Cannoneers in Gray: The Field Artillery of the Army of the Tennessee (Revised Edition). By Larry J. Daniel. (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2005. Pp. xi, 268.)
Once a neglected part of Civil War studies, the artillery now receives more attention and study, but the artillery of the Army of the Tennessee has not received as much attention as its counterpart in the army of Northern Virginia. With Cannoneers in Gray, Larry Daniel attempts to change that and give the long arm in the Army of the Tennessee its due. Faced with immediate problems and major deficiencies at the start of the war, the Confederate long arm in the western theatre never surpassed the Union long arm but was able to become a competent, working force in the army
Daniel divides the book into thirteen chapters with very helpful appendices, illustrated maps, and statistical charts to support his findings. The book moves chronologically, tracing the formation of the artillery corps, aspects of camp life, and following battles as they occur. Chapters include studies of the battles of Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Nashville, in which Daniel discusses the preliminary actions of the artillery, how the long arm was used during the battle, and after-action reports which discuss the long arm’s utilization. Using primary sources from the National Archives, the Tennessee State Archives, and various historical associations, Daniel paints a vivid picture of life in the long arm.
From the outset, the western long arm was plagued with problems. Few experienced artillery companies existed in the west, and those that did were quickly dispatched to the eastern theatre. There were a number of officers with experience in the artillery, but most of these had never experienced a real battle or even commanded an actual artillery company. Problems also existed in the logistics of supplying the long arm with proper equipment, and those supplies were often not enough. While the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond had been producing cannons for the government for many years, no large foundry existed in the west, and the Army of the Tennessee depended on several different sources for cannons until a national foundry was established in Georgia. This meant that the artillery corps relied on pieces already in existence; some of which were completely obsolete at the war’s outset. In addition, the lack of uniformity in cannon meant that there might not be enough of the proper ammunition. Problems with ammunition persisted for the army throughout the war. Faulty primers, non-uniform rounds, and improper powder were just some of the obstacles faced by the western long arm. A lack of horses also became a problem as the conflict wore on, and even when horses were available, implements such harnesses, caissons, and wagons were in short supply. However, the long arm weathered these storms, but Daniel argues that it never could overcome the problems of the command structure. The lack of veteran field officers with experience was immediate hurdle for the artillery corps, but this was eventually overcome with experience gained through early battles. The main problem lay in the high command’s inability to properly utilize the long arm in battle. Granted, the terrain often hindered the use of artillery, but even good terrain did not always help. The high command refused to change with the times and continued simply attaching a battery to a brigade instead of adopting a battalion structure. Daniel is especially critical of Braxton Bragg and John Bell Hood but does give some credit to Joseph E. Johnston for changing things to the battalion system, but it was too little too late. Bragg is especially criticized because he was an artillery officer and adopted a system of cronyism, promoting officers because of their loyalty to him and not necessarily their ability. By discussing these issues, Daniel achieves his goal of telling the story of the artillery corps in the Army of the Tennessee.
Daniel offers a detailed effort in his book and provides excellent source material and supporting evidence. However the book is not without flaws. No cohesive introduction or conclusion exists to truly move the reader into the subject. In addition, while the book offers specifics on battles, camp life and specifics of down time between campaigns are not discussed in detail. Nonetheless, Daniel has written a strong book and forged new paths for future research.
Texas Christian University Blake Hill
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Cannoneers in Gray: The Field Artillery of the Army of Tennessee, 1861-1865. By Larry J. Daniel. (University: University of Alabama Press, 1984. Pp. xi, 236.)
Historian Larry J. Daniel adds to the impressive historiography of the American Civil War with his book, Cannoneers in Gray (1984), by reviewing the history of the field artillery corps of the Confederate Army of Tennessee. Daniel contends that the artillery corps is an overlooked element in military history and one of his goals is to incorporate the story of the artillery corps into the scholarship on the Civil War. The artillery corps faced many challenges that included a constant lack of supplies and leadership that did not properly utilize the soldiers or the equipment. Daniel states that the story of the artillery corps is impressive for what it accomplished with the little supplies and the little support that it received. The artillery corps faced obstacles and challenges that the federal artillery did not have to endure and yet the artillery corps of the Army of Tennessee managed to persevere for the duration of the war.
The book is divided into sixteen chapters with an appendix of organization tables and helpful illustrations of soldiers, equipment, and battles. The author organized the chapters chronologically covering recognizable battles including Shiloh, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Atlanta, and Nashville. In each chapter, Daniel reviews the crucial elements of the battle, the problems the artillery corps faced, and the outcome for the artillery corps once the battle ended. Daniel used an impressive array of primary sources from the National Archives, the Tennessee State Archives, Tulane University, and various historical associations.
The author uses the artillery corps’ reenlistment rate as a testament to the character of the soldiers in the corps because more men reenlisted in the artillery corps in 1864 than any other branch of the Army of Tennessee (xi). Daniel states that the artillery corps main problem was ordnance and not the quality of the men. The Confederate Army lacked the necessary field artillery pieces for the corps and this greatly hampered their ability to defeat their enemy. Additionally, the field officers and battery commanders did not have the essential leadership skills to manage the artillery corps. While some officers did graduate from West Point or gained experience from their service in other wars, the officers and commanders used the artillery corps to gain experience and transfer to a different branch. The high turnover rate of officers left the artillery corps without adequate leadership, discipline, or guidance. At times, the men suffered greatly because they did not benefit from transporting their equipment by train and often had to move the artillery pieces with tired and weak horses. Other than General Joseph E. Johnson, the author criticizes the generals in charge of the artillery corps and their lack of understanding of how to use the artillery corps in battle. Daniel contends that the generals often improperly positioned the artillery corps on the terrain of the battlefield. The author skillfully depicts the harsh conditions and the lack of suitable leadership that the soldiers experienced. By reviewing these issues the author accomplished his goal of simply telling the field artillery’s story (xi).
The book contains a few weaknesses. First and foremost, knowledge of the Civil War, the major battles, and important military personnel is needed while reading Daniel’s publication. A novice reader of history could get confused because the author does not give background information or place the battles into a larger historical context. The absence of an introduction or conclusion chapter is unfortunate and throws a reader into the story without a proper guide. Cannoneers in Gray would be most useful for readers as a complimentary reading to a comprehensive publication on the Civil War. Overall, the author effectively achieves his objective of giving a voice and agency to the men of the field artillery corps of the Army of Tennessee and incorporates their accomplishments, despite their less than desirable support or leadership, into the historiography of the Civil War.
Texas Christian University Brooke Wibracht