Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign: The Last Great Battles of the Civil War. By Chester G. Hearn. (McFarland & Company Inc. Publishers Jefferson North Carolina and London, 1993)          

The last years of the Civil War saw marked advances in technology and the science of warfare. Among the innovations that took hold were ironclad warships, mines, known as torpedoes, and joint land water operations. The campaign to capture Mobile Alabama from August 1864 to April 1865 embodied the use of all the innovations listed above.

            In Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign, Chester Hearn begins by chronicling the advances in technology during the last years of the Civil War and the defenses of Mobile Bay. As early as 1862 rumors began reaching Union authorities at New Orleans of Confederate efforts to construct and outfit ironclad rams with which to break the blockade and establish Confederate naval superiority. “Ram fever” quickly took hold of the imaginations of the Federals, and they feared an attack at any moment. In reality the Confederates were building rams, but they were not so fierce some as the Yankees imagined. Confederate Secretary of the Navy Stephen R. Mallory began a project at Selma, Alabama to construct several ironclad rams. Admiral Franklin Buchanan, who had gained fame as captain of the Virginia in 1862, was sent to oversee the project. Buchanan quickly concentrated all of his efforts on the construction of the ram Tennessee, to the neglect of the other projects. He hoped to be done by the fall of 1863, but instead the Tennessee was not launched until February 1864. Hearn credits Mallory’s program with encouraging the U.S. government to concentrate on building armored Monitors, thereby immeasurably aiding Admiral David Farragut in his campaign to capture Mobile.

            A second innovation the Confederates employed were torpedoes, mines, set to detonate on contact with an enemy vessel. Confederate Captain Mathew Maury was the inventor of these “infernal devices” for the Confederacy, and soon the entrance to Mobile Bay was covered with them, lurking just below the surface. However, because of substandard materials, Confederate mines didn’t always detonate as they were supposed to, which severely limited their effectiveness. Buchanan and Maury depended heavily on these torpedoes to defend Mobile Bay, while Admiral Farragut didn’t give them enough credibility. They did play a role in the Battle of Mobile Bay, but not as much of one as would have been expected.

            Admiral David Farragut had wanted to attack and capture Mobile Bay for some time and with the fall of Port Hudson on July 8, 1863 he thought he saw his chance. But Washington had other ideas, and Farragut was forced to wait for infantry support until after the Red River Campaign in the spring of 1864. Finally in August everything was ready. Farragut was loaned part of the XIII Corps under Major General Gordon Granger to cooperate in capturing the Confederate forts while his ships forced their way into the bay.

At 6 a.m. on August 5, Farragut and his fleet steamed toward the entrance to Mobile Bay. Farragut, a traditionalist in his outlook, had fourteen wooden vessels and four ironclad monitors in his fleet as he approached the bay mouth. The Federal ironclad Tecumseh was in the lead as the fleet began to steam past Fort Morgan and the Tennessee, anchored beneath her guns. Just as the Tennessee prepared to open fire on the Tecumseh, the Union vessel struck a torpedo and sank to the bottom, carrying her captain with her. Admiral Farragut, lashed to the rigging of his flagship the Hartford, was at a moment of decision. With the sinking of the Tecumseh, he couldn’t decide whether to advance or retreat. As he hesitated, the fire from Fort Morgan began striking the Hartford. Farragut made up his mind to advance with the epitaph “Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!”

The Union fleet made it past Fort Morgan and dodged the Tennessee, which was too slow to keep up before they anchored out of range in Mobile Bay. Buchanan decided to pursue and caught up with the Hartford and the other ships in the bay where a fierce battle ensued. Eventually the Tennessee’s rudder was shot away, leaving her to the merciless pounding of the Monitors. Buchanan soon made the decision to surrender, ending the Battle of Mobile Bay.

By August 23, Granger had captured Forts Morgan, Gaines and Powell. All that remained was to capture the city of Mobile itself and the surrounding defenses. On March 17, 1865 Major General E.R.S. Canby led an expedition totaling forty-five thousand troops against the defenses of Mobile. Ten thousand Confederates under the command of Major General Dabney H. Maury defended the city. Canby approached from the east via Pensacola and invested Spanish Fort on March 27 with thirty-two thousand men of the XVI and XIII Corps. On April 4, Union General Frederick Steele converged on Fort Blakely, five miles north of Spanish Fort, and laid siege to it with his thirteen thousand men. Maury was forced to split his smaller force to defend both places. On April 8, Brigadier General Randall L. Gibson surrendered Spanish Fort and the next day Blakely also surrendered, leaving Mobile to Canby. Maury withdrew his remaining four thousand men inland where General Richard Taylor surrendered them on May 4, 1865. Mobile was finally under Union control.

Hearn does a good job writing Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign, but some of the material early on in the book is not always clear how it bears on the main subject at hand. In addition, his excessive use of block quotes is quite frustrating for anyone searching for the semblance of a narrative. However, that said, Mobile Bay and the Mobile Campaign is an imminently readable and authoritative account of these last great battles of the Civil War.

 John R. Lundberg