And Keep Moving On

And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864. By Mark Grimsley. Great Campaigns of the Civil War. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2002. Pp. xii-239.)

Was Ulysses S. Grant a butcher who callously tossed thousands of lives into the meat grinder of Robert E. Lee’s tactical brilliance in a deliberate campaign of attrition? Mark Grimsley challenges this old interpretation in And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864. This synthesis, examining the campaign in Virginia as a whole, presents a more unified and balanced view of Grant’s efforts than some of the long-standing mythology. Foremost among Grimsley’s points is that Grant was not the brute people then and later made him out to be, and that even though Grant did not achieve all his goals, he advanced the Union war effort. Grimsley also emphasizes the connection between the Overland Campaign and the efforts by Franz Sigel in the Shenandoah, Benjamin Butler at Bermuda Hundred, two other missions in southwestern Virginia, and a major cavalry raid by Phil Sheridan. All these Union efforts, intended to divide Confederate forces, must be considered as a whole to understand the outcome of Grant’s plan and the campaign. One also becomes conscious of the role politics played in the Union war plans for 1864, as Grant had to accommodate politically influential if militarily inept generals like Butler and Sigel.

An opening chapter establishes the Union campaign plans and discusses the state of two main armies when the campaign began in May 1864. Both armies faced confusion amid the Wilderness, but Grant maintained the offensive – something no previous commander of the Army of the Potomac would have done after a hard battle. The armies next pounded each other at Spotsylvania, where fruitless assaults proved vain Grant’s hopes of punching through Lee’s weakened lines. That Lee could receive much-needed reinforcements from other sectors after these battles highlighted the failure of Grant’s overall plan. Grant hoped a coordinated effort would stretch and weaken Confederate forces; the failures of Sigel, George Crook, and William Averell in the Shenandoah and southwestern Virginia allowed the Confederacy to reinforce Lee. Grimsley’s explanation for the Union failure is simple. Aside from Grant and Sheridan (who both came from the western theater), Union commanders in the east were simply too afraid of the Confederates to press their opportunities. Grimsley’s narrative has few villains (even oft-maligned Butler receives a slightly sympathetic portrayal), just many men who tried but sometimes made bad decisions. He makes an exception for Franz Sigel, however. Grimsley’s conclusion is clear: the man was remarkably idiotic.

Grant continued trying to turn Lee’s flank, or to bait Lee into attacking. The campaign culminated in the disastrous, uncoordinated Union attack against Confederate entrenchments at Cold Harbor. When that failed and the Army of the Potomac ran out of room to maneuver, Grant shifted to cutting off the supplies the Army of Northern Virginia needed, which led to the siege of Petersburg. Grimsley incisively notes that the deadlock of Petersburg colored the way people saw the Overland Campaign; had the North quickly seized Petersburg, the Overland Campaign might have seemed the prologue to brilliant success. The high cost of the campaign fixed on Grant the reputation of a butcher. Grimsley devotes a powerful chapter to describing the suffering of soldiers; he blends topics like flight, capture, hospitals, death, food, poison ivy, lice, and psychology in a powerful summary of the average fighting man’s experience.

An insightful final chapter discusses the myths that developed about the Virginia campaign. Grant deprived Lee of the initiative, maintained crushing pressure on Lee that eventually broke the Army of Northern Virginia, lost the same proportion of men from his army as Lee did, and moved the Union closer to winning the war. However, Grant’s detractors have viewed him as a butcher who relied on attrition rather than fighting smartly. The Lost Cause mythmakers, more than anyone else, wrongly attached the attrition strategy to Grant; they depict Lee outgeneraling Grant at every turn, but heroically losing because of being bludgeoned down by Grant’s overwhelming force. Grimsley insists that Grant did not intend a policy of attrition with his attacks; he seriously (albeit incorrectly) believed a hard push or two would break Lee’s weakened lines. Grimsley also identifies a fundamental difference between the command styles of Grant and Meade. Grant had the ability to react to circumstances, while the eastern generals obsessed over controlling their circumstances, and floundered when they could not. A few annoying typographical errors mar this work, such as obviously incorrect dates or mislabeled map legends (14, 31). An excellent essay on further reading outlines key secondary sources. Grimsley’s work is an invaluable guide to any reader seeking to better understand the latter phase of the Civil War in the east.

Jonathan T. Engel

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And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864. By Mark Grimsley. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

As part of the Great Campaigns of the Civil War series, And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864 offers a thorough synthesis of the six week struggle for Virginia between Ulysses Grant’s Army of the Potomac and Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Professor of History at Ohio State University, Mark Grimsley’s meticulous account of the Overland campaign reveals an in depth look at both armies key and supporting commanders, plans and strategies and the overall significance of this battle. In addition, the author positions his study in a political and social context that provides an even greater significance for this particular conflict.

Grimsley commences his work with a chapter that focuses on Grant’s arrival into Virginia, his plan of action, and those supporting commanders that would assist in Grant’s plan to defeat Lee’s Army. His strategy consisted of four subsidiary offenses: two in southwestern Virginia against Confederate saltworks, lead mines, and railroads; a third in the Shenandoah Valley under Major General Franz Sigel; and a fourth in the James River under Major General Benjamin Butler. (xiv) The central goal was to weaken Lee’s army in an effort to achieve a victory. Ultimately, this proved problematic as the opening battle of the wilderness failed to injure the confederates, but rather forced the federals to retreat. From there Grant sent his army to Spotsylvania Courthouse, where he met Lee and his army. The battle that ensued proved successful for the federals, for a bit at least, as Union soldiers successfully targeted a confederate line that was not heavily defended. After this battle, Grant sent his army down to Cold Harbor where another long battle ensued and witnessed Grant’s retreat. While Grant seemed to incur blunders of different sorts along his pursuit of the confederacy, the author suggests that Grant’s overall agenda centered on wearing the Confederates down. Lee was seen as a formidable general and his surrender would demand a careful and thoughtful undertaking. Thus, Grant decided to attack the Army of Virginia head-on, with an incredible amount of man-power and intentions of wearing down his impenetrable force. While high causalities ensued both Grant and Lincoln felt that this operation remained important as it could finally bring an end to the Civil War.

Throughout the narrative, the author continually expounds upon strategic initiative developed by Grant in order to push back Lee’s army and capture Richmond. Within his rendition of these plans, the author reveals the tension between Lee and Grant as they try to disengage the respective enemy. The author does a very nice job of exposing Grant’s true character, particularly examining his keen military sense, his desire to crush the Confederate soldier and his dry personality. Conversely, Grimsley offers a similar description of General Lee that reveals his motivations and doubts. Overall, Grimsley attention to both commanding generals and soldiers adds a personal element to his story. His writing is clear and thoughtful, leaving the lay historian to appreciate his explanation of the various strategies used during the struggle. Furthermore, the author final chapter on the significance of the Overland Operation puts this struggle into context and elucidates on its overall importance to the Civil War and the Union. And Keep Moving On will surely add another great addition to the existing historiography of the Civil War.

Amber Surmiller Texas Christian University

And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864. By Mark Grimsley. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

In this work, Mark Grimsley, military historian at Ohio State University, provides an insightful history of the 1864 Virginia Campaign which pitted Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, “the butcher” against “the fox” Gen. Robert E. Lee. Though the majority of the work is devoted to detailing the various battles, skirmishes, and movements of the campaign, Grimsley breaks new ground through an analysis of the political significance of the campaign and detailing the grim and, at time, grizzly experience of the common soldier. Ultimately, these discussions add new significance to a campaign which ended in stalemate. Grimsley argues that political developments in Washington, particularly the reelection of Lincoln, played an important role in Grants purpose and approach to this campaign. Moreover, the qualitative depictions of the carnage experienced during this campaign move the discussion beyond previous quantitative depictions based solely upon the numbers of deaths, wounded, and captured.

With Grant’s crossing of the Rapidan River on 4 May 1864, began a month long campaign, the longest, most sustained, and bloodiest campaign of the Civil War. The outcome of the campaign was believed to be crucial to presidential campaign of 1864. If America public believed they were losing the war, it was likely that Lincoln would return for a second term and be succeeded by a democrat. Lincoln feared that a democrat would not emancipate the slaves nor support the war. With the support of Lincoln, Grant, newly appointed Lt. General, shifted the military aims of the North. Beginning with this campaign, the destruction of Army of Northern Virginia became Grant’s paramount military objective rather than taking tactical cities. During the forty days of the campaign, Grant relentlessly pursued the Army of Northern Virginia not allowing Lee to create an advantageous position from which to initiate battle. As a result of Grant’s unyielding pursuit he became known as “the butcher.” During the Virginia campaign this pursuit resulted in heavy death tolls, yet produced limited if any advances upon the enemy. Perhaps the best example is the third battle at Cold Harbor. The dawn attack witnessed the bloodiest half hour in the history of the Civil War resulting in the loss of nearly 7,000 men, but achieved no decisive advantages. Grimsley, however, challenges the depiction of Grant as a butcher arguing he truly believed Lee’s army was coming apart.

Despite the length of the struggle and lives lost, the campaign resulted in a stalemate at the Petersburg. Grimsley argues that several factors contributed the campaign’s anticlimactic finish, particularly the poor performances of Grant’s commanding leadership. At the outset of the campaign Grant initiated several subsidiary offensive campaigns. The goal of these campaigns, lead by William W. Averell, George Crook, Franz Sigel and Benjamin Butler, was to create pressure on the Confederates and prevent the sending of reinforcements to Lee’s army. In each instance these campaigns ultimately failed to bring enduring pressure to bear upon the confederates. Grimsley notes that Lee was served much better by his commanding officers.

Grimsley, also devotes a chapter to the experiences of the common soldier during the campaign. He details the process of rendering medical aid to those who fell during combat and their transportation to field hospitals and onto Fredericksburg. Often those wounded lingered for days in the battle field waiting for rescue. Often doctors had to prioritize who received treatment. Those earmarked for death were often still conscious. Grimsley also describes the process of capture. He notes that Grant’s ending of the prisoner exchange with the Confederates may have been part of his overarching plan to destroy the Confederate army by relieving them of man power. Grimsley also describes the daily experiences of the soldier including fatigue, inadequate rations, lack of water, and diarrhea. During the portion of the campaign fought in heavy brush, soldiers also often suffered from poison ivy, wood ticks, and lice.

Despite the campaign’s dubious conclusion, Grimsley, convincingly argues for its significance to American political developments. He also demonstrates its importance to lost cause myth which continues to penetrate historical interpretations of the Civil War. Moreover, Grimsley’s depiction of the experiences of the common soldier brings to life the horrific battle conditions experienced during the Civil War.

And Keep Moving On: The Virginia Campaign, May-June 1864. By Mark Grimsley. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002. Pp. xx, 282.

According to Ulysses S. Grant, "The art of war . . . is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on" (1). This approach to warfare traveled with Grant when he moved from the western theater of the Civil War to combat General Robert E. Lee and his seemingly invincible Army of Northern Virginia. The Civil War had seen nothing like the spring campaigns that Lee and Grant commanded in 1864. These faithful months forced the two most successful generals to go head to head in a fight that became famous even before it began. Some citizens and soldiers knew of Grant’s successes in the West but worried as he had never faced the legendary Bobby Lee.

When Grant arrived in Culpeper Court House, Virginia, on March 25, 1864, no citizens met him with fanfare or ceremony. He cared little for such performances and began meeting with his subordinate officers to explain the movement and objectives required in the next few months. First, the Federal strategy under Grant targeted the Confederate army as the main focus of their attack rather than cities or other objectives. Next, Grant hoped to secure victories through maneuver if possible. In the end, he accepted attrition. The Army of the Potomac relentlessly attacked Confederate supply lines while using the North’s superior manpower and supplies to wear down Confederate resistance. Finally, and most importantly, the Union armies maintained a continual pursuit and constant pressure against the Confederate troops, something they had not experienced against previous Union generals. When explaining his plan to Abraham Lincoln, the president immediately understood and replied, “[A]s we say out West, if a man can’t skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does” (3).

When the Overland Campaign commenced on May 4, 1864, neither side realized what devastation the next several weeks would bring to both armies. After a harrowing battle at the Wilderness, losing JEB Stuart at Spotsylvania Court House, engagements along the North Anna River, and the destruction at Cold Harbor, “both armies emerged from the campaign as shadows of their former selves” (xv). When the campaign through Virginia ended forty days later on June 12, the armies tallied the results of the battles. The Confederates lost a third of its senior leadership and 33,000 of its veteran soldiers. The combination leadership under George Meade and Grant lost a proportional number of officers and 55,000 Federals were killed, wounded or captured by Confederate troops. Yet despite such incredible losses, Grant remained calm. Assessing the damage, he re-grouped his remaining soldiers and officers and kept moving on to commence the Petersburg campaign.

Grimsley focuses on the leadership and decision-making of Confederate and Union generals throughout the book. While some historians have shifted their research and publication efforts to present the experience of the common soldier, Grimsley explains his choice in presenting the campaign through the leading officers. “[T]hese men initiate the battle and give meaning to the outcome” (xvi). Grimsley views these men with great sympathy and passes judgment on them only when necessary. He considers them capable men working under tremendous stress and circumstances.

Grimsley has been criticized for this work as it revises no serious historiographical argument or resurrects any historical reputation that has been dragged through the mud by scholars. His book acts a fine piece of synthesis a fact which he states in the Acknowledgements. But his final chapter entitled “The Campaign’s Significance” brings to light three major developments following the Overland Campaign. First, the campaign would have been seen as the final act before Confederate surrender had Grant had managed to defeat Lee in the open field. Instead, the campaign was considered somewhat of a defeat because it ended with a ten-month long stalemate at Petersburg. Second, the Overland Campaign led to a realization among Union officers and forces of the inefficiency which existed because of the joint Meade-Grant command. Meade’s desired control in warfare—control of his officers, supplies, and all other resources—in order to achieve victory. This approach contrasted greatly with Grant’s coping style in warfare. Always focused on the ultimate objective, Grant’s ability to remain composed, reorganize, and improvise in battle eventually ended the war.

Finally, Grimsley makes some interesting observations about the perceptions of Lee and Grant after the Overland Campaign. The appraisal of Lee as a fox in battle and Grant as a murderous bludgeoner is erroneous when closely analyzed. Lee and Grant were all but identical in command style. However, the need to view Lee and the Confederacy as facing defeat with courage and dignity (and thus contribute to the Lost Cause) also dictates the need for another image. “ . . . Grant the implacable, Grant the hammerer, Grant the man who, despite everything, keeps moving on” (239).