The Battle of Belmont: Grant Strikes South. By Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1991. Pp. xviii, 310)

In his thorough book, Hughes recounts the opening salvo in the western front of the Civil War that began November 7, 1861. Sent out under orders Major General John Frémont, a young and battle hungry Ulysses S. Grant instructed some 3,000 men down the Missouri River under the auspice of a “demonstration on Columbus.” Though historians disagree as to when and how the decision was made to engage forces at Belmont, Hughes contends that Grant’s correspondence refers to his continued frustration over military inaction suggesting that what ensued was more than mere coincidence.(52)

As Grant’s forces landed at Hunter’s Farm, a brief exchange of fire sent enemy scouts fleeing and the invasion force unloaded without further incident by 8:30am. Two timberclad ships, the Tyler and the Lexington, provided a diversion for Grant’s landing forces, firing the initial shots of the battle. Utterly taken by surprise, Confederate forces at Camp Johnston, led by Leonidas Polk and Gideon Pillow, were called to arms and prepared to engage Union intruders. As the battle raged, Grant’s forces fought through the heavy timber, gaining the substantial cover of the trees and pushing rebel fighters into the openness of the fields. Grant then focused the battalions on Camp Johnston. After recovering from an initial Confederate counterattack, Grant’s forces broke the rebel line and proceeded successfully to his target. Though he gained the ground of the camp, Grant was unable to control the actions of his soldiers as they began looting. He finally commanded it to be burned to the ground and munitions collected, but in all the chaos rebel forces were given time to mount another fierce counterattack.

Rather than stay their ground, Grant ordered his troops to fall back to the river so that they could evacuate. As the Northern fighters scurried back to the shore, the Confederates regained some of their materiel that had been discarded in the madness. More importantly, they imposed heavy losses, in dead and wounded, and captured at least one hundred of their Union counterparts. Grant and his troops boarded the transport ships and after some confusion, began firing the ship’s canons at the enemy. The light show that followed was impressive, but accomplished little. The same tree cover that had earlier protected their own forces from rebel fire now defended their enemy. Though the Confederate forces had gained the upper hand, they were unable to exploit this advantage because they ran out of ammunition.

As Union ships proceeded upriver, the military battle at Belmont ended in a draw, but both sides construed it as victory for their respective causes. Grant considered his original objective not to take Columbus, but preventing Confederate forces from sending troops to Missouri.(193) Northern leaders and the media castigated Grant for what they considered a loss. As for the Confederacy, Polk and Pillow regarded the victory as standing their ground against Northern aggressors, even though the literal soil was all they had to show for it.

Though Hughes constructs a very detailed narrative, he accomplishes little in the way of analysis. The last chapter presents the only hint at his interpretation of the bloody affair. Hughes cautions any scholar in attempting to assess the Battle of Belmont in blanket terms of praise or blame; victory or defeat.(198)

On the Confederate side, the author admits that though Polk made many poor decisions, his biggest fault was that he lacked the resolve to destroy Grant’s fleeing forces.(200) Pillow acted recklessly on the battlefield with his all-or-nothing tactics, costing the lives of his men and this played to Grant’s advantage. The Confederate brigade commanders played a very small role in the melee with the exception of Ed Pickett and James Tappan. The failure of the Watson battery, under the command of Dan Beltzhoover, and his mysterious lack of ammunition only exacerbated the problems of the Confederate forces.(202)

As for the Union leadership, they were no more illustrious. Though Grant’s subordinates performed better overall, Hughes maintains that the actions of officers such as Napoleon Buford may have jeopardized a clear-cut victory. As for Grant, the author questions Grant’s objective, arguing that it should have been to defeat Pillow’s forces rather than capture the camp. He agrees that Grant should have better controlled his troops, but admits that these were green soldiers and officers needing the experience of battle.(206) The Battle of Belmont gave Grant significant on-the-job training. Ending the piece, Hughes concludes that the battle may have served as a critical diversion for later attacks on Fort’s Henry and Donelson.

In this work, Hughes provides the reader with a colorful account sure to entertain all those interested in the battles of the Civil War.

Robert Little