Over Lincoln’s Shoulder: The Committee on the Conduct of the War. By Bruce Tap. Modern War Studies. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Pp. xii, 319. 

            In the U.S. Civil War, the federal government expanded many of its powers in an attempt to win the conflict. This included the suspension of habeas corpus, the creation of a federal tax, and the first national draft. Out of these expansions, the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (JCCW) is unique to the Civil War. Since 1865, Congress has convened only a two committees with as much influence as the JCCW, the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Ervin Committee, which investigated Watergate. Bruce Tap attempts to record the impact of the JCCW on the Union’s conduct of the Civil War and the future of the relationship between civil and military authority at a time of war.

            Prior to Tap’s study, few historians have tried to produce a thorough examination of the JCCW. Most Civil War historians acknowledge the centrality of the committee on Union military policy, but none have attempted to show its overall impact. Other historians have both criticized the JCCW for its partisan interference in the Union war effort and praised it for supporting the conflict and building public morale. Tap supports part of both arguments in Over Lincoln’s Shoulder. He believes ultimately the JCCW negatively impacted Union military policy. Yet, Tap also argues that free-labor ideology, antislavery zeal, and patriotism—all parts of the popular Republican platform—motivated the JCCW’s mission. Although strongly supporting the Republican ideology of the period, Tap argues, the committee was not the Radical Republican kabal that some historians have made it out to be.

            Despite Tap’s support for a more benign understanding of the JCCW, he concludes that the committee’s actions primarily resulted in negative effects on the Union war effort. The committee’s ideologically driven battlefield investigations, starting with the disasters at First Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff, helped politicize military appointments, incited jealousy and distrust in the officer corps, and led to the deterioration of the relationship between civilian and military leadership. Primarily, the committee members’ lack of military experience led them to develop an unrealistic and simplistic view of military strategy. This caused them to have a misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict, which damaged morale.

            Additionally, the partisanship divided support for the war along party lines. Throughout the conflict, the JCCW constantly attacked the Democratic officers, such as Generals George B. McClellan, George Strong, and George Gordon Meade, and their battlefield performances, while they tried to shield the Republican darlings of the army, such as Generals John C. Frémont, Joseph Hooker, and Daniel Sickles. Consisting of only two Democrats, Moses Odell of New York and Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, and primarily Radical Republicans, the partisan investigations of the committee destroyed cooperation with the Democrats and depleted any form of bipartisan support for the conflict. When not doing serious harm, Tap argues, the committee’s actions were a waste of time for the Union.

            Some of the JCCW’s actions resulted in positive developments during the conflict. It attempted to and successfully exposed corruption in government contracts. It also pushed for a more energetic war policy, especially early in the war. In addition, it investigated the treatment of prisoners of war and atrocities committed against black troops as well as those committed by Union troops against Native Americans, such as the Sand Creek Massacre in 1864. Despite these positive results of the JCCW, Tap predominantly paints a negative picture of the committee.

            Although an interesting study that chronicles the numerous investigations of the JCCW, Tap’s examination is far from the ultimate monograph on the committee. While showing a breakdown in the relations between civilian and military leaders, Tap leaves this topic still fairly open to interpretation. He touches on the impact of the JCCW on Lincoln’s decision making during the conflict, but could have placed more emphasis on this topic. Finally, he argues that the actions of the JCCW had an influence on Northern morale, but once again only briefly examines how soldiers and civilians reacted to JCCW investigations. This is another area that could use additional study.

            Despite some of these problems, Tap’s examination of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War attempts to provide a balanced view of the commission. He delivers an excellent chronicling of the committee’s investigations and questions previously held assumptions of the JCCW. This study establishes a basis for further research on the relationship between the political and military realms of the conflict, especially with the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War.

Over Lincoln’s Shoulder: The Committee on the Conduct of the War. By Bruce Tap. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998. Pp. ix, 319.

            Historian Bruce Tap reviews the history of a federal government committee, the Committee on the Conduct of the War (CCW), in his book Over Lincoln’s Shoulder.  Tap believes the committee has not received the proper treatment in Civil War scholarship and he published the monograph to address the inadequacies in the historiography.  The author finds a middle ground between the two central opposing viewpoints on the CCW and he successfully inserts a new perspective with his analysis.  Tap addresses the view on the CCW asserted by T. Harry Williams in Lincoln and the Radicals (1941) and Hans L. Trefousse in The Radical Republicans: Lincoln’s Vanguard for Racial Justice (1968).  Williams argued that the committee represented a political faction that worked against President Lincoln while Trefousse argued the CCW, represented by moral and principled reformers that supported Lincoln’s goals, had a positive effect on the war.  Tap believes the work of the CCW’s needs a thorough reexamination with a focus on the committee’s influence on military policy because he argues that the committee members were not radicals but reformers and their work was not wholly positive or negative. 

            The book is divided into nine chapters with a helpful introduction and epilogue.  The monograph reviews the CCW chronologically through the war from 1861 to 1865.  The first chapter gives adequate background information on the secession crisis and the outbreak of war which leads to the creation of the committee.  The committee’s investigation of Bull Run and Ball’s Bluff are reexamined as well as the investigation of the Army of the Potomac.  An entertaining chapter titled, “McClellan Is an Imbecile If Not a Traitor,” highlights the issues the CCW and Lincoln had with McClellan.  The epilogue gives a reader a glimpse into the lives of the committee members after the war and summarizes the author’s findings.  The book lacks a bibliography but does have endnotes that document the author’s use of an array of secondary books and articles as well as relevant primary sources such as government documents, personal letters, and diaries. 

            Tap’s monograph weaves together pieces of Williams’ and Trefousse’s findings and inserts his opinions to produce a more even-handed review of the CCW.  Tap claims that the committee members were not radicals but “principled reformers, opponents of slavery, and genuine patriots” but he gives a mixed opinion on the overall influence of the CCW (x).  In the committee’s investigation of the Army of the Potomac, the committee member’s efforts were hampered by McClellan’s generals unwillingness to discuss the Army’s military plans without first speaking with McClellan.  Tap argues that the internal investigation negatively affected military morale.  However, in the committee’s investigation into the Fort Pillow Massacre, demonstrated that an external review, focused on the enemy, boosted military morale and placed the CCW in a positive light.  The committee’s investigation into the Battle of Bull Run did not help or hurt the military, it came to a simple conclusion—that someone in the army had made an error and the committee could not hang the incident on one particular person. 

            Tap argues that the committee’s problems can be found in its origins.  The committee was given a vague goal because Congress gave it the power to “examine any aspect of military affairs, past, present, or future” (258).  The author rates the committee’s overall performance as having some positive outcomes and some negative outcomes but does not paint the committee as wholly good or bad.  If the committee members had military experience and less political experience perhaps civil war historians would judge the committee in a different manner. 

            Overall, the book is an interesting addition to the Civil War scholarship but it might appeal only to a specific readership since it is a review of federal government bureaucracy.  Tap deserves praise for tackling a difficult topic and presenting it to a reader in an understandable and enlightening manner. 

Texas Christian University                                                                              Brooke Wibracht

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Over Lincoln’s Shoulder: The Committee on the Conduct of the War.  By Bruce Tap. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998.

Bruce Tap provides a detailed analysis of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (CCW) in, Over Lincoln’s Shoulder.  In a long overdue study, Tap probes into the committee’s investigations in order to fill a void in the present scholarship.  Perceiving the CCW as a nuisance, Tap asserts that the Union could have created a committee that was capable of directing the war effort.  Yet, Congress appointed men ignorant of military matters who used their positions to champion the radical Republican agenda.  Thus, Tap effectively argues that although the CCW impacted the war both positively and negatively, “a large portion of the committee’s work had little direct impact on the war effort” (8).

                Tap examines the committee from its inception in 1861 through the end of the war in 1865.  Early Union military setbacks prompted Congress to believe that the Lincoln administration was mishandling the war.  Thus, after the Union defeat at First Bull Run and the military debacle at Ball’s Bluff, Congress established the CCW.  Tap proceeds to examine the members of the CCW noting that the majority of its associates were radical Republicans.  As a result, the CCW became a champion of Republican values and free labor ideals.  It believed that only vigorous offensive action and hard war could destroy the Confederacy. 

                The author proceeds to accurately stress the significance of First Bull Run and the committee’s investigation into the Army of the Potomac.  According to Tap, the CCW investigation into Bull Run set the tone for future committee activities (38-55).  The CCW, perceiving the United States Military Academy and professional soldiering as a mindless oligarchic pursuit, blamed the debacle on West Point officers with Democratic proclivities.  With regards to the Army of the Potomac investigation, the CCW attacked General George B. McClellan.  His caution reduced the Army of the Potomac to a sluggish pace thus causing the CCW to question his loyalty.  They believed that his conciliatory attitude and southern sympathies made Little Mac a poor choice to lead the largest Union army.  Yet, Tap points out that while these accusations contain an element of truth, the CCW’s primary gripe with Little Mac extended from the fact that he was an unproductive West Point Democrat.   Overall, the CCW, an organization designed to help the Union achieve victory, hindered the army via politicization (101-137).

                Other noteworthy topics that appear in the book include the Frémont investigation and the atrocity investigations of 1864-1865.  The Frémont inquiry contrasts with the atrocity investigations; the former highlights the committee’s shortcomings while the latter exemplifies CCW success.  During the Frémont investigation, the CCW championed this militarily deficient general because he shared the committee’s abolitionist sentiments.  Thus, this incident is exemplar of how the committee commonly allowed politics to influence its decision making process (81-100).  Conversely, the late war atrocity investigations, which examined the Fort Pillow massacre and the plight of Union prisoners of war, brought these tragedies to public attention (193-208)

                Tap’s conclusion illustrates the balanced nature of his work.  He acknowledges that the CCW contained good intensions writing that it, “was not simply a cover for base motives but a well-intentioned effort to direct the nation’s war goals” (225).  The CCW, at times, even produced positive results.  They, “exposed corruption, financial mismanagement, and crimes against humanity” (255).  Yet, he astutely acknowledges that good intentions do not necessarily produce results and, many of the committee’s inquiries, “were simply a waste of time, energy, and resources” (255).  Thus, the CCW, “made no significant contributions to Union military fortunes” (256).   Nevertheless, when forced to choose sides, Tap’s inclination is to claim that the CCW produced a negative impact on the Union war effort.  It expanded party divisions and contributed to the politicizing of the army.  In sum, while the CCW achieved some minor positive results, its impact was overwhelmingly negative.

                This book will appeal to numerous audiences.  Academic historians will appreciate its diverse layers which intricately lace political and military history.  Meanwhile, aspiring graduate students might consider this book a paradigm of a successful thesis.  Still, the book proves easy to read making it ideal for the casual reader.

Texas Christian University                                                                                                                      Justin S. Solonick