Bentonville: The Final Battle of Sherman & Johnston. By Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr., copyright 1996

In his book, Bentonville: The Final Battle of Sherman and Johnston, Nathaniel Hughes recounts the last battle of the Army of Tennessee.  Bentonville serves as a companion piece to Hughes’s earlier book, Belmont, which recounted the first battle of that illustrious army.  In his own words:

I committed myself finally to write a full account of Bentonville after publishing Belmont, the story of the first battle of the Army of Tennessee.  I wanted to fast-forward in my research to 1865, see how things turned out with other men I had come to know.  Such an effort also promised a sort of symmetry to my work.  Besides, as I remembered, the desperation, the futility, of the struggle called Bentonville could serve almost as a metaphor for the Confederacy itself.[1] 

 Hughes believes that the Battle of Bentonville has not received adequate attention from historians, even those who focus on the Army of Tennessee.  The fact that Bentonville was a large battle fought between two important Civil War generals warrants greater recognition than received to date.  Hughes emphasized that this battle held great significance for the people involved even though it did not alter the war.  Whatever else the battle of Bentonville may have been, it proved that Sherman’s brutal invasion of the South would have a price. 

            Hughes not only describes the battle of Bentonville, but also explains the larger strategic context.  His effort to elevate our perspective is helpful in understanding the battle, but cannot make it more than it was.  Despite its importance to the men who fought there, Bentonville was neither decisive nor significant to the overall outcome of the war.  Bentonville: The Final Battle of Sherman & Johnston remains a battle history of value primarily to those who study leadership, motivation, psychology, logistics, and tactics of combat.  In this regard, Hughes has made a superb contribution to the study of warfare. 

            Throughout his invasion of the South, Sherman confused Confederate officers regarding his intentions.  Although his ultimate objective of linking with Grant in Virginia was obvious, he constantly placed his opponents on the “horns of a dilemma” regarding his intermediate objectives.  He moved his army along an axis that always provided alternate objectives, never committing until the last possible moment.  This technique forced Confederates to defend in multiple locations thereby disbursing their forces, while allowing Sherman to keep his concentrated.  As the battle of Bentonville approached, Sherman had the flexibility to attack either the rail center at Goldsboro or the state capital at Raleigh. 

At the behest of Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. Johnston returned to command of the Army of Tennessee in February 1865.  His mission was to organize the remnants[2] of that army and somehow prevent Sherman from connecting with Grant in Virginia.  His instinct was to retire before the Union army, and await the right opportunity to strike.  Neither of his two superiors—Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis—considered this feasible and influenced Johnston to take offensive action.  The foxy Johnston began to concentrate his forces at Smithfield, North Carolina from where he could move against Sherman in several directions.  In so doing, he kept his forces concentrated and denied Sherman full advantage of his most successful tactic.  Unfortunately for the Confederacy, Johnston did not have sufficient strength to benefit from this positioning.  Based on initial and subsequent intelligence from Wade Hampton, Johnston decided to strike the Union left wing, commanded by Henry W. Slocum, as they neared the town of Bentonville.  Should Johnston destroy this element, he would have a chance against the reminder of Sherman’s army. 

Hughes provides a riveting account of the actual fighting.  Johnston’s army set and excellent trap and experienced early success especially at the Battle of Acorn Run.  They drove the Union army throughout most of the day until resistance stiffened during the evening.  At the end of the days fighting—bloody Sunday—Johnston pulled his troops back to their starting positions and proclaimed a victory.  Slocum’s view was that he had held his own and given the enemy a bloody repulse.  The next day, Slocum reoccupied most of the ground he had lost on the 19^th and established a strong line of battle.  Simultaneously, Sherman moved his right wing, under Oliver O. Howard, up to join Slocum’s line and overwhelm Johnston’s army.  Sherman also ordered John M. Schofield’s two corps to move from Wilmington to Goldsboro and thereby threaten Johnston’s rear.  Despite Johnston’s dramatic success on the first day of battle, the Union forces held the tactical advantage by the end of day two.  Throughout the battle, Sherman maintained a focus on taking Goldsboro where he could care for his wounded and utilize the railroad network. 

Despite the advantageous position of the Yankees after the first day of fighting, Johnston continued to believe he had prospects for victory.  Having placed his army in strong defensive positions, Johnston hoped that Sherman could be enticed to attack.  But Johnston’s position was strong only if Sherman chose to attack.  Otherwise, it was a trap for Johnston, as he faced a much larger force capable of maneuvering on his flanks and rear.  Motivated by the desire to evacuate all his wounded, Johnston elected to remain in defensive positions throughout the day of March 21, 1865.  Late in the day, the Union army mounted a division-sized attack led by Joseph A. Mower, which enjoyed initial success, but ultimately failed to unbalance the Confederate position.  During the night, Johnston extracted his army and slipped across Mill Creek and then across Hannah’s Creek the next morning.  Hughes summed-up the situation with the following words:

On March 23 a weary and discouraged Johnston wired Robert E. Lee: “Sherman’s course cannot be hindered by the small force I have.  I can do no more than annoy him.  I respectfully suggest that it is no longer a question whether you leave present position; you have only to decide where to meet Sherman.  I will be near him.”[3]

 After Johnston’s withdrawal, Sherman moved his entire army into Goldsboro for rest and refitting.  Leaving Schofield in charge, he then departed for City Point, Virginia to meet with Grant and Lincoln.  These towering figures of the Union would discuss and plan the final campaign against Lee and Johnston.  Johnston took his army to Smithfield where it underwent a massive reorganization.  But events were moving fast, and in less than three weeks, Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia and Johnston entered into negotiations with Sherman. 

      In the final chapter titled The Angel of the Covenant, Hughes engages in the obligatory criticism of Johnston’s tactical decision-making during the battle.  To his credit, he does recognize that Johnston’s actions possessed sound strategic logic and that he made excellent use of terrain and timing.  But the standard for performance in historical analysis is perfection.  The fact that Johnston surprised and halted one on the most successful generals in American history (who possessed three times his number), gave him a bloody nose, and then escaped to fight another day does not find favor with Hughes.  He would judge Johnston adequate only if he had driven Slocum from the field in utter defeat; and that was beyond the capability of the Army of Tennessee in March 1865. 

      Hughes is also critical of Sherman whom he believes countermanded orders that would have destroyed Johnston’s army at the hands of Mower’s division.  His counterfactual musings proclaim that Sherman would have everlasting fame for tactical brilliance had he only follow-up on this great opportunity.  Hughes is also severely critical of Sherman’s mindset, which he considers to have been careless and overconfident.  He also faults him for keeping a focus on the tactical objective, Goldsboro, failing to recognize its full importance.  Had the war gone on, Goldsboro was critical as a base for future Union operations.  At the time of the battle of Bentonville, Sherman had no way of knowing that the war would be over in less than a month.  Sherman’s main concern was that Lee would escape from Grant’s grasp and continue the contest through maneuver warfare.  Having Goldsboro as a base of operations would be much more important to the Union war effort than the enhancement of Sherman’s reputation. 

      Hughes is rightfully generous to Henry Slocum who commanded the left wing of Sherman’s army during the battle.  Slocum demonstrated competence and professionalism as he directed operations at the scene of battle.  Yet even here, Hughes insists on a flight of fancy by decreeing Slocum should have defeated Johnston with only the forces he commanded at the time of the initial engagement.  The assumption of Slocum’s superiority is alluring, but highly speculative.  Johnston’s performance in the battle was superb considering the disparity of forces.  He was not a simple morphon against whom Slocum could demonstrate tactical brilliance.  Slocum also benefited from the presence of Howard and Schofield’s forces near the scene of battle.  Even though they were not a substantial factor in the actual fighting, they severely restricted Johnston’s options.

      The battle of Bentonville was not significant in determining the outcome of the Civil War.  But it is important in understanding the commitment of southerners to their view of nationhood.  True, there were deserters form the southern armies, but there remained a large cadre of men willing to fight as long as leaders ask it of them.  Bentonville occurred not with the first calls to glory, but long after such illusions passed.  These soldiers, and those remaining with Lee in Virginia, would have served as the core of a guerrilla army had Confederate leadership chosen to pursue that course.  The surrender of Lee and Johnston not only ended four years of violence and bloodshed, but also eliminated the prospect of four more years of vicious partisan conflict. 

Gary J. Ohls