Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign: The Last Great Battles of the Civil War.  By Chester G. Hearn.  (Jefferson: MacFarland, 1993)

            In August of 1864, Union naval forces under the command of David Glasgow Farragut closed to the last remaining major Confederate seaport when they captured Mobile, Alabama.  Though a major target for Farragut ever since his successful capture of New Orleans, Louisiana in April of 1862, scattered Union naval resources continued to put off the closure of the only other major Confederate port on the Gulf Coast for over two years.  In his work Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign Chester G. Hearn explores the military situation in Mobile through much of the war and the naval and land battles that culminated in that city’s capture. 

            Like most Gulf Coast operations throughout the war, Mobile’s defense and capture remained in the shadow of larger operations in Virginia and Tennessee for much of the war.  That both Union and Confederate officials consistently overlooked the Gulf Coast is surprising given the importance of that region in supplying the Confederacy with foreign resources and in its role in exporting cotton to foreign markets and thus supplying the Confederacy with international support.  Indeed, throughout much of the war Mobile witnessed, on the Confederate side, a revolving door of military commanders who the Confederate War Department moved out of the area once their competence became apparent.  The resulting situation left Mobile’s defenses in a constant state of want and incompletion until the spring of 1864 when finally a permanent commander settled into office, Richard Page.  The naval situation for the Confederate forces in Mobile stood on good legs under the command of Franklin Buchanan, a distinguished naval officer.  However, Buchanan’s authority stopped at the shoreline and he could do little to influence the construction of fortifications around the bay.  Instead, Buchanan exerted all of his energy on the construction of a number of ironclad gunboats that could be used in the event of Union assaults to force the bay’s opening.  Those gunboats caused considerable trepidation to Farragut, who had heard of their impeding construction as soon as he captured New Orleans.  As Hearn shows, Farragut argued vociferously for permission to assault Mobile before the ironclads became seaworthy.  Despite Farragut’s pleadings, he would have to wait over two years for his chance to assault Mobile.  

            The intervening time provided Farragut ample opportunity to plan his assault, and Union army and Navy forces worked in much closer concert during the campaign than did their Confederate counterparts.  As a result, of these preparations, Farragut’s ship captains knew their assigned roles and those of their colleagues.  In addition, Farragut worked closely with the union army commander Gordon Granger.  Granger acquiesced to Farragut’s plan since the latter had spent much more time researching the options available to them.  Union army and navy forces even exchanged signal troops so that both branches could keep in close contact through out the inevitable confusion of the attack.  Thus, the battle of Mobile Bay contains striking relevance, not only for its role in the American Civil War, but also its use as a case study in combined operations.  Confederate forces never attained the unity of command that Union forces did and therefore there was little synergy between Confederate planning on land and sea in the defense of Mobile.  Conversely, Union forces had unity of command and a common operational model to work with. Chester G. Hearn’s Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign is of use to not only academic students of military history, but also practical students of the field.

Joseph Stoltz                                                                                Texas Christian University