And Keep Moving On

And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864. By Mark Grimsley. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

In this work, Mark Grimsley, military historian at Ohio State University, provides an insightful history of the 1864 Virginia Campaign which pitted Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, “the butcher” against “the fox” Gen. Robert E. Lee. Though the majority of the work is devoted to detailing the various battles, skirmishes, and movements of the campaign, Grimsley breaks new ground through an analysis of the political significance of the campaign and detailing the grim and, at time, grizzly experience of the common soldier. Ultimately, these discussions add new significance to a campaign which ended in stalemate. Grimsley argues that political developments in Washington, particularly the reelection of Lincoln, played an important role in Grants purpose and approach to this campaign. Moreover, the qualitative depictions of the carnage experienced during this campaign move the discussion beyond previous quantitative depictions based solely upon the numbers of deaths, wounded, and captured.

With Grant’s crossing of the Rapidan River on 4 May 1864, began a month long campaign, the longest, most sustained, and bloodiest campaign of the Civil War. The outcome of the campaign was believed to be crucial to presidential campaign of 1864. If America public believed they were losing the war, it was likely that Lincoln would return for a second term and be succeeded by a democrat. Lincoln feared that a democrat would not emancipate the slaves nor support the war. With the support of Lincoln, Grant, newly appointed Lt. General, shifted the military aims of the North. Beginning with this campaign, the destruction of Army of Northern Virginia became Grant’s paramount military objective rather than taking tactical cities. During the forty days of the campaign, Grant relentlessly pursued the Army of Northern Virginia not allowing Lee to create an advantageous position from which to initiate battle. As a result of Grant’s unyielding pursuit he became known as “the butcher.” During the Virginia campaign this pursuit resulted in heavy death tolls, yet produced limited if any advances upon the enemy. Perhaps the best example is the third battle at Cold Harbor. The dawn attack witnessed the bloodiest half hour in the history of the Civil War resulting in the loss of nearly 7,000 men, but achieved no decisive advantages. Grimsley, however, challenges the depiction of Grant as a butcher arguing he truly believed Lee’s army was coming apart.

Despite the length of the struggle and lives lost, the campaign resulted in a stalemate at the Petersburg. Grimsley argues that several factors contributed the campaign’s anticlimactic finish, particularly the poor performances of Grant’s commanding leadership. At the outset of the campaign Grant initiated several subsidiary offensive campaigns. The goal of these campaigns, lead by William W. Averell, George Crook, Franz Sigel and Benjamin Butler, was to create pressure on the Confederates and prevent the sending of reinforcements to Lee’s army. In each instance these campaigns ultimately failed to bring enduring pressure to bear upon the confederates. Grimsley notes that Lee was served much better by his commanding officers.

Grimsley, also devotes a chapter to the experiences of the common soldier during the campaign. He details the process of rendering medical aid to those who fell during combat and their transportation to field hospitals and onto Fredericksburg. Often those wounded lingered for days in the battle field waiting for rescue. Often doctors had to prioritize who received treatment. Those earmarked for death were often still conscious. Grimsley also describes the process of capture. He notes that Grant’s ending of the prisoner exchange with the Confederates may have been part of his overarching plan to destroy the Confederate army by relieving them of man power. Grimsley also describes the daily experiences of the soldier including fatigue, inadequate rations, lack of water, and diarrhea. During the portion of the campaign fought in heavy brush, soldiers also often suffered from poison ivy, wood ticks, and lice.

Despite the campaign’s dubious conclusion, Grimsley, convincingly argues for its significance to American political developments. He also demonstrates its importance to lost cause myth which continues to penetrate historical interpretations of the Civil War. Moreover, Grimsley’s depiction of the experiences of the common soldier brings to life the horrific battle conditions experienced during the Civil War.

Jacob W. Olmstead

And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864. By Mark Grimsley. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. Pp. xx, 282.

According to Ulysses S. Grant, "The art of war . . . is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on" (1). This approach to warfare traveled with Grant when he moved from the western theater of the Civil War to combat General Robert E. Lee and his seemingly invincible Army of Northern Virginia. The Civil War had seen nothing like the spring campaigns that Lee and Grant commanded in 1864. These faithful months forced the two most successful generals to go head to head in a fight that became famous even before it began. Some citizens and soldiers knew of Grant’s successes in the West but worried as he had never faced the legendary Bobby Lee.

When Grant arrived in Culpeper Court House, Virginia, on March 25, 1864, no citizens met him with fanfare or ceremony. He cared little for such performances and began meeting with his subordinate officers to explain the movement and objectives required in the next few months. First, the Federal strategy under Grant targeted the Confederate army as the main focus of their attack rather than cities or other objectives. Next, Grant hoped to secure victories through maneuver if possible. In the end, he accepted attrition. The Army of the Potomac relentlessly attacked Confederate supply lines while using the North’s superior manpower and supplies to wear down Confederate resistance. Finally, and most importantly, the Union armies maintained a continual pursuit and constant pressure against the Confederate troops, something they had not experienced against previous Union generals. When explaining his plan to Abraham Lincoln, the president immediately understood and replied, “[A]s we say out West, if a man can’t skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does” (3).

When the Overland Campaign commenced on May 4, 1864, neither side realized what devastation the next several weeks would bring to both armies. After a harrowing battle at the Wilderness, losing JEB Stuart at Spotsylvania Court House, engagements along the North Anna River, and the destruction at Cold Harbor, “both armies emerged from the campaign as shadows of their former selves” (xv). When the campaign through Virginia ended forty days later on June 12, the armies tallied the results of the battles. The Confederates lost a third of its senior leadership and 33,000 of its veteran soldiers. The combination leadership under George Meade and Grant lost a proportional number of officers and 55,000 Federals were killed, wounded or captured by Confederate troops. Yet despite such incredible losses, Grant remained calm. Assessing the damage, he re-grouped his remaining soldiers and officers and kept moving on to commence the Petersburg campaign.

Grimsley focuses on the leadership and decision-making of Confederate and Union generals throughout the book. While some historians have shifted their research and publication efforts to present the experience of the common soldier, Grimsley explains his choice in presenting the campaign through the leading officers. “[T]hese men initiate the battle and give meaning to the outcome” (xvi). Grimsley views these men with great sympathy and passes judgment on them only when necessary. He considers them capable men working under tremendous stress and circumstances.

Grimsley has been criticized for this work as it revises no serious historiographical argument or resurrects any historical reputation that has been dragged through the mud by scholars. His book acts a fine piece of synthesis a fact which he states in the Acknowledgements. But his final chapter entitled “The Campaign’s Significance” brings to light three major developments following the Overland Campaign. First, the campaign would have been seen as the final act before Confederate surrender had Grant had managed to defeat Lee in the open field. Instead, the campaign was considered somewhat of a defeat because it ended with a ten-month long stalemate at Petersburg. Second, the Overland Campaign led to a realization among Union officers and forces of the inefficiency which existed because of the joint Meade-Grant command. Meade’s desired control in warfare—control of his officers, supplies, and all other resources—in order to achieve victory. This approach contrasted greatly with Grant’s coping style in warfare. Always focused on the ultimate objective, Grant’s ability to remain composed, reorganize, and improvise in battle eventually ended the war.

Finally, Grimsley makes some interesting observations about the perceptions of Lee and Grant after the Overland Campaign. The appraisal of Lee as a fox in battle and Grant as a murderous bludgeoner is erroneous when closely analyzed. Lee and Grant were all but identical in command style. However, the need to view Lee and the Confederacy as facing defeat with courage and dignity (and thus contribute to the Lost Cause) also dictates the need for another image. “ . . . Grant the implacable, Grant the hammerer, Grant the man who, despite everything, keeps moving on” (239).