One Damn Blunder from Beginning

One Damn Blunder From Beginning to End: the Red River Campaign of 1864. By Gary Dillard Joiner. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2003)

In the late spring of 1864 Union General Nathanial P. Banks left New Orleans with an army of 30,000 soldiers and lead them north into the heart of the Confederate held portion of Louisiana. One of the most successful Confederate operations of the entire war, the Red River campaign resulted in not only Bank’s defeat on the battlefield, destroyed any serious chance of him opposing Lincoln in the 1864 presidential election. Gary Dillard Joiner’s One Damn Blunder From Beginning to End provides an excellent survey of an understudied campaign.

As one of the only failures of the 1864 Union strategy to end the war quickly and decisively, he Red River campaign has not received considerable attention from historians. Joiner argues that this is entirely unfair and that a number of the campaigns features make it particularly worthy of examination. For one, the invasion of the Red River valley was the largest combined arms operation undertaken by the U.S. Army and Navy during the war, and the lack of doctrine or precedent on how to conduct such operations severely curtailed operational direction and objectives. Second, from a naval perspective, the campaign witnessed the first use of a periscope to fire on an enemy vessel in history. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the constant and influential use of military engineering throughout the campaign highlights the importance of that branch. Prior to the Civil War military engineering courses focused on the defense or assault of static positions. Campaigns like those conducted in the imposing terrain of the Red River valley established a need for further study and training in more tactical uses of military engineering.

The Union defeat in the Red River campaign resulted from an overly convoluted plan of attack, poor communication between the army and the navy, and the Confederate advantage of interior lines. As planned, by Union General-in-Chief Henry Halleck the invasion of northwestern Louisiana would involve the conversion of three separate points of attack: a ground force from New Orleans in the south, and amphibious force from Vicksburg to the west, and an additional ground force from Arkansas to the north. Theoretically, these forces would advance simultaneously and neutralize the Confederate defenders. Only the Vicksburg and New Orleans columns meet up with each other, but even this proved a set back as the issue of overall command and subordination arose between the army and navy. As a result, Banks took his soldiers inland away from the supporting heavy guns of the navy. The Navy in turn lost its ability to strike with impunity ashore and ran into issues of supply. Confederate forces lead by Richard Taylor took advantage of the squabbling and attacked the Union forces separately whenever possible. The Confederate assaults proved so successful that the union invasion force retreated back down river and was almost captured when low water rapids prevented their further exodus from the Red River Valley. Ingenious military engineering though, came to the rescue of Bank’s force and the Union army and navy continued their retreat all the way back to the Mississippi River.

The debacle of the Red River Campaign resulted in not only considerable investigation by the army and navy, but even caught the attention of the United States Congress, which laid primary responsibility at the feet of Nathanial Banks. One Damn Blunder From Beginning to End provides a compelling investigation of events in 1864 Louisiana and is important reading for all students of the Trans-Mississippi theatre.

Joseph Stoltz Texas Christian University

One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End: The Red River Campaign of 1864. By Gary Dillard Joiner. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 2003.

Speaking of the Red River Campaign of 1864, Major General William T. Sherman exclaimed, it was “One damn blunder from beginning to end” (xix). In this study, Gary Dillard Joiner, professor of history at Louisiana State University and director of the Red River Regional Studies Centers, offers an insightful examination of this campaign which represented an embarrassing failure to the North. Because Civil War scholars tend to focus on the eastern battles and since the Red River campaign ended in failure for the northern victors, until now historians have neglected this campaign. Despite the outcome of this battle for the North, Joiner argues the campaign represented perhaps the greatest cooperation, to that time, between the United States Army and the Navy during the Civil War. Through this cooperative effort, according to Joiner, the Army and Navy learned each others strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, Joiner argues the significance of this campaign can also be found in the South’s employment of a greater degree of innovation and engineering than it used prior to that time.

Joiner describes the political and economic factors which resulted in a campaign to take Shreveport, the Confederate capital of the Louisiana. Perhaps more important than the cities designation as a capital and a headquarters of the Confederate Army, Shreveport represented a center of the cotton industry. By 1864 the economy of New England began to falter because of lull in production from textile mills. Joiner also describes the politicking which resulted in the assignment of Nathaniel P. Banks, a political general, to head the operation. As a potential political rival, Lincoln sent Banks to Louisiana to move him away from his power base in the Northeast, but also to create a pro-Lincoln constituency in Louisiana. Viewing the prospects of obtaining a victory in Louisiana as a political boon for himself and tapping the cotton market for his constituency in the North, Banks also sought the command.

The North’s strategy to take Shreveport, as detailed by Joiner, rested upon a three pronged pincer attack. First, the U.S. Navy under the command of William D. Porter and A. J. Smith moved northward on the Red River. Second, Banks took his army overland northward to meet the Navy at Alexandria. Together the Army and Navy would approach Shreveport from the South. Finally, Frederick Steele commanding a second army was to approach Shreveport from the north. Each of the pincers ultimately failed for various reasons. Due to the South’s defenses on the Red River, Porter and Smith nearly lost a significant portion of the North’s navy. The South placed a ship perpendicular, from shore to shore, in the Red River creating a makeshift dam. As the North’s fleet moved up the river, the South destroyed a dam on one of the river’s outlet causing the water level on the Red River to drop significantly making it difficult for the Navy to move up the river. Too preoccupied with cotton and politics in Louisiana, Banks caused extensive delays and failed to meet the Navy at the designated times. Joiner argues that due to over confidence, failure to send out scouts to ascertain the best route to Shreveport, and mismanagement of troops, Banks lost the Battle of Mansfield and Pleasant Hill.

Following the campaign a Joint Committee on the Conduct of War was held by Congress to evaluate the campaign. During this investigation, Banks emerged as the fall guy as he was accused, by his own men, of devoting too much of his attention to cotton and politics. The campaign at Red River resulted in the death of Bank’s political aspirations. Joiner does a good job of detailing the developments of this campaign and explaining the reason for its failure. However, his argument for the importance of this campaign is weak. He argues that it was significant because of the lessons learned through the cooperation the U.S. Army and Navy. However, he fails to demonstrate how these lessons were used in subsequent campaigns requiring cooperation between these institutions.