William Henry Seward. By Glyndon G. Van Deusen. (New York: Oxford University Press, c. 1967. Pp. xi+666).
As one of the most critical figures of Civil War diplomacy, as well as politics in the nineteenth-century, William Henry Seward holds an important role in the period. Befitting his subject’s importance, Glyndon Van Deusen’s large biography William Henry Seward tries to examine the many facets and contradictions of the man’s character. In particular, Van Deusen looks at Seward’s foreign policy directives during the War, and shows a figure whose passion and energy created a legacy that far outlasted his time in office.
Born in Florida, a hamlet of Orange County, New York in 1801, William Henry Seward was one of five children of the wealthy and connected Samuel Seward. The elder Seward provided for his children’s education, particularly William, arranging for him to attend Union College in Schenectady. After a brief interlude, Seward graduated and found work in a law firm in Auburn, a town in western New York. In Auburn, he married Frances Miller, and under the tutelage of newspaper publisher Thurlow Weed, began to enter politics. Outgoing and combative, Seward quickly established himself as a leading figure of the state and national Whig Party. Prior to 1860, he served in the New York State legislature, the United States Senate, and a term as governor of New York. Seward was a reform advocate, particularly regarding prisons and criminals, and held ardently anti-slavery views. The anti-slavery position expressed itself most noticeably during the debate on the eventual Compromise of 1850, where Seward stated his opposition to slavery on the basis of a “higher law” than even the Constitution. In spite of this anti-slavery position, Seward was an ardent expansionist, and supported the addition of new territory whenever possible. Though somewhat late switching from the dying Whigs to the new Republican Party, Seward remained a leading figure up to the 1860 convention, when Lincoln beat him for the Presidential nomination. Seward would have to content himself with the State Department.
Throughout the war, Seward was an aggressive diplomat. Initially, Seward directed this aggression towards the new President. Seward believed that with his long experience in public office, he would direct the administration and the war effort as a prime minister behind the figure-head of Lincoln. This plan would not last, and while Seward was never truly able to admit the President was a stronger and more politically-able figure, he at least respected Lincoln’s authority. In fact, for the rest of Lincoln’s term, the two were close friends and confidants. As the war progressed, Seward turned his aggressive action abroad, but in constructive ways. Seward acted quickly at the war’s outbreak to establish principles by which the government would deal with foreign nationals. He maintained good personal relationships with foreign ambassadors, and demonstrated to their governments that he was a reasonable figure. Van Deusen credits Seward with expert handling of the Trent Affair, ably diffusing British anger while maintaining popular confidence in the Lincoln administration. Van Deusen also gives Seward credit for declaring the Union navy’s activity during the war as a blockade, which carried a particular definition in international law. The general inability of the Confederates to break the blockade contributed to their inability to gain recognition.
As a leading national figure, Seward continued to express his opinions on key issues during the course of the war. Most noticeably, Seward appears to have modified his position on slavery. Seward had always favored gradual emancipation, but once the war broke out decided that reunification should be the primary goal. Seward downplayed abolitionist sentiment, feeling that it would only serve to further enflame the South and prevent peaceful reunification. After Lincoln’s death, Seward continuously backed Andrew Johnson during Reconstruction, favoring the President’s more moderate course opposite the Radicals in Congress. Seward defended Johnson through the President’s impeachment crisis, and continued to pursue his foreign policy goals. With some notable successes such as the acquisition of Alaska, and several disappointments such as the inability to force Britain to settle the Alabama claims, Seward continued his aggressive stances, setting the course for a new, more assertive United States internationally. Finally leaving office in 1869 with Grant’s inauguration, Seward spent the rest of his days travelling, succumbing to old age in 1872.
At times, it is difficult to understand Seward the man, and it is clear that Van Deusen occasionally struggles with his subject. Where possible, the author is critical of Seward’s decision-making and reasoning. In the end, though, Van Deusen cannot help but be overwhelmed by Seward’s expert handling of Civil War diplomacy and his many other traits. He campaigns for the Secretary’s preeminent place in the course of American foreign relations long after Seward left the State Department. Beyond that, Seward defies characterization, and Van Deusen has written a lengthy yet readable analysis of the man’s life.
Texas Christian University Keith Altavilla