around his inauguration in March 1861 crystallized the sentiments of many northerners. He rejected outright peaceful disunion and compromise, making enforcement of the laws and preserving the Union central to the North’s response to secession. After Lincoln’s inauguration, Stampp observes that all that was needed to initiate civil war was a single provocative incident, and that occurred at Fort Sumter in April. Northern policymakers, who had for so long supported inactivity, rallied behind Lincoln. Stampp concludes that no organized opposition to the war existed in the North because the Union was able to engage in a defensive war against southern aggression.
Stampp’s monograph is an informative analysis of northern attitudes during the critical months preceding the outbreak of war. And War Came is narrative driven, and Stampp excels in describing the animated political debates of the period. He offers particularly poignant observation of the failure of compromise during the sectional crisis.
Jennifer Branscombe Texas Christian University
Kenneth M. Stampp. And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861. Louisiana State University Press, 1950.
Kenneth M. Stampp looks at the American sectional conflict through the northern reaction to southern secession in And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 1860-1861. Here Stampp focuses on the five months between the election of Abraham Lincoln and the attack on Fort Sumter. During this period all the issues which had divided the sections for a generation were intensified in a way that brought on a tragic climax. In the end, the majority of Northerners accepted this crisis as a final struggle for power against their southern rivals.
Stampp argues that there is some truth to the idea that the propaganda of northern and southern agitators, distorting public opinion, eventually brought on the disunion and war. Still, before a war could be waged, there remained a necessity to mold mental attitudes. More than that, beneath all of the propaganda existed the issue of slavery. Without such an institution there could have been no proslavery or antislavery agitators and no division on the issues of the extension of slavery into new territory. He goes on to argue that the attack on slavery by northerners was a logical product of the nineteenth century liberal capitalism. On the other hand, the southern defense of slavery by planters concerned about both their profits and capital investment, was also understandable. Other economic differences combined with the issue of slavery added to the sectional hatred.
In the beginning Republicans attributed secession to nothing more than a rumor created by Democrats in an effort to discredit the Republicans, forcing them to abandon their principles. During the first weeks of the crisis the idea in the North to do nothing remained popular. According to this plan the North should remain calm, avoid anything that could cause further irritation, wait for the South to regain its senses, and encourage the growth of the Unionist reaction which northerners believed would inevitably take place. Most only held onto this plan for the first six weeks after the election, although some stuck with it until near the end.
Others in the North looked toward the remedy of compromise. They hoped that “the issue could be evaded once again by ‘reasonable and honorable’ concessions.” (21) As the Democrats took on the role of “Unionsavers,” a minority of Republicans became ready to support moderate concessions. Still, whether northerners intended to compromise or not according to Stampp, southerners were not. Those who favored prompt and unqualified disunion were in power in the Deep South. The votes for delegates to state conventions showed that these men spoke for the majority of their constituents. “By its own acts the southern party in the sectional dispute had taken a stand against conciliation.” (136) During this winter, northern compromisers often showed enthusiasm for concessions on matters that had no direct bearing upon their interests but remained less enthusiastic about those issues that touched them closely.
Lincoln reacted to the secession movement like many other Republicans. From Springfield he revealed only fleeting glimpses of his thoughts. Here he exposed himself only slightly through sending private letters with advice to Republican leaders. By December Lincoln had decided that if events demonstrated that state authorities in the South, supported by large bodies of its citizens, proposed to reject the basic powers of the Federal government then coercive obedience of the laws would be necessary.
A majority of Northerners believed that the formation of a Southern Confederacy would have been a terrible disaster. They felt this way for many reasons. Some emphasized the political consequences of disunion, others the economic. Some Northerners eagerly welcomed a war for the Union while others only regretfully accepted it as a national tragedy. “When at last the guns were unlimbered, Yankees could unite only upon the sentiment embraced in Jackson’s famous toast: ‘Our Federal Union – it must be preserved!’” (205)
This book gives a thorough account of Northern reaction to the secession of the Southern states. Stampp demonstrates the attempts at peace made by the North and the feelings of the President during the crisis as well as the President elect. He also takes a hard look at the feelings of the Northern majority who overwhelming supported the coming war. The book is well written and easy to follow giving a clear cut picture of the North during the months after Lincoln’s election.
Leah D. Parker
And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis 1860-1861. By Kenneth M. Stampp. 1950.
In his book, And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis 1860-1861, Kenneth Stampp recounts the events leading to civil war from the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860 to the attack on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. Stampp’s stated purpose is to explain northern reaction to southern secession, but his book accomplishes much more. He also explains northern attitudes and underlying forces that made compromise impossible and, in turn, further contribute to southern determination for a split. Stampp attempts to explain why war came, but he considers the issue of inevitability to be a philosophical question, beyond the purview of historical analysis. In Stampp’s view, the war resulted from many deep and fundamental causes that developed over the entire history of the nation. Slavery and sectional political power may not have been the only causes, but they proved fundamental to all issues contributing to disunion. During the secession crisis, political leaders, both north and south, made genuine efforts to seek a solution short of separation and war. Many of the sectional differences held promise for resolution by compromise. But the issue of slavery and the balance of political power proved beyond remediation. On these issues both sides held strong philosophical and emotional views, well beyond the capacity of nineteenth-century Americans to resolve peaceably.
Extremists on
both sides tended to exaggerate the attitudes and conditions of their opposite
section. Whether from abolitionists
in the north, or fire-eaters of the south, the generation leading-up to 1860
received an endless flow of polemics and invective. Differences also existed between moderate people of good
will. As Kenneth Stampp states,
Enmeshed
with slavery were other economic differences which contributed to sectional
hate. The South was a static,
agrarian, debtor section, tied to an economy of staple crops.
The North was a dynamic, commercialized, industrializing, creditor
section. The South was exploited and the North was the exploiter.
Spokesmen for the two sections could never agree upon the wisdom of
protective tariffs, navigation acts, shipping and fishing subsidies, national
banks, or Federal appropriations for internal improvements.
These matters, together with slavery, were always back of the tirades of
the agitators. And these matters,
rather than the tirades, were at the roots of things.
Without them there could have been no sectional agitation and no civil
war. Between North and South there
did exist a profound and irrepressible clash of matters of interest.[1]
Rarely
did a contemporary Yankee see anything but evil in James Buchanan.
Yet, considering his southern sympathies, his state-rights proclivities,
and his low reputation in the North, Buchanan’s actual record in the secession
crisis contains some significant surprises.
Viewed retrospectively, his indictment falls rather flat. When the tug actually came, he quickly proved that he shared
one basic concept with the nationalists: a deep belief in the perpetuity of the
Union. In truth, southern
secessionists miscalculated Buchanan’s course of action as badly as northern
Unionists.[2]
In the end, all of Buchanan’s southern supporters abandoned him and most northerners never trusted him. Not able to find a path acceptable to both sides of the conflict, he received only distain from each. Buchanan spent his last few weeks as President of the United States of America as a very lonely man, misunderstood and unappreciated for his sincere efforts.
Lincoln remained silent in Springfield, Illinois during this entire period. But Senator William H. Seward—a moderate Republican and perceived “premier” of the new administration—undertook highly visible, yet inconclusive, efforts to save the Union. Buchanan, Seward, and Lincoln all believed—to some extent—that a strategy of “masterly inactivity” provided the key to saving the Union. They did not literally think they should do nothing, but rather believed that by protracting the crisis—and avoiding irrevocable actions—the unionists in the south would ultimately come to the rescue. By the time of Lincoln’s inauguration this view was losing credibility, and Lincoln began his administration with portends of a stronger approach.
In addition to the efforts of Buchanan and Seward, numerous cross currents resulted from actions by leaders of very stripe both north and south. Many abolitionists in the north supported southern secession early on, as a means to rid the nation of slavery and slaveholders. Constitutional authorities used legal rationalizations to justify both unionism and secession depending on their viewpoint. Northerners believed that the opportunity for Constitutional amendments and the guaranteed right to vote eliminated any justification for revolution in the United States. “In other words, the revolution of 1789 had eliminated the need for a repetition of the violence of 1776.”[3] Invocation of the Declaration of Independence also occurred, not by the south to justify separation, but by northerners to deny it. In Stampp's words:
Jefferson
had not betrayed them! For had he
not said: “Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established
should not be changed for light and transient causes…”
The prudent heirs of Revolutionary fathers had found new virtue in
Jefferson’s sometimes disturbing document.[4]
In both north and south, the concept of defensive action, as opposed to aggression, drove much of the thinking. Southerners portrayed the occupation of Federal forts, arsenals, customhouses, post offices, revenue cutters, navy yards, and mints as defensive acts appropriate for protection of the Confederacy. Northerners saw these as acts of aggression against the Union. Northerners saw reinforcement of forts, collection of customs from navy ships, and other such reactions as defending the nation, whereas southerners perceived them as aggressive. It had become entirely a matter of viewpoint. But being morally right on the question of “aggressive action” meant much to both sides.
During December through February, the two most important efforts at compromise occurred in Washington City. The first consisted of Congressional efforts led by Senator John J. Crittenden, the great compromiser of his era. As Stampp explains:
In
brief, Crittenden advocated the passage of six constitutional amendments: (1) In
all territory, now held “or hereafter acquired,” slavery was to be
prohibited north of the line 360 30´, and recognized and protected
south of it. (2) Congress was to
have no power to abolish slavery in places under its jurisdiction when it
existed in the surrounding state. (3)
The same restriction was to be applied to the District of Columbia.
(4) Congress was to be denied authority to interfere with the interstate
slave trade. (5)
Slaveholders prevented from recovering a fugitive by violence were to be
compensated by the Federal government. (6)
No future amendment to the Constitution was to affect these five preceding
articles, nor to give Congress the right to abolish slavery in the states.[5]
Additionally, Crittenden introduced resolutions supporting the fugitive slave law and eliminating the personal-liberty laws. His proposals supplied the basic ingredient for the major conciliation effort of this period.
The second major effort involved the work of a Peace Conference sponsored by the Virginia legislature and ultimately consisting of representatives from twenty-one states. Their proposals proved much the same as Crittenden’s with a few variations. Neither of these efforts came to fruition because, southern states began seceding from the Union first. By February, a new Confederate President and Congress had served notice that the Deep South was out of the Union. Conciliation efforts based on mutual participation no longer showed promise for success.
There is an entire body of literature about war enthusiasm among southerners in the months leading up to the Civil War. Somehow that seems more romantic and colorful that the similar hysteria occurring north of the Mason-Dixon Line during the same period. Yet war fever raged in the north as politicians, newspaper editors, and popular leaders voiced outrage at southern actions and fanned emotional fires in their Yankee brethren. Offers to form militias and recruit volunteers became common. But the stalemate at Forts Sumter and Pickens, along with Buchanan, Seward, and Crittenden’s efforts to find a solution prevented military actions through April of 1861. Both sides awaited aggressive action by the other so they could claim the moral high ground. After his inauguration, Lincoln, by word and deed, shrewdly maneuvered the south into a position where they must submit to Federal law—at least in those areas that the Yankees could act—or take aggressive action against the Union. The final element of this strategy included the decision to reinforce Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor. As Stampp characterizes the actions:
The
Sumter expedition, then, was the final culmination of Lincoln’s crisis
strategy. He had long calculated
the risk of hostilities, and he had always intended to make the Confederates be
the aggressor. That he anticipated
resistance at Charleston is hardly open to doubt.
The messengers sent there in March gave him abundant opportunities to
know the state of feeling in South Carolina.
The whole North assumed in advance that the Sumter expedition meant war;
and, on April 4, the state governors returned from their conference with the
President to speed their war preparations.
… And when the news
arrived of the attack upon Sumter, they [Lincoln’s secretaries] noted that he
was neither surprised nor excited.[6]
The firing on Sumter created mass hysteria throughout the north as Yankees forgot political or social differences and rallied to the flag. Stampp contends that the extreme reaction came partly from nationalistic feelings and partly due to emotional release from the months of uncertainty and stress. Regardless of the motivation, they did respond for what they believed would be a short war and glorious victory. Though they gladly unleashed the dogs of war, few, if any, suspected the implications of their actions.
Gary J. Ohls