Atlanta Will Fall: Sherman, Joe Johnston, and the Yankee Heavy Battalions. By Stephen Davis. The American Crisis Series: Books on the Civil War Era, No. 3. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2001. Pp. ix-203.)

 

            In Atlanta Will Fall: Sherman, Joe Johnston, and the Yankee Heavy Battalions, Stephen Davis contends that three factors ensured the Union capture of Atlanta: William T. Sherman’s good leadership, Joseph E. Johnston’s poor leadership, and Northern numerical superiority. The first part this book provides a supporting narrative for this thesis, while the second part of the book defends the corollary that John Bell Hood does not deserve blame for the fall of Atlanta (as some histories have claimed); by the time Hood gained command, that outcome was a fait accompli. After the Union trounced the Army of Tennessee at Missionary Ridge in November 1863, Davis argues nothing could be done to save Atlanta, given the Union numerical advantages, Johnston’s ineptitude and propensity for retreat, and Sherman’s strategic competence and aggressiveness. Hood fought hard and refused to retreat, but Johnston had conceded too much for Hood’s efforts to make a difference.

            The narrative begins with the predication of a Southern newspaper columnist in May 1864, warning that Atlanta would fall to Sherman, and identifying three reasons for this conclusion – Sherman’s skill, Johnston’s passiveness, and Northern numbers. A small campaign against Jackson, Mississippi, in 1863, pitted Sherman against Johnston and foreshadowed many elements of the Atlanta Campaign. Sherman “radiated confidence” while Johnston projected “hypercautiousness…and cantankerousness” (7). Davis provides a brief history of Johnston’s dismal record and his focus on fighting defensive battles and retreating. He emphasizes the contrast between the confidence of Sherman (which he connects to superior numbers) and the weakness that Johnston exhibited. Johnston was a decent administrator, but by March 1864, before the campaign even began, he was already thinking of retreating all the way to Atlanta. He often had no sense of initiative, preferring only to react to his enemy.

            Sherman consistently outmaneuvered Johnston, thanks to his vast army and to tactical errors by Johnston. Johnston knew of, yet failed to defend, the Snake Creek Gap that Sherman used to outflank Johnston’s first defensive position. Next Johnston retreated from Resaca, Georgia (Davis criticizes Sherman for letting Johnston escape on this occasion). The narrative becomes repetitive: Johnston took a defensive position, Sherman flanked it, Johnston chose to retreat rather than fight. Sherman occasionally made mistakes, such as his frontal assaults near Dallas and Kennesaw Mountain, but overall his handling of the campaign was masterful. Johnston, meanwhile, fixated on convincing other people to send cavalry strikes against Sherman’s rear (while neglecting to use his own cavalry for the task) and on retreating. Davis argues that numbers got into both commanders’ heads, the Union’s superiority enhancing Sherman’s confidence while undermining Johnston’s ability to command. Davis also consistently favors Hood throughout the narrative, explaining away failures and commending his willingness to attack.

            Johnston eventually removed everyone’s hope that he would defend Atlanta, precipitating fevered letter exchanges and frantic cabinet meetings for Jefferson Davis, before he replaced Johnston with Hood. Hood (presented here with an almost sterling record) was an aggressive disciple of Robert E. Lee and Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson. Davis takes care to dispel as unsubstantiated past claims that painkillers impaired Hood’s competence. Hood’s most serious failing was “a quite ordinary inability to control events” (136). While Davis chides Sherman for dishonorably shelling Atlanta without prior warning, he praise Hood for launching attacks that partook of the tactical genius of Lee and Jackson. Hood’s “brilliant plan” floundered due to “the fog of war” or “friction of war” (139). Fascinatingly, the Confederate cavalry that Johnston failed to use turned out to be undisciplined and ineffective once Hood attempted to employ them. Hood put up a “fierce, manly struggle,” but despite “admirably” and “heroically” fighting for the South, Sherman and superior Union forces ultimately prevailed (199-200).

This excellent volume has few weaknesses (though Davis’s interpretation of Hood may seem remarkably positive). Nonetheless, the substance of Davis’s case against Johnston and his broader contention about the three reasons Atlanta fell both seem sound. Had the Union not fielded such a strong army, not had as determined a commander as Sherman, or not faced as ineffective a commander as Johnston, perhaps Atlanta would not have fallen; together those three factors guaranteed its fall. This incisive account is aimed more at lay than scholarly readers, but the endnotes and a brief essay on sources provide a helpful starting point for further study. The fall of Atlanta ranked among the crucial developments of the Civil War, and Davis has done an excellent job of bringing clarity that event.

 

Jonathan T. Engel

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Atlanta Will Fall: Sherman, Joe Johnston, and the Yankee Heavy Battalions.  By Stephen Davis. (Wilmington: SR Books, c. 2001).         

 

Southern journalist Henry Watterson, writing under the pen name “Shadow” for a Mobile newspaper, predicted Atlanta’s demise in May 1864 bluntly writing, “I think Atlanta will fall”(Davis, 3).  Stephen Davis borrows from Watterson’s analysis arguing that three factors contributed to Union victory during the Atlanta campaign.  According to Davis, Union numerical superiority, Sherman’s military genius, and Joe Johnston’s martial inferiority combined in order to secure Northern victory during this pivotal campaign (Davis, 4).

            Davis divides his book into two parts.  The first part examines Sherman’s campaign against Joe Johnston, while the second half discusses Sherman’s conflict with John Bell Hood.  Davis begins with a brief dissection of the Mississippi campaign in which Sherman first outmaneuvered Joe Johnston.  He believes that this incident foreshadows Johnston’s larger loss at Atlanta.  In Mississippi, Sherman displayed superior generalship thereby defeating Johnston.  Davis goes on to explain how Johnston earned his reputation as the foremost retreater of the Civil War.  Johnston’s proclivity to seek a defensive battle and propensity for hasty withdrawals began during the Peninsula campaign of 1862.  This reputation followed him for the remainder of the war and he repeated his mistakes during the Atlanta campaign in 1864.  Subsequently, Davis explains the Union strategy during 1864.  Grant ordered Sherman, leading the Armies of the Tennessee, the Ohio, and the Cumberland, to drive from Tennessee towards Atlanta in the hopes of destroying the Confederate Army of Tennessee.  Meanwhile, Grant, recently promoted to commander of all Union armies, would face Robert E. Lee in Virginia with the Army of the Potomac. 

Sherman proceeded to drive southeast towards Atlanta turning Johnston at Mill Creek Gap, Resaca, and New Hope Church.  By early June, Johnston was within twenty five-miles of Atlanta.   Sherman did, however, make one unsuccessful frontal assault against an entrenched Confederate line at Kennesaw Mountain.  Nevertheless, Sherman proceeded to turn Johnston’s line yet again forcing the Confederate general to retreat to the Chattahoochee River – the last natural defensive barrier between the Union army and Atlanta.  Yet, Johnston bungled this defensive opportunity and forfeited the river to Sherman’s advancing army.  Confederate President Jefferson Davis consistently hounded Johnston to engage the Union forces throughout the campaign.  In July 1864, Davis queried Johnston as to his plans for Atlanta’s defense.  Johnston replied that he intended to leave Atlanta’s defenses in the hands of the Georgia militia in order to free his army up for wider movements against Sherman.  An outraged Jefferson Davis relieved Johnston of command on July 17, 1864 and promoted John Bell Hood to command the Army of Tennessee.

The second half of Davis’s book examines the campaign between Sherman and Hood.  Historians over the years have consistently blamed Hood for Atlanta’s fall.  Davis, however, disagrees with this stating the Hood inherited an untenable situation from Johnston.  Thus, the author blames Joe Johnston for Atlanta’s capitulation thereby exonerating Hood from blame. 

This segment begins with Davis explaining how Hood was a student of the “Lee and Jackson School” (Davis, 127).  Hood, after the war, claimed to have learned the art of generalship from these two military geniuses.  Next, Davis describes Hood’s attempts to dislodge Sherman from the outskirts of Atlanta.  The Confederate general attempted a series of offensives resulting in the battles of Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, and Ezra Church.  The unsuccessful attacks depleted Hood’s army forcing him to seek shelter behind Atlanta’s defenses.  A brief siege commenced in which Sherman attempted to bombard the city into submission.  This, however, proved ineffective and Sherman decided to mount a large turning movement south of the city in order to cut the Macon & Western Railroad.  An intelligence game ensued in which Hood could not ascertain Sherman’s movements south of the city, “Hood figured Sherman was heading for the railroad, but he did not know precisely where . . . Clearly, though, the main enemy threat would be against the Macon & Western somewhere between East Point and Jonesboro”(Davis, 181).  The Union army achieved a one sided victory at Jonesboro and cut the last remaining rail line into Atlanta.  Hood, unable to receive supplies from outside Atlanta, abandoned the city the next day. 

The second segment ends with Davis fiercely defending Hood.  According to Davis, “writers in their blunter passages have in fact portrayed the Confederate commander at Atlanta as befuddled, deluded, or asleep” (Davis, 188).  The author, however, believes that this assessment is unfair and compares Hood’s situation at Jonesboro with Lee’s situation in Virginia along the James River seeking to understand why the former failed while the latter succeeded.  Davis resolves that Lee contained advantages at Petersburg that Hood did not have at Jonesboro including reserves and entrenchments.  Furthermore, Grant’s targeting of Petersburg proved obvious due to the city’s significance as a rail depot.  Meanwhile, Sherman simply needed to cut the Macon & Western somewhere along a six mile front south of Atlanta.  Yet, Davis does not seek to discredit Sherman’s brilliance and concedes that, “just as Lee was outgeneraled at the James, so was Hood at Jonesboro” (Davis, 190). 

Davis’s overall conclusion remains a reiteration of his overarching thesis that Sherman’s brilliance, Johnston’s inadequacies, and the Yankee heavy battalions operated simultaneously resulting in Union victory.  Furthermore, he provides a lengthy commentary exonerating Hood from all blame for Atlanta’s capitulation claiming that historians should regard Johnston as the true culprit. (Davis, 199-200).  Yet, one should note that Hood, while a capable field general, never displayed the aptitude to become an army commander.  Other Confederate generals such as Pat Cleburne might have better filled the position as head of the Army of Tennessee.  Thus, Davis’s overt defense of John Bell Hood becomes questionable towards the end of the book.   Nevertheless, while Albert Castel’s Decision in the West (1992) remains the most detailed account of the Atlanta Campaign, Davis’s book provides an excellent overview and thoughtful analysis.  Students of the Atlanta campaign will appreciate this survey.   

 

Texas Christian University                                                                                                               Justin S. Solonick