A Short History of the Civil War at Sea

A Short History of the Civil War at Sea. By Spencer C. Tucker. (Wilmington: SR Books, 2002).

Many Civil War military historians focus on the various Confederate and Union armies. Those favoring land operations tend to neglect the naval activities that transpired during the war. Spencer C. Tucker attempts to rectify this imbalance in the scholarship in, A Short History of the Civil War at Sea, arguing that the maritime war helped decide the outcome of the conflict (Tucker, xi). According to Tucker, the North contained a superior navy whose activities blockading ports, controlling rivers, and supporting land operations, helped secure Union victory (Tucker, xi-xii).

Tucker begins situating the Civil War within the larger context of naval history. He points out that the war began during a revolution in naval ship construction and ordinance. Advances in ships’ armor and steam power rank among the more significant evolutions of the era. Cannons also improved during this period. Larger and more powerful rifled pieces such as Dahlgren guns and Parrott rifles allowed captains to engage enemy vessels at greater distances and inflict heavier damage. The Union, unlike the Confederacy, began the war with a navy and used its superior industrial capabilities to capitalize upon these revolutionary naval developments. By 1864, the North had created the second largest navy in the world.

Subsequently, Tucker addresses the most important element of the war at sea; the Union blockade. “Although the Civil War witnessed no great fleet engagements, the naval war was vital to the outcome and is a prime example of the importance of command at sea. The North controlled the sea at all points during the war” (Tucker, 11). The suffocating Union blockade helped choke off the Confederacy from the outside world and stifled its attempts to export cotton. This greatly impacted the Confederate economy as cotton became its primary export by 1861.

Other topics that Tucker examines include: joint land and sea operations, the duel between the Monitor and CSS Virginia, commerce raiding, the capture of New Orleans, and the Siege of Charleston. The segment pertaining to land-sea operations emerges as the weakest part of the book as he only briefly addresses the Fort Henry and Donelson campaign and Vicksburg. Tucker might have considered adding more about these Union endeavors as they are probably the two most important combined arms operations of the war. Yet, in Tucker’s defense, a large base of literature pertaining to these subjects already exists. Ergo, this neglect does not detract from the book’s overarching thesis.

The author’s contextualization of the duel between the Monitor and the Virginia proves interesting. Tucker explains this fight as part of a larger naval evolution writing that, “The engagement signaled a new era in naval warfare: ironclad vessels had fought one another for the first time. The era of the metal ship had already arrived, but the Monitor-Virginia clash gave emphasis to a revolution in progress “(Tucker, 50). Thus, the duel was part of a larger global naval transformation.

The most thought provoking chapter addresses commerce raiding during the war. The Confederacy, unable to compete with the Union navy, attempted to harass the Federal merchant marine via privateering. Tucker spends a good deal of time describing the exploits of the commerce raider CSS Alabama. This Confederate ship traveled a total of 75,000 miles over a two year period and attacked Union merchant ships throughout the world until a Federal vessel defeated the Alabama off the coast of France in 1864. Although Confederate commerce raiders sank 257 U.S. merchant vessels and cost the Union $3,325,000, this barely impacted Federal shipping and finances (Tucker, 135).

Ultimately, Tucker concludes that although it becomes difficult to quantify the naval contribution to Union victory, he believes that, “Federal naval power shortened the war” (Tucker, 173). Hastening the war’s conclusion, in turn, projected Union military might and deterred foreign intervention. According to Tucker, “The Civil War reveals that victory in warfare is a tandem of forces – in this case army and naval forces working together, supported by overarching industrial power”(Tucker, 174). His survey adequately addresses the Civil War at sea and remains essential reading for those beginning their quest to understand the maritime dimensions of America’s bloodiest conflict.

Texas Christian University Justin S. Solonick

In his book, A Short History of the Civil War at Sea, Spencer C. Tucker provides an account of the naval role in the American Civil War which he rightly believes is somewhat neglected. Although he recognized that the scope of waging war at sea did not approach that of the land effort, its importance to the outcome proved equally critical. In his words,

“The North was able to exploit its significant naval and maritime advantage to turn the war on land in its favor. Above all there was a Union blockade of the Confederate coasts. This action kept the South from selling its cotton crop abroad and using the revenue to purchase arms and machinery. Although blockade runners continued to get into Southern ports throughout the war, it became much more difficult as the conflict wore on, and much of this traffic, in any case, was not in war material. Control of the Confederate coasts afforded the Union the same advantage that the British had enjoyed during the War of American Independence and again in the War of 1812—the ability to project land forces at will against any point along some thirty-five hundred miles of coastline. Such actions intensified the South’s already horrendous defensive problems, forcing it to dissipate scant resources over a vast area.”[1]

Tucker further contents that Union naval superiority not only provided economic and tactical advantage but also played a key role in President Lincoln’s wartime diplomacy. In addition to these advantages on the high seas and at the littorals, the Union navy dominated inland operations on the bays and rivers throughout the continent.

Tucker points out that the navies of the world had undergone important innovation in both ship design an gunnery during the years leading up to the Civil War. Indeed this modernization effort continued during the war as well. The United States Navy had the good fortune to have two of the world’s finest ordnance designers in its service. Commander John Dahlgren developed and produced a wide variety of weapons but primarily heavy, smooth bore muzzle loading canons of great reliability. Robert P. Parrott excelled in design and production of rifled guns, which provided excellent combat support for both the army and navy. These weapon designs were also available to the Confederate government who manufacture their own versions of the Dahlgren and Parrott guns. The South also had an ordnance designer, Lieutenant John Mercer Brooke, who made modest improvements to the weapon systems of both Dahlgren and Parrott. Although the Confederacy could never match the Union in production quantity, they were often more than a match in quality thanks to the abilities of Brooke. In the area of fighting vessels, the U.S. Navy started out with a distinct superiority, which they extended throughout the war due to greater productive capability.

The Union plan to establish, maintain, and strengthen a naval blockade of the Southern coastline began with the start of hostilities. The initial Southern strategy included issuing letters of marque and reprisal, fortifying key port cities, and attempting to predict and counter Union amphibious landings. With the exception of privateering, these options recognized that Union forces held the advantage of initiative. This advantage brought results on August 26, 1861 when the first amphibious operation of the war brought a Union victory in the battle of Hatteras Inlet. In this engagement, a landing force of 900 Marines and soldiers under command of Benjamin F. Butler, and supported by naval gunfire captured two Confederate forts and provided the Union its first victory of the war. Though little remembered now, this victory provided a great morale boost to the Northern population, which had suffered defeat in the first battle of Manassas only five weeks earlier.

Rapidly following the Hatteras Inlet victory, a Union expeditionary force under Captain Samuel F. Du Pont captured Port Royal in South Carolina after winning a duel with shore-based batteries on November 7, 1861. Next came the hard fought amphibious operation against Roanoke Island effectively wage by the joint command of Louis M. Goldsborough and Ambrose Burnsides. In the last months of 1861 and the first months of 1862, the Union navy experienced success along the Atlantic coast of the Confederacy as well as on inland waterways. Collectively, the actions along the Atlantic coast limited Confederate control to semi-isolated enclaves at Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington. Most significant of the riverine actions was support of Ulysses S. Grant’s operations against Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee River.

In a chapter titled The First Clash of Ironclads, Tucker addresses the advent of ironclad fighting ships using the classic duel between the Monitor and Virginia (Merrimack) as its centerpiece. But Tucker provides much more than just an exciting account of that dramatic action. He explains the developments in naval architecture and weapons systems that brought about these remarkable war ships. Of even greater value is his description of the role they played in the overall actions at Hampton Roads and elsewhere along with their impact on the larger war effort. Union spies were well aware that the Confederate navy had raised the Merrimack and were refitting it as an ironclad warship. In response, they dispatched the Monitor on an adventuresome sea voyage from the Brooklyn Navy Yard to the scene of threat at Hampton Roads.

On March 8, 1962, before the Monitor reached Hampton Roads, the Virginia sortied out to attack ships of the Union navy sinking the Cumberland, destroying the Congress, and damaging the Minnesota before returning to its base due to darkness. She had received more than 100 hits and although damaged was still in fighting condition. The next day, the Virginia came out to finish the Minnesota, but the Monitor had arrived on scene and moved to protect the Minnesota. Thus began the three and one-half hour battle in which the two titans pounded each other to an inconclusive draw. Tucker contends that the battle was a strategic victory for the Union navy because the action allowed them to retain the blockade and protect the naval force supporting McClellan’s operations at Fortress Monroe. In this he may be right, but he fails to recognize that the fear generated by the presence and effectiveness of the Virginia prayed on the mind of both naval and army planners. This anxiety constrained their actions for two months until the Confederate navy scuttled her on May 11 to avoid capture by Union forces. The battle between the Monitor and the Virginia ushered in a new era in naval warfare, which dominated naval tactics throughout the balance of the war and beyond. In Tuckers words, “The U.S. Navy would retain its coastal monitors into the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the Civil War monitor craze inhibited the construction of seagoing ironclads.”[2]

Tucker provides a chapter each on the naval efforts against New Orleans and Charleston. New Orleans fell to the Yankees early in the war whereas Charleston repulsed Union attacks and remained a Confederate bastion for most of the war. On April 24, 1862, a Union flotilla commanded by David G. Farragut battled its way past Confederated defenses on the lower Mississippi. After a day of hard fighting against both shore based and waterborne defenses, Farragut arrived at New Orleans and on April 25 effectively captured the city. Shortly thereafter, Farragut landed occupation troops under command of Benjamin F. Butler and the crescent city would remain in Union hands for the rest of the war. Because of the capture of New Orleans, the Union navy became the dominant force on the Mississippi River. Only Vicksburg and Port Hudson remained Confederate strongholds.

Efforts against Charleston were less successful, and Confederate forces held the city until pressure from William T. Sherman’s rampaging army forced a military evacuation on February 15, 1865. Although high-level leaders in Washington pressed for the capture of Charleston immediately after the fall of Port Royal, the local commander, Samuel F. Du Pont, was less sanguine about the prospect for success. When finally forced to act, Du Pont conducted a series of action, which culminated in a powerful direct attack on April 7, 1863. The stalwart defenders decisively repulsed Du Pont’s effort resulting in his relief by John A. Dahlgren. Dahlgren devised a new plan but accomplished little more than had Du Pont. Washington determined that the risk to its monitor fleet was greater than any advantages gained from an attempt to shell Charleston into submission. This ended any major naval efforts to take the city by direct attack. The battles for Charleston saw use of monitors, shore-based and ship mounted Dahlgren and Parrott guns, torpedoes (contact & electric detonated), and the introduction of submarine warfare. On February 17, 1864, the CSS Hunley attacked the USS Housatonic and became the first submarine in history to sink a ship. This event added submarine warfare to the list of Civil War naval innovations which includes use of ironclad warships, improved naval gunfire systems, and advanced detonation techniques for torpedo (mine) warfare.

Tucker includes a chapter about Confederate commerce raiding which offered colorful and dramatic inspiration to Southerners for much of the war. The ultimate value of these adventures proved greater as morale boosters than actual damage to the Union war effort. In Tuckers words:

During the Civil War, the Confederate commerce raiders destroyed some 257 U.S. merchant ships, or about 5 percent of the total. They drove up the insurance rates substantially, but they hardly disrupted U.S. trade nor did they disturb the Union blockade, which became steadily more effective as the war progressed. Cruisers employed by the U.S. Navy to hunt down the Confederate raiders cost the government approximately $3,325,000. During 14 months from January 1863, a total of 72 warships and 23 chartered vessels were used in this effort.[3]

Tucker also points out that the greatest impact of Confederate commerce raiding was to force the permanent foreign registry of U.S. vessels. Additionally, after the war the United States pressed claims against Great Britain for aid she provided the Confederate raiders. Ultimately, an international tribunal awarded the U.S. government $15,500,500 in damages because of these “Alabama claims.”

Tucker describes other coastal operations including the battles for Galveston, Mobile Bay, West Point and White Horse on the Pamunkey, and Plymouth and Wilmington in North Carolina. The battle of Mobile Bay was, of course, one of the most famous and important naval battles of the Civil War. In this action, David Farragut again demonstrated his genus as a leader of naval combat. In what he called the most desperate battle he ever fought, Farragut defeated a strong Confederate force of shore based forts and waterborne craft to close off another important port and effectively end blockade running in the Gulf. Although Farragut won the battle of Mobile Bay by August 8, 1864, it was not until March 1865 that the Union army mounted an effective land attack, which forced its surrender on April 12.

By the end of 1864, Union forces had captured or controlled all important ports of the Confederacy with the exception of Wilmington, North Carolina. The key to control of Wilmington was Fort Fisher, located at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. To reduce Fort Fisher, the Yankees assembled the most powerful naval force in U.S. History under command of David D. Porter. Army support included 6,500 army troops under Benjamin F. Butler. On December 24, 1864, Porter conducted his first attack against Fort Fisher and maintained a desultory bombardment for two days until Butler could get troops ashore for his attack. After determining that the fort was undamaged by the naval bombardment, Butler embarked his troops and returned to Fortress Monroe. A second assault against Fort Fisher began on January 13, 1865 under Alfred H. Terry who had replaced the incompetent Butler. On January 15, supported by sailors and Marines from Porter’s fleet, Terry launched an all out attack that constituted some of the most vicious fighting of the war. The issue remained in doubt until Terry committed his last reserve thereby turning the tide in the Union favor. In Tuckers words:

Fort Fisher was the most heavily fortified position taken by amphibious assault during the war. Its capture was the last great Union maritime effort of the war and closed the remaining sea gate of the Confederacy. The fall of Fort Fisher was followed by a Union advance up the Cape Fear River and the capture of Wilmington, all of which starved Lee’s army of essential supplies. Meanwhile, as Grant attempted to take Richmond and destroy Lee, Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman took Atlanta and drove east to the sea, cutting a wide swath through Georgia to Savannah. He the turned north through the Carolinas to join up with Grant.[4]

Tucker concludes his account by emphasizing that Union success on the seas and waterways was due to the decided advantage in force structure she enjoyed from beginning to end. He also points out that the Union victory was much more of a joint army-navy victory than is often recognized. Without in any way denigrating the contribution of the army, Tucker does a convincing job of demonstrating the critical importance of the U.S. Navy in the Union victory of the American Civil War.

[1] Spencer C. Tucker, A Short History of the Civil War at Sea (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2002), xii.