Why The South lost the Civil War. By Richard E. Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, William N. Still, Jr. (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, c. 1986. ISBN 0-8203-0815-3).
The authors’ intent in this work is to encourage a new and complex interpretation of why the South lost the Civil War. This book was partly a response to David Donald’s work, Why the North Won the Civil War, which was published in 1960. A main point of emphasis for the authors is attacking commonly accepted explanations for Southern defeat, which they feel are outdated and too simplistic. Many historians and non-historians alike contribute the loss of the civil war to the lack of manpower and resources that the Confederacy faced. In their collective opinion, it is easy to analyze the population numbers as well as the superior industrialization of the North, and come to the conclusion that the South was doomed from the beginning. Instead, it was quite the opposite, and the South had the ability to be victorious during the war, or at least force a negotiated settlement from the North.
This work begins with the authors claiming that many previous historians misunderstood the writings of the military theorists Antoine Jomini and Karl Von Clausewitz. For example, Jomini placed less importance on the taking and holding of territory than some historians believed. In addition to this, the authors claim that the majority of Civil War generals found Clausewitz more influential than Jomini. Clausewitz emphasized tactical defense and the strength of defensive field entrenchments. Therefore, the authors convey that many Southern generals had a more defensive mindset than previously thought, and that at times, Southern generals took the initiative as a tactical way of being defensive. Historians such as Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson disagree, and claim that the South lost the Civil War due to their tendency to make costly frontal assaults. This claim was made in their book, Attack and Die: Civil War Military tactics and Southern Heritage, as they argue that it was the Celtic background of the South that inspired many of these reckless attacks. Hattaway and his fellow authors meanwhile argue that Confederate armies attacked less then Union armies and sustained only a slightly greater percentage of casualties. Therefore, the Confederates had a more defensive mindset than McWhiney and Jamieson claimed. Due to this defensive orientation and other military advantages such as the long-range rifle, the authors conclude that the Confederacy had several military assets in their favor as the war began.
While the Union put more men into arms than did the Confederacy during the war, the South mobilized its population at a higher degree than did the North. The South was more effective than the North at conscription and put an astounding number of men into battle given its population constraints. Even towards the end of the war, the authors claim that the South still contained the necessary amount of men needed to achieve their aims. Therefore the main reason the South lost the war was not a lack of men, firepower, or resources, rather it was the lack of southern commitment to the cause.
The authors claim that the fragile sense of Confederate nationalism was the main cause for the Southern defeat during the Civil War. They argue that many Southern citizens were not fully committed to the Confederate cause. Instead many supported the cause for fear of being castigated by their neighbors and community. Therefore once the tide of the Civil War turned in Northern favor, many Southerners did not have the resolve to withstand the North. By pointing to high Southern desertion rates, particularly those by soldiers who deserted once their homes were occupied by Northern soldiers, the authors illustrate this point effectively. For many men of the South, they fought the war to protect their homes and families, and once those were in the hands of the North, there was no longer a reason to fight. Basically, the amount of men that were true Confederates at heart and willing to fight to the last man were not seen in high numbers. In discussing Confederate nationalism, the authors convey the direct link of this nationalism to the South’s evangelical religion. The religion of many Southerners bolstered their war efforts and desire to fight the war, yet by 1864 this desire began to fade. Consequently, many preachers looked to reasons for the demise of the South and concluded that the South was being punished for its sins. The most notable of these sins was slavery, and many preachers conveyed that the South was bound to lose this war because God was punishing them for slavery. As it became evident that the South would lose the war in the years of 1864 and 1865, many Southerners felt guilt over slavery as claimed by the authors. Throughout this work, previously held notions of why the South lost the war are challenged, as the authors convey the importance of opening a fresh debate on why the South lost the Civil War.
Albert Cox
Texas Christian University