Confederate Struggle for Command: General James Longstreet and the First Corps in the West.  By Alexander Mendoza.  College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2008.

Few generals, whether he wore blue or grey, commands the reputation and experience of James Longstreet in the American Civil War.  Longstreet's experiences and exploits are well known to Civil War historians who study Longstreet's tenure in the eastern theatre of operations, but less understood is Longstreet's experience in the western theatre.  Alexander Mendoza's work follows James Longstreet and his First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia west to reinforce General Braxton Bragg's beleaguered Army of Tennessee in late 1863, and highlights the rocky relationship between the two generals as they each struggled with each other and Jefferson Davis over the overall strategy and command in the west.

Difficult as it is to study Longstreet's actions and thoughts based on documentation from the war, it is even more difficult to sort through the post-war memoirs of Longstreet and his contemporaries, many of whom harbored ill feelings toward "Old Pete," partly due to his actions during the war, partly thanks to his post-war affiliation with the Republican party.  Mendoza addresses some of the criticisms of Longstreet's trip west in particular, and determines that Longstreet's contemporary critics had ulterior motives, and that present day historians have misinterpreted Longstreet's motivations.  It was with the effort to flesh out Longstreet's true motives in the struggle for command that Mendoza writes this book. 

Mendoza argues that Longstreet's request to be transferred to the western theatre of operations stems from a desire to join forces and tactical philosophies with General Joe Johnston, hoping to turn the western war in the South's favor.  Longstreet has long been accused of jockeying for promotion in requesting transfer to the west.  Contemporaries and historians alike have alleged that Longstreet had ulterior motives in requesting his transfer, secretly scheming to be promoted to command the Army of Tennessee in Bragg's stead. 

Mendoza points out that numerous generals, both of Northern and Southern sympathies, utilized their political connections to gerrymander promotions or transfers, including Grant, Sherman, Jackson, and Bragg.  To appeal to connections with the aim of bettering one's position is not a methodology unique to James Longstreet, although Longstreet is sometimes unfairly criticized by modern historians for attempting to take advantage of his relationship with Robert E. Lee and other political connections to further his career. 

Once transferred to Bragg's command in Tennessee, Longstreet was immediately faced with the responsibility of leading troops into battle.  Longstreet had no first-hand knowledge of the terrain and no experience with those troops in particular, but managed to lead Confederate forces to victory at the Battle of Chickamauga.  The victory proved a hollow one as the Federal troops, though beaten, simply retreated to Chattanooga to regroup and try again. 

Once Longstreet had a few days to settle in to his post under Bragg, he became acutely aware of the precarious command structure plaguing the Army of Tennessee.  Bragg had long since lost the respect of his corps, division, and brigade commanders, and had proceeded to earn their disdain.  At this juncture Longstreet spotted an opportunity, whether for himself or for his friend Joe Johnston remains speculation.  If Bragg proved to be unpopular enough with his commanders, and Longstreet's petitions to his friends in high places found purchase, then either he or Johnston could take command of the Army of Tennessee and hopefully reverse Confederate fortunes in the western theatre.  Longstreet wrote his contacts, including Robert E. Lee, Secretary of War James Seddon, and Texas Senator Louis Wigfall, recommending a change in command.

Longstreet underestimated, however, the influence Bragg had in Richmond, particularly with President Jefferson Davis.  Davis was determined to keep Bragg in command, despite complaints from  Bragg's subordinate general officers.  Davis even made a trip out west to the long-neglected theatre to hold a meeting with Bragg's corps commanders, hoping they would lose their nerve in front of Davis and Bragg.  Davis was mistaken--Bragg's general officers were critical of him to Davis' face and to Bragg's.  Davis created an unwinnable situation for everyone involved by holding this rendezvous, and the problems with the chain of command were only exaggerated. 

Ultimately, the structure could not take the stress.  Rather than relieve one man in Bragg, Davis opted to authorize Bragg to relieve all of his subordinates.  Longstreet was sent on a fruitless campaign in East Tennessee, until he and his corps were finally recalled to Lee's side in Virginia.  Bragg was finally relieved as commander of the Army of Tennessee, but promoted to Davis' war adviser in Richmond where he undermined Longstreet's reputation at every possible turn, further harming Longstreet's reputation.  While Longstreet is not blameless in his efforts to maneuver Bragg out of his job, it is clear that Longstreet was not the only one working behind the scenes.  Bragg was also pulling strings, and probably won out because he had the support of Jefferson Davis. 

Stephen Edwards