The Alabama Claims

The Alabama Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1872. By Adrian Cook. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1975. Pp. viii, 261.)

In his in-depth study, Adrian Cook examines the diplomatic trials and tribulations surrounding the Alabama Claims and the subsequent efforts to resolve them. Cook maintains the settlement was complicated by a number of factors: an Anglophobic American tradition, the Fenian sympathies in the United States, American efforts to annex Canada, and the rise of Canadian nationalism. (9) He posits if left to themselves, the United States secretary of state and the British foreign secretary could have settled the matter anytime between 1869 and 1872. Unfortunately, the rise of expectation in American public opinion, provided chiefly by Charles Sumner in 1869, rendered any quick verdict void.(10)

Cook begins his work with a discussion the Alabama claims during 1866 and 1867. The author principally blames the unyielding nature of Secretary of State William Seward. Seward continually pushed for British acquiescence of Canada to the United States, but British officials refused to hand over a population that had not asked for annexation. The prospect of arbitration was never agreed on, despite Charles F. Adams’ work to engage a meaningful solution. The British refused to arbitrate the question of the Neutrality Proclamation and Seward would have it no other way. Cook speculates the matter of neutrality could have been resolved in 1867 if both sides would have slightly eased their position.(42)

Cook then recounts the brief tenure of diplomat Reverdy Johnson. Seward vaguely outlined the diplomat’s assignments to apply an 1853 convention as a template for the Alabama claims, but scoffed at the results. Cook lays the blame for Johnson’s failure at the feet of Seward for pushing his negotiations at a frantic pace rather than approving the convention piece by piece. Seward usually negotiated treaties on his own or micromanaged the process, but lacked the ability to negotiate at a distance.(55) The resulting Johnson-Clarendon Convention represented a poor diplomatic effort and was roundly defeated by the United States Senate. Cook states the machinery established by treaty “stood a greater chance of creating more disputes than it settled.”(63) Despite the blunders by Seward, Cook concedes rather than being the leader of an Anglophobe crusade he doggedly pursued an honest policy that allowed the British and American governments in the postwar to trust one another.(72)

The author then centers on the effect of Senator Sumner’s highly charged speech. Sumner blamed the British for aiding the Confederacy and extending the time of the war. The diatribe proved exceedingly popular at home, causing many Anglophobic members of the Senate such as Zach Chandler and Ben Butler to raise their demands for settlement that included incalculable sums of money and the possible acquisition of Canada. Cook condemned the actions of Sumner, noting his speech was “one long confusion of his private moral principles with the genuine national grievance of the Alabama Claims.”(100)

The last section of the book deals with the settlement of claims under the new leadership of President U.S. Grant and Secretary of State Hamilton Fish. Cook argues the failure of Grant as a politician in this situation was in “acting too little like a general.”(104) The author portrays Fish as a man without a friend, competing against Grant who wanted to hold out for Canada and Sumner who thought the secretary’s policies submitted too much to British demands. Grant finally gave into more moderate tones when the spectacle of re-election faced his scandal-ridden administration. Fish brilliantly maneuvered through the opposition, secured the appointment of a biddable minister in Robert Schenck, and gained the necessary senatorial support to ratify the Treaty of Washington in May of 1871. Cook depicts the professional character of Sumner in keeping the hope of settlement alive, despite being removed from the chairmanship of the foreign relations committee and his personality clash with Grant and Fish.(192)

Cook censures Fish for his handling of the indirect claims, nearly causing the settlement to flop. After skirting the issue to gain the treaty, Fish continually inserted claims that were not up for discussion. According to the author, Fish “emerges from it as either a knave or a fool.”(216) The Commission after several months of deadlock compromised on an extralegal settlement at a lump sum of 15.5 million. Cook concludes the treaty proved a less important diplomatic precedent than the designers had hoped. The author credits Fisk for realizing the desirability of peaceful Anglo-American relations, but admonishes him for almost wrecking “the whole scheme several times over.”(244)

The book draws on extensive primary source work from the national archives both in England and the United States. The work by Cook provides a much needed study of foreign relations in an era usually dominated by domestic politics.

Rob Little
Texas Christian University

The Alabama Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1872. By Adrian Cook. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1975. Pp. viii, 261.)

While few historical works actually consider the serious implications of the American Civil War in terms of foreign policy, Adrian Cook masterfully narrates and capably analyzes the significance of relations between the United States and Great Britain in The Alabama Claims: American Politics and Anglo-American Relations, 1865-1872. Published in 1975 by Cornell University Press, the study contributes significantly to nineteenth century diplomatic historiography as well as research into post-Civil War challenges. Sentence structure and the use of dated vocabulary tend to reveal the age of the book but the work reveals the issues that both American statesmen and British politicians faced in the years following a civil war which produced considerable international concerns.

Cook presents a brief background of the tense relations between the United States and Great Britain leading up the Civil War. Although affairs between the two nations were less than desirable due to the American War for Independence and the War of 1812, relations in 1861 had reached a breaking point. Yet both the Union and the Confederacy looked to Great Britain to aid their war efforts. While Union military and political representatives demanded neutrality from Great Britain during the war, they actually hoped for intervention from England on their behalf. The British surprised President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of State William H. Seward when the Confederate navy received several warships built in Great Britain. The Alabama was the most notable of such warships and represented Union claims for reimbursement for lost property and assets following the Civil War. “The Alabama Claims—the American demands for compensation from Great Britain for unneutral acts during the Civil War—were not settled for seven years after the end of the fighting . . . The settlement of the Alabama Claims was complicated by a number of factors: traditional American distrust and dislike of Britain, Fenian hopes of enlisting the aid of the United States in the struggle for Irish independence, American dreams of adding Canada to the Union, [and] nascent Canadian nationalism.” (8-9). As a result, relations between the two countries remained strained for rest of the nineteenth century until “the great rapprochement” witnessed a shift in relations between the two nations from foes to friends.

Clearly a leading scholar in this overlapping area of politics, warfare, and diplomacy, Cook skillfully follows the efforts of several British and American diplomats: On the British side, Lord John Russell, Sir John Ramsden, John Laird, Henry John Temple Palmerston, and William E. Gladstone all represented a variety of approaches to the American claims of unneutrality and varying British interests. On the American side, William H. Seward, Charles Francis Adams, Charles Sumner, and Hamilton Fish all served at the helm of American diplomacy during the period. Both nations suffered from quick turnover in international representation during this difficult episode—a fact that certainly contributed to complications in reaching an agreement.

Cook’s study is an important contribution to Anglo-American historiography particularly in the context of outcome of the American Civil War. However, the author unwisely assumes that his audience is familiar with political and diplomatic decision-making by American and British politicians during the Civil War. His frequent footnotes and thorough bibliography help the reader considerably in questioning his sources and debating historiographic shifts in opinion. Nevertheless, the writing style at times is difficult to follow mainly due to the age of the book. While Cook’s work remains critical for a comprehensive understanding of international dimensions due to the American Civil War, particularly the history of Anglo-American relations, it is best used in conjunction with related works such as Stuart Bernath’s Squall Across the Atlantic and Charles S. Campbell’s From Revolution to Rapprochement.