Blue & Grey Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Foreign Relations. By Howard Jones. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.

            Jones is a professor of history at the University of Alabama. He primarily focuses on U.S. foreign relations from the eighteenth century to the present. He also published a few works on the American Civil War within the context of foreign relations. His works include Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: The Union and Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War and Union in Peril: The Crisis over British intervention in the Civil War. His most recent work, Blue and Grey Diplomacy, “focuses on Union and Confederate foreign relations during the Civil War from a European as well as an American perspective.” (3) His analysis is primarily limited to 1862 and 1863. Many themes developed throughout Jones’s work. For example, he pays particular attention to the Union’s blockade, which prevented international powers from recognizing the Confederacy Also, Confederate legitimacy would have granted the embryonic nation more powers and could possibly have decided the fate of the war. Finally, Europeans lacked the ability to understand Lincoln’s position on slavery and the Union.

            From the beginning of the war, the Confederacy’s main foreign policy objective was to gain recognition from the European powers, and the North’s goal was to prevent this from happening. The Confederacy used King Cotton Diplomacy, which they believed would force Britain and France into war due to their dependency on cotton. The Confederacy believed that if they withheld southern cotton from Europe, their economies would begin to suffer and eventually plunge into war in favor of the Confederacy. However, this became an egregious and miscalculated mistake on the part of the Confederacy. Moreover, it backfired on them, and Britain did not only show them a cold-shoulder but also “fostered an unfriendly neutrality.” (49) The British and French were hesitant about going to war, but there was still a possibility. In fact, the Trent affair stressed that possibility. In the end, however, the Palmerston ministry “strongly suggested” that Britain “intended to remain neutral.” (110) Even so, by 1862 the possibility of Confederate recognition was still alive. 

            Jones also analyzed international law and explained the powers both the Union and Confederacy possessed. The Union maintained both belligerent and sovereign status throughout the war, while the Confederacy only had the former. In sum, the Union had the authority to suppress the rebellion, while maintaining war powers. These powers, granted by international law, played a very important role when it came to recognizing the Confederacy as a sovereign nation. If European powers recognized the Confederacy the war may have turned out much differently.

            Jones contends that emancipation initially “deepened the mistrust between the Union and England and encouraged intervention.” (213) They viewed emancipation as a “cheap” way of getting revenge against the South by encouraging insurrections. By 1862, England’s intervention was almost inevitable after the Union’s defeat at Second Bull Run. However, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation made the war a crusade against slavery, and forced Britain to decide whether they wanted to fight on behalf of slavery. In essence, Emancipation Proclamation “decisively blocked British intervention.” Napoleon, on the other hand, had dreams of reestablishing the French empire and sought to control Mexico. He believed that a Confederate alliance would be truly beneficial. Napoleon did, however, have a strong distaste for slavery. In the end, he too decided neutrality was the best course.

Overall, Jones’s work is a must read for any Civil War historian and no bookshelf is complete without a copy of Blue & Grey Diplomacy. It offers much insight to the crucial role of foreign powers during the war.

Shawn Devaney