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A REVIEW of recent scholarship relating to origins of the War of 1812 reveals a growing interest in an examination of partisan politics in the Twelfth Congress in explaining the final votes for war. In the mid-1950s the work of two scholars, John S. Pancake and Margaret K. Latimer, inaugurated the move away from standard interpretations for war compiled by Warren H. Goodman.[1] Pancake's research centered around a group of Republicans who followed the leadership of Gen. Samuel Smith of Baltimore, Senator from Maryland, and frequently opposed the policies of the Madison administration. In Pancake's view, these "Invisibles" combined forces with the War Hawks in 1811 and pushed President Madison to take strong measures against Great Britain—even as far as war.[2]

Margaret Latimer also focused on a "bloc" in Congress during Madison's first administration. She assessed the influence of three young congressmen from South Carolina—John C. Calhoun, William Lowndes, and Langdon Cheves—who were elected to the House "with reference to the critical condition of the country." Because of the unusual cohesion of opinion within South Carolina, these young congressmen came to Washington committed to the promotion of a vigorous foreign policy. By working with the Speaker of the House, Henry Clay, the new delegation from South Carolina became the most aggressive

[1] Warren H. Goodman, "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXVIII (1941-1942), 171-186.

[2] John S. Pancake, "'The Invisibles': A Chapter in the Opposition to President Madison," *Journal of Southern History*, XXI (1955), 17-37.

force in Congress and was primarily responsible for plunging their "peace loving party" into war.[3]

Both authors emphasized that influential members of the Republican party produced the movement toward war. Norman K. Risjord was one of the first historians to suggest another explanation for Republican party voting. Attacking Latimer's South Carolina position, Risjord argued that the election of Calhoun, Lowndes, and Cheves represented an addition not of numbers but of talent to the House of Representatives. More significant to Risjord was the gradual shift of older Republican members of Congress away from Jeffersonian peaceful coercion to a vigorous defense of American neutral rights. The only unifying factor in all parts of the country to explain this conversion and the eventual decision for war, said Risjord, was "the realization that something had to be done to vindicate the national honor." The majority of the Republicans who voted for war were men who had been in Congress for many years, and the younger War Hawks were primarily catalysts rather than determinants of the war.[4] Bradford Perkins's detailed account of Anglo-American relations from 1805 to 1812 stressed that the majority of the Republicans moved toward war slowly and with deep misgivings about the prudence of their course. He presented the War Hawks as an ineffective, though persistent, force in breaking the deadlock in Congress between Federalist opposition to restrictions against Great Britain and Republican continuation of peaceful coercion.[5]

Perhaps the most significant study of activity in the Twelfth Congress has been that of Roger H. Brown. Brown took the final votes for war recorded in the House and Senate and showed that "with some exceptions the congressional split followed party lines."[6] Moving beyond

[3] Margaret Kinard Latimer, "South Carolina—A Protagonist of the War of 1812," *American Historical Review*, LXI (1955-1956), 914-929.

[4] Norman K. Risjord, "1812: Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation's Honor," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., XVIII (1961), 196-210; Risjord, *The Old Republicans: Southern Conservatism in the Age of Jefferson* (New York, 1965), 122-126.

[5] Bradford Perkins, *Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961), 373-377.

[6] Roger H. Brown, *The Republic in Peril: 1812* (New York, 1964), 45. His count revealed that only Republicans voted for war (98) and that all the Federalists (40) voted against it. He used the list in *Niles' Weekly Register*, Nov. 30, 1811, to determine party affiliation. My calculations are somewhat different, based on the criterion detailed in note 11, and tend to be more conservative than those obtained by following Brown's method.

nationalistic explanations of congressional action, Brown stressed Republican party unity as the primary motivation in the decision for war. To Republicans, the situation in 1812 was the end result of a defense of republicanism born in 1800. Submission to the British Orders in Council would threaten their party's control of the presidency and could even destroy republican government in the nation.[7] Jefferson and Madison, according to Brown, had committed their party repeatedly to a program that would permit no foreign government to regulate American commerce, which is precisely what the Orders sought to do. When peaceful policies of diplomacy and commercial restrictions no longer offered any hope of redress, Republicans in Congress viewed war as the only policy which would save their imperiled nation.[8]

Although studies of congressional voting in this period have been too individualistic to constitute a new school in the historiography of the war's causes, one may isolate three explanations for legislative behavior: (1) Pancake and Latimer contended that blocs of common interest, both sectional and personal, determined legislative voting; (2) Risjord and Perkins indicated that attitudes, primarily on the issue of national honor, motivated the majority of the Republicans to vote for war; (3) Brown emphasized the role of political parties in the war declaration. The validity of each of these evaluations is confirmed in the congressional debates. To date, however, no historian has expanded his investigation of the traditional sources of political rhetoric, newspapers, and manuscripts to include a systematic analysis of the voting behavior of the lawmakers in 1812. A rigorous study of the roll call votes in Congress relating to foreign affairs can help to break the deadlock in conflicting interpretations and assess the relative strengths of geographical blocs, factional groupings, and party cohesion in influencing political activity in the Twelfth Congress.[9]

[7] Brown, *Republic in Peril,* 73.

[8] *Ibid.,* 39-48. Reginald Horsman has argued that the wars of Europe caused the War of 1812. Had there been no war between France and England, there would have been no Orders, no impressment, and hence no war. *The Causes of the War of 1812* (Philadelphia, 1962), 14-23, 265-267.

[9] Although most of the roll-call analyses of the U. S. Congress have dealt with recent times, several historians have demonstrated the utility of such studies for Congresses prior to and during the Civil War. See Thomas B. Alexander, *Sectional Stress and Party Strength: A Study of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in the United States House of Representatives, 1836-1860* (Nashville, 1967); Joel H. Silbey, *The Shrine of Party: Congressional Voting Behavior, 1841-1852* (Pittsburgh, 1967); and

Social scientists have developed several statistical methods of investigating sectional, factional, or partisan motivations for voting. An index of cohesion measures the strength of party unity.[10] After dividing the members of a legislative body into self-conscious political groupings (Republicans and Federalists in the Twelfth Congress), one calculates the difference in percentages between the members of a party who voted yea and those who voted nay.[11] In order to evaluate the relative strengths of the parties on particular roll calls, an index of fifty (a 75-25 percent split) may be operationally used as a basis of comparison.

In a cluster-bloc analysis, the researcher counts how many times each pair of legislators voted together on related roll calls and then fits the pair-wise agreement scores into a matrix to form groups of like-minded legislators (Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix).[12] A series of identical votes to individual roll calls indicates that similar considerations prompted the legislators to vote alike. Cross-party voting and sectional groupings are uncovered in this manner.

Scaling, developed by Louis Guttman in the 1940s to analyze opinion surveys in social psychology, is applied to political studies to evaluate quantitatively a legislator's position toward a particular issue.[13] Using

Allan G. Bogue, "Bloc and Party in the United States Senate: 1861-1863," *Civil War History*, XIII (1967), 221-241.

[10] Developed by Stuart A. Rice, *Quantitative Methods in Politics* (New York, 1928), 208-209. For applications, see Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W. Allen, "Party Loyalty in the Progressive Years: The Senate, 1909-1915," *Journal of Politics*, XXIX (1967), 567-584.

[11] The criterion for determining party identification was the party label that the individual used in his campaign for Congress as recorded in the *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1961* (Washington, D. C., 1961), supplemented by the *Dictionary of American Biography*. Nine legislators were not identified in these sources. Because of general voting behavior, I assigned 8 (David Bard, Josiah Bartlett, Jr., Howell Cobb, Isaiah L. Green, George C. Maxwell, Thomas Moore, William Piper, and George Smith) to the Republican party, and Edwin Gray to the Federalist party. See Table II for party affiliations.

[12] See David B. Truman, *The Congressional Party, A Case Study* (New York, 1959), 46. The 63 roll calls were the same as those to which the Q statistic was applied.

[13] George M. Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, II (1958), 377-402. See also Bogue, "Bloc and Party," *Civil War Hist.*, XIII (1967), 224; and Silbey, *Shrine of Party*, 14-15. Not every roll call should be included in the scale. Only those which dichotomize the members into two groups, pro and con, plus those whose voting pattern cannot be better explained by other reasons, namely unanimity or sharp partisanship, can be used. Unanimity was operationally defined as 90% of those voting either favoring or oppos-

roll calls relating to a certain topic, scaling ranks legislators according to their positions toward the issue in question and allows the researcher to divide them into groups which range, in this case, from aggressive to moderate to non-aggressive categories. In addition to the issue orientation of scaling, the scales can play a double role due to the variety of information which they contain when party affiliation and geographical representation of the legislators are also considered (Tables I and II).

Scaling is a more versatile tool than either a cohesion index or cluster-bloc analysis because attitudinal rankings can also be grouped in terms of partisan or sectional considerations. By using all three techniques, however, each of which considers the roll-call data differently, historians have arrived at a fuller picture of legislative behavior.

The present study utilizes an index of cohesion, scaling, and cluster-bloc analysis to study roll calls related to foreign policy in the House of Representatives during the first session of the Twelfth Congress, from November 4, 1811, to June 18, 1812, the date of the final votes on the bill declaring war. This presentation involves a wider range of roll-call behavior within a larger universe than has previously been attempted, but the special tactical problems arising from such a decision do not outweigh the potential benefits. For the purpose of a more nearly complete roll-call analysis, the House provides greater possibilities than the Senate for three reasons: (1) the larger number of roll calls dealing specifically with foreign affairs which the House recorded during the first session; (2) the larger sectional groupings; and (3) the larger number of Federalists potentially in opposition to the Republican majority.[14]

Of the 166 roll calls in the House during this timespan, 113 non-

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ing the subject of the roll call, and partisanship was based on a 90% agreement in both parties (cohesion indexes above 80) or a cohesion index of one party above 95 on a particular vote. In addition, roll calls were excluded if less than 80% of the legislators voted so as not to inflate spuriously the reproducibility of the scale, and finally according to their level of association measured by the Q statistic. Of the 63 roll calls for which Q values were calculated, 26 (Table I) were mutually scalar at the .8 level. See Lee F. Anderson *et al., Legislative Roll-Call Analysis* (Evanston, Ill., 1966), 89-106; Charles D. Farris, "A Method of Determining Ideological Groupings in the Congress," *Jour. Pol.,* XX (1958), 308-338; and Duncan MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," *American Political Science Review,* LIX (1965), 909-926.

[14] For the most recent study of the Senate in the first session, see Leland R. Johnson, "The Suspense Was Hell: The Senate Vote for War in 1812," *Indiana Magazine of History,* LXV (1969), 247-267.

unanimous votes were generally related to foreign affairs, with Federal-
ists and Republicans in opposition to one another on 98 of the votes (87
percent). From a graph of the two parties' indexes of cohesion over
time (Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix), one sees this divergence of party
policies even more clearly. In particular, two trends are obvious. First, both
parties were able to maintain a relatively high degree of unity through-
out the session. Republicans fell below an index of fifty (a 75-25 percent
split) forty-two times from November through June 18. The Federalists
fell below it only twenty times. Secondly, a point arose in the session
when the cohesion of both parties increased sharply. In *Prologue to War*,
Bradford Perkins argued that the nadir in the movement for war came
in March and was not closely related to any one issue.[15] The cohesion
indexes indicate, however, that the crisis occurred earlier—the Republi-
can jump corresponding with the second reading of a bill to borrow
$11 million on February 24, and the Federalist tightening with the
first war tax resolution on February 27. From February 24 through
the final war votes, Republicans fell below the fifty mark only fifteen
times (20 percent of the votes as compared to 68 percent prior to this
point). Once again, the Federalists attained a higher degree of party
unity as they fell below the mark only three times after February 27,
a miniscule 4 percent.[16]

The loan and the war taxes were direct responses by the Republican
majority in the House to President James Madison's State of the Union
Message presented to Congress on November 5, 1811.[17] In his message,
the President asked the lawmakers to "feel the duty of putting the United
States into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and cor-
responding with the national spirit and expectations." Specifically, he
recommended that the military establishment be strengthened and that
new sources of revenue be tapped to provide for military preparedness.[18]
After nearly a four-month delay, on February 26 the Ways and Means

[15] Perkins, *Prologue to War*, 373-376.
[16] [Annals of Congress.] *Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United
States, 1789-1824* (Washington, D. C., 1853), 12th Cong., 1st sess., 1086-1087, 1108.
[17] *Ibid.*, 11-15, 331.
[18] *Ibid.*, 13-15. One week later, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the
Whole on the State of the Union to consider the president's message, and John
Smilie (R., Pa.) submitted six resolutions. Two of his motions related explicitly to
preparations for war: that a select committee be appointed to study foreign relations
and that the Committee of Ways and Means be charged with implementing the
financial section of the president's message. *Ibid.*, 334-335.

Committee finally presented fourteen resolutions for raising taxes to support a war with a European nation.[19]

The financing of the war marked an especially significant stage for the Federalists in cementing their party unity. As a whole, the Federalist congressmen generally took no part in the debates of the first session, believing that the Republicans used Federalist opposition only to consolidate their own party's position. As one Federalist explained, "The cry of British party, and British influence has been managed with great adroitness and success. This [silence] has stript them of this weapon, and now they have not to plead . . . Federal opposition as an apology for the continuance of the restrictive system."[20]

Some Federalists, however, led by Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, supported the Republicans in the early part of the session. In two letters to Massachusetts Federalist Harrison Gray Otis, Quincy revealed his motives for such a drastic change in policy on the part of the pro-British Federalists. Shortly after the opening of the session, Quincy declared to Otis that "the fault of the conduct of the federalists has been the zeal with which they have advocated every point between this country and Great Britain, in favour of the latter." He felt that Federalists could destroy the administration by pressing for war with Great Britain, and he informed Otis that he was "very far from being alone in these sentiments."[21] A fortnight later, he reiterated his stance: "Let them [Federalists] set themselves about convincing the people of our section of the country that the present situation of the commercial part of the country *is worse than any war, even a British,* and that if [the] administration mean to force us to take the one, or the other, that although they cannot justify the principle of such war, yet that in its political effects, foreign war in any supposable calamity is preferable to the evils we now feel and may fairly anticipate."[22]

Even Quincy, however, abandoned his plan when the taxes became

[19] *Ibid.,* 1106-1107.

[20] Samuel Taggart to John Taylor, Dec. 14, 1811, "Letters of Samuel Taggart: Representative in Congress, 1803-1814," American Antiquarian Society, *Proceedings,* N.S., XXXIII (1924), 369-370.

[21] Josiah Quincy to Harrison Gray Otis, Nov. 8, 1811. Quoted in David Hackett Fischer, *The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy* (New York, 1965), 174.

[22] Quincy to Otis, Nov. 26, 1811, in Samuel Eliot Morison, *The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765-1848,* II (Boston, 1913), 34.

the issue of debate. As Abijah Bigelow of Massachusetts explained to his wife, Federalists would know that the Republicans were truly determined upon war only when they voted the taxes necessary for its prosecution: "The great difficulty is raising taxes. They dare not do it. They are too cunning to risk their popularity by a land tax, loans, etc.,

TABLE I

SAMPLE OF FOREIGN POLICY ROLL CALLS

Q = .8 OR HIGHER

Scale Number	Volume and Page (Annals)	Date	Subject	Positive Response	Cohesion Index		Number of Ties
					Rep.	Fed.	
1	1/545-6	Dec. 16	Raise additional troops for a period of three years.	Y	91	3	6
	1/800-1	Jan. 17	Raising a volunteer corps--final vote.	Y	88	20	
2	1/716-7	Jan. 9	Postpone consideration on bill to raise additional troops as amended by the Senate.	N	87	44	3
	1/1092	Feb. 25	Borrow $11 million--final reading.	Y	91	43	
3	1/617	Jan. 2	Raise additional troops--second reading.	Y	76	45	0
	1/691	Jan. 6	Raise additional troops--final reading.	Y	75	44	
4	2/1636-7	June 4	Motion to adjourn.	N	74	82	0
	2/1635-6	June 4	Postpone decision on bill to declare war until June 5.	N	67	89	
	2/1635	June 4	Postpone decision on bill to declare war until the first Monday in October.	N	73	82	
5	1/340	Nov. 12	Motion to send Madison's State of the Union Message to a special committee on the state of the union.	N	91	76	6
	1/341	Nov. 12	Motion to read the documents connected with Madison's State of the Union Message.	N	77	61	
6	2/1632	June 3	Defeat bill declaring war.	N	68	82	1
	2/1634-5	June 4	Second reading of bill to declare war.	Y	69	82	
7	2/1681-2	June 18	Postpone declaration of war to the first Monday in October.	N	69	84	2
	2/1682	June 18	Postpone declaration of war to the first Monday in July.	N	65	84	

when they raise the taxes necessary to carry on a war I shall think them in earnest, not before."[23]

Another way to test the strength of party unity than a cohesion index is to compare party loyalty with other explanations for a legislator's vote, such as attitudinal or sectional reasons. In a scale reflecting a representative's position toward roll calls related to foreign policy (Tables I and II), the diversity one might expect within rankings from zero to fourteen does not occur. The construction of the scale purposely em-

8	2/1637	June 4	Final vote for war.	Y	63	83	·
9	1/1108	Feb. 27	War Taxes, Resolution 1. Add to duties on imports.	Y	79	82	5
	2/1470-8	May 29	Resolution: Inexpedient to resort to war against Great Britain at this time.	N	75	86	
10	2/1630-1	June 3	Vote to remove secrecy on the bill declaring war.	N	68	88	0
	2/1631-2	June 3	Open the doors of the House to discussion of the bill declaring war.	N	72	89	
11	1/1111-2	Feb. 27	War Taxes, Resolution 3. Add to tax rate on foreign ships per ton.	Y	81	73	7
	1/1148	Mar. 4	War Taxes, Resolution 6. Tax on licenses to retailers of wines, etc.	Y	65	81	
12	1/793-4	Jan. 15	Amendment on bill to raise a volunteer corps.	N	76	84	
13	1/1111	Feb. 27	War Taxes, Resolution 2. Retain 25 per cent of the drawbacks on exports.	Y	73	89	12
	1/1150-1	Mar. 4	War Taxes, Resolution 9. Duties on carriages for transport of persons.	Y	78	89	
14	1/1161	Mar. 6	Resolution to cut funds from maritime defenses.	Y	57	89	

Note: In forming a scale, roll calls of similar subject matter and voting patterns can often be combined to form "contrived items," thereby minimizing the number of absences of legislators in the scale. Items 12 and 14 could not be combined with roll calls of similar content or voting pattern without an excessive number of tied votes occurring (13 dichotomous responses represent about a 10% error). The final vote for war (item 8) stands alone because of its special content. For a discussion of "contrived items," see Anderson *et al., Roll-Call Analysis*, 107.

[23] Abijah Bigelow to Hannah Bigelow, Jan. 1, 1812, "Letters of Abijah Bigelow, Member of Congress, to His Wife, 1810-1815," Am. Antiquarian Soc., *Procs.*, N.S., XL (1931), 323.

TABLE II

SCALE OF FOREIGN POLICY ROLL CALLS
FIRST SESSION, TWELFTH CONGRESS: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Representative	Party-State	Scale Type	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Alston	R-NC	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bard	R-Pa	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Bibb	R-Ga	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Brown	R-Pa	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Burwell	R-Va	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Butler	R-SC	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Calhoun	R-SC	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Crawford	R-Pa	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Davis	R-Pa	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Desha	R-Ky	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Earle	R-SC	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Hall, O.	R-NH	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Harper	R-NH	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Kent	F-Md	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lacock	R-Pa	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Lyle	R-Pa	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Moore	R-SC	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
McCoy	R-Va	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Morrow	R-Oh	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Rhea	R-Te	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Roane	R-Va	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Sage	R-NY	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Seaver	R-Ma	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Smith, G.	R-Pa	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Troup	R-Ga	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Findley	R-Pa	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Cheves	R-SC	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Johnson	R-Ky	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Lowndes	R-SC	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
New	R-Ky	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Ormsby	R-Ky	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Piper	R-Pa	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Cochran	R-NC	14	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Taliaferro	R-Va	14	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Whitehill	R-Pa	14	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Winn	R-SC	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Goodwyn	R-Va	14	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+
Ringgold	R-Md	14	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Dawson	R-Va	14	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	0
Clopton	R-Va	14	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	0	0
Franklin	R-NC	14	+	+	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	0	+	+	+	+
Clay, M.	R-Va	14	+	+	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	+	+	+	+

phasizes the extreme positions (zero and fourteen), and yet one finds 46.5 percent of the total number of scaled legislators (58 of 125) in these most extreme categories (Table II).

When one adds to these two groups of legislators others whose scale positions may be viewed as similarly extreme, the division between aggressives and non-aggressives becomes even more striking, and the moderate position virtually disappears (Table III).[24]

[24] A division of scale types into three simple categories—aggressive, moderate,

Representative	Party-State	Scale Type	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Hall, B.	R-Ga	13	x	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Pond	R-NY	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	+	+	+
Smith, J.	R-Va	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Dinsmoor	R-NH	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	+	
Morgan	F-NJ	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	+
McKim	R-Md	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	+
Seybert	R-Pa	13	x	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	O
Anderson	R-Pa	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	O
Strong	R-Vt	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	O	x	+
Lefever	R-Pa	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	+	x	+
Pleasants	R-Va	13	O	+	O	+	x	+	+	+	+	+	+	O	+	+
Blackledge	R-NC	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Condict	R-NJ	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Green	R-Ma	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Little	R-Md	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Newton	R-Va	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Roberts	R-Pa	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Sevier	R-Te	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Hyneman	R-Pa	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+
Grundy	R-Te	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
McKee	R-Ky	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Pickens	R-NC	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Gholson	R-Va	13	+	+	+	+	O	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+
Shaw	R-Vt	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	O	+	-	+
Porter	R-NY	13	+	+	+	O	+	O	O	O	+	O	+	-	+	+
Wright	R-Md	13	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	+	+	-
Bacon	R-Ma	13	x	+	+	O	+	O	O	O	+	O	+	-	+	+
Smilie	R-Pa	13	+	+	-	+	+	O	+	+	+	O	+	+	+	+
Turner	R-Ma	12	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	+	+	+	x	-
Widgery	R-Ma	12	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	+	-	O	+	+	x	+
Archer	R-Md	12	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-
Bassett	R-Va	12	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	-
Hawes	R-Va	12	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+
Williams	R-SC	12	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	O	+	O	O
Metcalf	R-NY	12	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	x	+	+	+
Richardson	F-Ma	12	O	+	O	+	O	+	+	+	+	-	+	O	x	-
Fisk	R-Vt	11	x	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	x	+	x	+	-	-
Nelson	R-Va	11	+	+	+	+	x	+	+	+	x	+	+	-	+	-
Macon	R-NC	11	+	x	-	+	x	+	+	+	x	-	+	+	-	+
King	R-NC	11	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	-	
Sammons	R-NY	10	+	+	+	-	+	+	O	-	+	+	-	+	+	-
Mitchill	R-NY	9	+	+	+	+	+	x	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	O
Van Courtlandt	R-NY	6	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	O	-	-	+	-	O
Sullivan	F-NH	4	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	O	O	O
Tracy	R-NY	4	+	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	O	x	-
Stow	F-NY	4	+	+	-	-	+	O	-	-	-	O	x	+	-	-
Rodman	R-Pa	4	+	-	-	-	O	-	-	-	x	-	x	+	x	+

and non-aggressive—reflects the polarity of the data without undue constriction of the moderate position. A grouping of the types 14 to 11 as aggressives, 10 to 4 as moderates, and 3 to 0 as non-aggressives represents approximately a 25% division of the total scale types in the extreme categories and approximately 50% in the moderate range. Scaling tends to push individuals to the extreme positions, especially when a "minimum error score" is used. (For an example of this type of scor-

Representative	Party-State	Scale Type	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Reed	F-Ma	3	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Emott	F-NY	3	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
Gold	F-NY	3	+	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-
Quincy	F-Ma	3	+	+	+	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	0
Bleecker	F-NY	3	+	+	+	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	0
Milnor	F-Pa	3	+	x	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
McBryde	R-NC	2	+	-	-	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	0
Baker	F-Va	1	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wilson	F-Va	1	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Breckinridge	F-Va	1	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ridgely	F-De	1	+	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Goldsborough	F-Md	1	+	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
Key	F-Md	1	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Randolph	R-Va	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	0
Chittenden	F-Vt	1	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ely	F-Ma	1	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Taggart	F-Ma	1	-	-	-	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Fitch	F-NY	1	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Potter	F-RI	1	-	x	-	-	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	-	-
Stanford	R-NC	1	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	x	-
Jackson	F-RI	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Law	F-Ct	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lewis	F-Va	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Moseley	F-Ct	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sturges	F-Ct	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Wheaton	F-Ma	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
White	R-Ma	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Brigham	F-Ma	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
Champion	F-Ct	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
Davenport	F-Ct	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
Pearson	F-NC	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Stuart	F-Md	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tallmadge	F-Ct	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
Pitkin	F-Ct	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	-	-
Bigelow	F-Ma	0	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-
Sheffey	F-Va	0	-	-	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	0	-	-	-	-

Total Positive Responses = 96 92 87 80 77 77 77 77 77 74 74 73 70 56
Total Respondents = 125

Notes: + = positive response; − = negative response; ✕ = tied response. Two tied responses per individual raise or lower the scale type one rank. Tied responses were treated as error responses when computing the coefficient of reproducibility (CR = .94). Adam Boyd, Jacob Hufty, George C. Maxwell, and Thomas Newbold (all Republicans from New Jersey) were eliminated because their responses would not scale; other missing legislators did not respond to two-thirds of the scale items.

In our own day, issues of foreign policy often evoke a comparable polarization of attitudes. Are there other explanations for this extreme divergency? A breakdown of the legislators into sectional groupings

ing, see Bogue, "Bloc and Party," *Civil War Hist.*, XIII [1967], 230.) Therefore, in calculating an individual's scale type, I used a simple score based on the number of positive responses recorded.

TABLE III

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE, ATTITUDE FREQUENCY
TWELFTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

	Scale Type	Number	Percentage
Aggressive	(14-11)	82	65.6
Moderate	(10- 4)	7	5.6
Non-aggressive	(3- 0)	36	28.8
	totals	125	100.0

(Table IV) revealed that the South and West section was most favorable
to war and the Northeast was least favorable. The Middle States were
the most diverse with five of the six moderates in the scale belonging to
this section:

A division of the legislators by party as well as section, however,
proved to be more informative than the attitudinal or sectional group-
ings alone (Table V). Two patterns are evident from such a presenta-
tion. First, Republicans and Federalists opposed one another diametrically
in every section. This opposition appears to have been especially intense
in the South and West and Northeast as both factions attained approxi-
mately 90 percent cohesion. More diversity was evident in the Middle
States, but the party division was virtually the same as in the other two

TABLE IV

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE, SECTIONAL DIVISION
TWELFTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Scale Type		South and West No. Per Cent	Middle No. Per Cent	Northeast No. Per Cent
Aggressive	(14-11)	42 82.4	28 65.1	12 38.7
Moderate	(10- 4)	-- ----	6 14.0	1 3.2
Non-aggressive	(3- 0)	9 17.6	9 20.9	18 58.1
	totals	51 100.0	43 100.0	31 100.0

South and West	Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio.
Middle	Pennsylvania, Maryland, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware.
Northeast	Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island.

TABLE V

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE DIVIDED BY SECTION AND PARTY

TWELFTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Scale Type		Republicans No. Per Cent		Federalists No. Per Cent	
South and West					
Aggressive	(14-11)	42	93.3	--	----
Moderate	(10- 4)	--	----	--	----
Non-aggressive	(3- 0)	3	6.7	6	100.0
totals		45	100.0	6	100.0
Middle					
Aggressive	(14-11)	26	83.9	2	16.7
Moderate	(10- 4)	5	16.1	1	8.3
Non-aggressive	(3- 0)	--	----	9	75.0
totals		31	100.0	12	100.0
Northeast					
Aggressive	(14-11)	11	91.7	1	5.3
Moderate	(10- 4)	--	----	1	5.3
Non-aggressive	(3- 0)	1	8.3	17	89.4
totals		12	100.0	19	100.0

sections. Secondly, the polarization of attitudes evidenced in Table III may be best explained in terms of these partisan divisions. In other words, the attitudinal diversity is of less importance than the two parties' differing views on the conduct of foreign policy.

It could be argued that party would naturally appear from this scale as more revealing of voting patterns than either issue or section because the roll calls which the Q statistic selected for inclusion in the scale were those with high cohesion scores (Table I). Thus, a new scale composed of roll calls with lower cohesion scores tested the validity of the original scale. A frequency distribution by issue revealed 56.2 percent aggressives, 19.0 percent moderates, and 24.8 percent non-aggressives—a gain in the moderate position. A division by party and section revealed a tendency for Federalists in the Middle States and Republicans in the Northeast to be influenced more by sectional considerations than in the first scale (Table VI), but party still appeared to explain more of the voting than either section or issue:[25]

[25] I selected another group of roll calls from the initial group of 113 non-unanimous roll calls by eliminating those with either party possessing an index of 80 or

TABLE VI

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE II, DIVIDED BY SECTION AND PARTY
TWELFTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Scale Type		Republicans No. Per Cent		Federalists No. Per Cent	
South and West					
Aggressive	(6-5)	32	74.4	---	-----
Moderate	(4-2)	7	16.3	---	-----.
Non-aggressive	(1-0)	4	9.3	6	100.0
totals		43	100.0	6	100.0
Middle					
Aggressive	(6-5)	23	69.7	4	40.0
Moderate	(4-2)	9	27.3	3	30.0
Non-aggressive	(1-0)	1	3.0	3	30.0
totals		33	100.0	10	100.0
Northeast					
Aggressive	(6-5)	7	58.3	2	11.8
Moderate	(4-2)	4	33.3	---	----
Non-aggressive	(1-0)	1	8.3	15	88.2
totals		12	99.9	17	100.0

A cluster-bloc analysis of the sectional groupings also emphasized a partisan voting pattern rather than factional or geographical ones, especially in the South and West and Northeast where Republicans and Federalists were most heavily concentrated (Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix). In each matrix a near perfect division existed between the two parties. At the 80 percent cohesion level, the diverse Republican blocs are intriguing but at lower levels collapse due to the absence of moderate scale types and the lack of cross-party voting. For example, at the 70 percent cohesion level, the left corner of Figure 3 becomes one bloc. Extensive manuscript research would be necessary before much significance could be assigned to the specific differences between the Republican groups in each section.

One additional observation from the results of the cluster-bloc analy-

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above (90-10% split). Only 30 of the 113 roll calls remained. Once again I chose a Q score of .8 as the minimum level of association and found 6 roll calls mutually scalar at this level. The fact that in both cases the Q statistic selected roll calls in which party explained the association more than issue or section is quite significant. This second scale is available from the author on request.

sis relates to James Sterling Young's scrutiny of the Washington society of this period. Young discovered that "boarding house fraternities" which developed among the legislators were often more influential in determining political attitudes than partisan or sectional ties. For example, during the Twelfth Congress Abijah Bigelow roomed in Washington with Elijah Brigham and dined with Brigham and William Ely from Massachusetts, Epaphroditus Champion, Jonathan O. Moseley, Lewis B. Sturges, and Lyman Law from Connecticut, Martin Chittenden from Vermont, and Asa Fitch from New York. Figure 4 in the Appendix shows the high voting cohesion of this group (minus Fitch) and would seem to support Young's perceptive insights.[26] The fact that they were all Federalists, however, would also indicate that by the Twelfth Congress party ties had become more important than Young would admit.

There are three questions not central to this presentation which are worthy of extended investigation. The scale itself contains at least two definable "sub-issues" relating to Madison's State of the Union Address, additional military personnel and loans and taxes for war. An intensive examination of each of these issues which are connected with but inferior to the main problem of an overall view of foreign policy in the Twelfth Congress would provide additional information on the positions of individual congressmen as well as the interaction of the political parties on specific instances of conflict. Secondly, the political diversity of the Middle States both along attitudinal and party lines is most intriguing. In particular, preliminary research would indicate that the Republicans in the Middle States were extremely sensitive to the issue of the war taxes and other legislation which might hamper their advantageous position as a "breadbasket" for the participants in the Napoleonic Wars. Federalist newspapers in the Northeast blasted what they viewed as clear evidence of political expediency and favoritism in the application of Republican foreign policy. One Boston newspaper even suggested that President Madison's dependence on the support of the Middle States (and particularly Pennsylvania) in his reelection bid in 1812 was the reason for their preferential treatment.[27] Thirdly, concerning the War

[26] James Sterling Young, *The Washington Community, 1800-1828* (New York, 1966), Chap. 7. Young does not include in his study roll calls from 1809 to 1815. A. Bigelow to H. Bigelow, Nov. 4, 1811, "Letters of Abijah Bigelow," Am. Antiquarian Soc., *Procs.*, N.S., XL (1931), 317.

[27] Thomas Jefferson wrote to Madison on one occasion on the importance of keeping markets open for American farmers: "Our farmers are cheerful in the ex-

Hawk controversy, one may easily distinguish from the voting scales a group of representatives who may be classified as "hawks" as well as a group of "doves."[28] And yet, these same divisions may best be labeled Republicans and Federalists as only one Federalist was included in the forty-two legislators in the most aggressive scale type of fourteen, and only one Republican was in the most non-aggressive scale type of zero (Table II).[29] Republican voting became especially cohesive after the war taxes were introduced, but the voting scales indicate that a warlike attitude was present from the beginning of the session. An analysis of the Eleventh Congress and previous Congresses would be necessary to help resolve the larger question of when this party transformation occurred.

In summary, the three statistical techniques—index of cohesion, cluster-bloc analysis, and scaling—although they organized the data differently, each presented overwhelming evidence to support the conclusion that Republican party unity was the determining factor in the decision of the House of Representatives to declare war on Great Britain in June of 1812. This study, therefore, supports Roger H. Brown's contentions, based on the final war vote, that a division of legislators by party explains the voting pattern better than one by geographical blocs or attitudinal considerations. From an analysis of the foreign policy related roll calls over the entire session, however, it is

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pectation of a good price for wheat in Autumn. Their pulse will be regulated by this, and not by the successes or disasters of the war. To keep open sufficient markets is the very first object towards maintaining the popularity of the war." Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 5, 1812, in Andrew A. Libscomb and Albert E. Bergh, eds., *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* XIII (Washington, D. C., 1907), 132; *New England Palladium,* Aug. 28, 1812. See also Irving Brant, *James Madison: Commander in Chief, 1812-1836* (Indianapolis, 1961), 104.

[28] The *Ind. Mag. of Hist.* devoted its June 1964 issue (Vol. LX) to the question of the War Hawks in the Twelfth Congress. The participants, Reginald Horsman, Roger H. Brown, Alexander DeConde, and Norman K. Risjord, observed that those legislators who should be termed hawks will long be the subject of debate because of the complex of factions and personalities composing the Republican party. For a recent study emphasizing the role of the War Hawks in the decision for war, see Harry W. Fritz, "The Collapse of Party: President, Congress, and the Decline of Party Action, 1807-1817" (Ph.D. diss., Washington University, 1971).

[29] Joseph Kent, the Federalist exception, is classified as a Republican by Roger Brown, *Republic in Peril,* 45; and Norman Risjord, "1812," *WMQ,* 3d Ser., XVIII (1961), 197. Leonard White, the Republican in the non-aggressive group, was actively involved in Federalist party activities in Massachusetts. Daniel A. White Collection, Essex Institute, Salem, Mass.

apparent that Brown understated his evidence in support of his major thesis of Republican concerns over their imperiled nation.

The importance of the search for party solidarity should not be lightly regarded. Although an aggressive attitude existed from the beginning of the session, there were numerous opportunities in the Twelfth Congress for divisive opinions on such topics as the timing of the declaration, the mobilization of a standing army before the outbreak of the war, and the means of financing the war effort to wreck the movement toward war. Felix Grundy of Tennessee spoke to his Republican colleagues on December 9, 1811, on the need for developing and adhering to a consensus:

My business at present is to address a particular portion of the members of this House—I mean, sir, the Republican members—and although what I am about to say might be deemed impolitic on ordinary subjects of legislation, yet, at this time and on this occasion, it would be criminal to conceal a single thought which might influence their determination. We should now, Mr. Speaker, forget little party animosities, we should mingle minds freely, and, as far as we are able, commune with the understandings of each other; and, the decision once made, let us become one people, and present an undivided front to the enemies of our country. Republicans should never forget that some years ago a set of men of different politics held the reins of this Government, and drove the car of State. . . . By a national sentence, the men then in power were taken down from their high places, and Republican men were put in their seats. If your minds are resolved on war, you are consistent, you are right, you are still Republicans; but if you are not resolved, pause and reflect, for should this resolution pass, and you then become faint-hearted, remember that you have abandoned your old principles, and trod in the paths of your predecessors.[80]

Late in the session, however, consensus ceased to attract a least one candid Republican congressman. Thomas Sammons of New York, a supporter of the additional troop levies and most of the war tax legislation (Table II), opposed the timing of the war declaration as potentially disastrous to the nation. Stressing the unprepared state of the country to conduct an offensive war, he attacked the majority of the Republican

[80] Grundy's speech came in response to John Randolph's objection to raising a standing army in peacetime because of accusations during John Adams's administration of Federalist intentions to use troops to curb internal dissent. Grundy argued that the army could be raised only for war purposes, if the Republicans were to be consistent in their thinking. *Annals of Congress,* 12th Cong., 1st sess., 423-424.

legislators as determined "to go to war at all events or under any cir-
cumstances whatever." Sammons, a staunch Republican who endorsed
the war's legitimacy if not its timing, bitterly lamented the partisanship
which he felt had contaminated the war issue: "The prejudices and self
will of parties and party men to support principles and measures right or
wrong if it is brought forward by their political friends has appeared to
me for some time verry dangerous, in perticular when it concerns our
for[e]ign relations, including Mr. Adams administration to the present.
[T]he federalists and republicans have each in turn supported and
opposed the same acts and measures with but few exceptions—no
reformation appears to take place every one is just all parties are right
at Least in their own opinion."[31]

In a similar vein, one of the older Federalists in the House, Daniel
Sheffey of Virginia, viewed circumstances leading to the declaration
of war in 1812 as being the same type of situation that the nation faced
in 1798. He depicted both occasions in terms of the deleterious impact
of partisan politics on foreign policy decision making: "It is but about
fourteen years ago, when the very men who now brand every person
with the name of tory and British partisan, merely because they think
the war impolitic—themselves opposed a war contemplated by their
government, and partially entered into against France. . . . We had
abundant cause for war—the only difference then and at present, is, that
the war then was waged against *France,* now it is waged against *En-
gland.* Then Federalists were the war spirits, now republicans (so
called) have stept into their principles. With the people, these *distinc-
tions* can make no difference; the effect on them will be the same, what-
ever nation may be the enemy."[32]

When historians debate the conflicting reasons for the declaration of
war in the House of Representatives in 1812, they generally minimize

[31] Thomas Sammons to James Lansing, May 9, 1812, Thomas Sammons Letters,
The Old Fort, Fort Johnson, N. Y. Writing to New York Governor Daniel B.
Tompkins the same day as the war was formally declared, he said: "I voted against
the declaration believing the United States were not prepared to prosecute the war
Immediately which in my opinion the safety and good of our country required."
Sammons to Tompkins, June 18, 1812, Daniel B. Tompkins Collection, Box 3, Pack-
age 3, New York State Library, Albany, N. Y.

[32] Daniel Sheffey, *The Honorable D. Sheffey (Member of Congress from Vir-
ginia) to His Constituents* (Washington, D. C., 1813), 15. This circular was evi-
dently printed at several places. The one to which I refer was printed in Lexington,
Ky., at the press of Thomas T. Skillman.

the importance of the legislators' partisan motivations. However, a congressman who broke party ties was an exceptional case, and both parties exhibited remarkably strong wills to survive as organizations when confronted with potentially disruptive pressures within or outside their ranks. The victorious Republican faction molded a consensus at the beginning of the session which favored a declaration of war and either adjusted or abandoned positions which threatened to destroy the cohesion necessary to realize its goal. By June the war issue had become so thoroughly entangled with partisan political strategies that the decision for war must be viewed in terms of Republican party unity.

Figure 1

Republican Party Index of Cohesion Values for Non-unanimous Foreign Policy Roll Calls
Twelfth Congress, First Session: House of Representatives

Figure 2

Federalist Party Index of Cohesion Values for Non-unanimous Foreign Policy Roll Calls
Twelfth Congress, First Session: House of Representatives

Figure 3
South and West Section
Pair-wise Voting Scores on Sixty-three Foreign Policy Roll Calls
Twelfth Congress, First Session: House of Representatives[a]

	Alston, R-NC	Bassett, R-Va	Lowndes, R-SC	Troup, R-Ga	Cheves, R-SC	Calhoun, R-SC	Roane, R-Va	Hibb, R-Va	Ormsby, R-Ky	Grundy, R-Te	New, R-Ky	Morrow, R-Oh	Johnson, R-Ky	Butler, R-SC	Hall, R-Ga	Pickens, R-NC	King, R-Va	Gholson, R-Va	McCoy, R-Va	Moore, R-SC	Frankl'n, R-NC	Earle, R-SC	Dawson, R-Va	Newton, R-Va	Cochran, R-NC	Sevier, R-Te	Rhea, R-Te	Winn, R-SC	Hawes, R-Va	Blackledge, R-NC	Burwell, R-Va	Smith, R, Va	Clay, R-Va
Alston, R-NC																						52								51			
Bassett, R-Va																							50										
Lowndes, R-SC																						52	51	50									
Troup, R-Ga																					50												
Cheves, R-SC																						52									51		
Calhoun, R-SC																																	
Roane, R-Va																																	
Hibb, R-Va																							51	50									
Ormsby, R-Ky																			51			50											
Grundy, R-Te																																	
New, R-Ky				53	52	53	52	54		51	55	52	50	51		50																	
Morrow, R-Oh			50	53	54	53	50	52	51		51	50	51			53		52		50				51									
Johnson, R-Ky																														50			
Butler, R-SC																									50								
Hall, R-Ga																																	
Pickens, R-NC																																	
King, R-Va																		53	50	50	53								53				
Gholson, R-Va																																	
McCoy, R-Va																		50	51	50	51												
McKee, R-Ky																		54	50	53													
Moore, R-SC																		50	50		51				50								
Franklin, R-NC				50	50	52																50	51										
Earle, R-SC	52	52									52											50	50		50								
Dawson, R-Va		51	52								51							51	50														
Newton, R-Va	50	50									50	50										51	50										
Cochran, R-NC											50		50			50																50	
Sevier, R-Te						51																				52							
Rhea, R-Te						50																			52								
Winn, R-SC																				50													
Hawes, R-Va											53																						
Blackledge, R-NC	51																																
Burwell, R-Va						50																											
Smith, R-Va			51																														
Clay, R-Va																						50											

[a] 80% agreement matrix

Figure 3
Continuation of Original Matrix

	McBryde, R-NC	Pearson, F-NC	(R-Va)	(F-Va)	(R-Va)	Sheffey, F-Va	(R-NC)	(F-Va)
McBryde, R-NC		50						
Pearson, F-NC	50		50		50			
Sheffey, F-Va						50		

Figure 3.1
Two Additional Blocs
Hidden in the Original Matrix

	Troup, R-Ga	Earle, R-SC	Dawson, R-Va	Newton, R-Va	Grundy, R-Te	Sevier, R-Te	Rhea, R-Te
Troup, R-Ga	\	52	51	50			
Earle, R-SC	52	\	50	51			
Dawson, R-Va	51	50	\	50			
Newton, R-Va	50	51	50	\			
Grundy, R-Te					\	51	50
Sevier, R-Te					51	\	52
Rhea, R-Te					50	52	\

Figure 4
Northeast Section
Pair-wise Voting Scores on Sixty-three Foreign Policy Roll Calls
Twelfth Congress, First Session: House of Representatives[a]

|	Fisk, R-Vt	Shaw, R-Vt	Dinsmoor, R-NH	Green, R-Ma	Hall, R-NH	Seaver, R-Ma	Strong, R-Vt	Harper, R-NH	Turner, R-Ma	Quincy, F-Ma	Reed, F-Ma	White, R-Ma	Brigham, F-Ma	Moseley, F-Ct	Sturges, F-Ct	Bigelow, F-Ma	Champion, F-Ct	Chittenden, F-Vt	Davenport, F-Ct	Ely, F-Ma	Jackson, F-RI	Law, F-Ct	Pitkin, F-Ct	Potter, F-RI	Taggart, F-Ma	Wheaton, F-Ma	Tallmadge, F-Ct
Fisk, R-Vt	\	52	51																								
Shaw, R-Vt	52	\	52																								
Dinsmoor, R-NH	51	52	\	52		52																					
Green, R-Ma			52	\	55	50				51																	
Hall, R-NH				55	\	54	50																				
Seaver, R-Ma			52	50	54	\	55																				
Strong, R-Vt					50	55	\																				
Harper, R-NH		52						\																			
Turner, R-Ma		51							\																		
Quincy, F-Ma				51						\	59																
Reed, F-Ma										59	\	50	51	51	51												
White, R-Ma											50	\	60	62	62	53	57	58	60	60	60	60	58	55	59	60	55
Brigham, F-Ma											51	60	\	61	61	54	58	57	61	59	59	59	59	58	58	59	56
Moseley, F-Ct											51	62	61	\	63	54	58	59	61	61	61	61	61	59	56	60	54
Sturges, F-Ct											51	62	61	63	\	54	58	59	61	61	61	61	61	59	56	60	54
Bigelow, F-Ma												53	54	54	54	\	51	50	52	52	52	52	52	50	51	51	54
Champion, F-Ct												57	58	58	58	51	\	56	60	56	60	58	56	53	55	58	53
Chittenden, F-Vt												58	57	59	59	50	56	\	57	61	57	57	59	56	60	59	54
Davenport, F-Ct												60	61	61	61	52	60	57	\	59	61	61	59	56	58	59	54
Ely, F-Ma												60	59	61	61	52	56	61	59	\	59	59	61	58	62	59	52
Jackson, F-RI												60	59	61	61	52	60	57	61	59	\	61	57	54	58	59	52
Law, F-Ct												60	59	61	61	52	58	57	61	59	61	\	57	54	58	59	54
Pitkin, F-Ct												58	59	59	59	50	56	59	59	61	57	57	\	58	60	57	52
Potter, F-RI												55	58	56	56	51	53	56	56	58	54	54	58	\	57	56	51
Taggart, F-Ma												59	58	60	60	51	55	60	58	62	58	58	60	57	\	58	53
Wheaton, F-Ma												60	59	61	61	54	58	59	59	59	59	59	57	56	58	\	54
Tallmadge, F-Ct												55	56	54	54	53	54	54	52	52	52	54	52	51	53	54	\

[a] 80% agreement matrix