The Alabama, British Neutrality, and the American Civil War. By Frank J. Merli. Edited by David M. Fahey. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

In this study Frank J. Merli challenges several prevailing assumptions regarding British neutrality during the Civil War specifically relating to the events surrounding the CSS Alabama. Since the 1970 publication of his first and only monograph Great Britain and the Confederate Navy, 1861-1865, Merli published dozens of articles unraveling the details of the Alabama and British neutrality. At the time of his death in 2000, the author was in the process of writing four book length studies intended to challenge a number of conclusions regarding Anglo-American relations during the Civil War. The present work is a posthumous collection of the completed portions of these works, edited and organized by historian and friend David M. Fahey. Because of the circumstances of publication, the chapters do not build upon each other in the development of a specific argument. However, two central themes emerge: First, Merli is primarily interested in correcting the chronology relating to the escape of the Alabama. Second, Merli critiques the pioneering work of E. D. Adams and Frank L. Owsley whose conclusions have become undisputed in the historiography of Anglo-American foreign relations during the Civil War.

After spending nearly thirty years searching for new documents in British and American archives and reinterpreting previously known documents, Merli presents a new chronology of events leading up to the escape of the Alabama on 29 July 1862. He focuses primarily upon bureaucratic processes within the British Foreign Office in the deliberation over the American claims that the construction of ship “No. 290”, later christened the Alabama, was in violation of the 1819 Foreign Enlistment Act. Merli demonstrates that Foreign Secretary Lord Russell took the American complaint seriously and that no unnecessary delays in deliberations within the Foreign Office slowed the development of an official position. Unfortunately for the Americans, the Alabama dossier disappeared for a weak due to secret mental incapacitation of Sir John Harding while the dossier was in his charge. Nevertheless, Merli argues that any hold ups in the deliberations resulted from the Thomas H. Dudley’s unfamiliarity with the requirements of British law.

The reconstruction of the chronology represents a significant challenge to a number of conclusions of E. D. Adams and Frank L. Owsley. Through the establishment of the chronology, Merli challenges the claim that Russell handled the American complaint in a lackadaisical manner reflecting his latent siding with the Confederates. Merli also challenges the assertion that James D. Bulloch was tipped off by an insider within the British Foreign Office prompting the hurried departure of the Alabama. The chronology established by Merli demonstrates that those within the office would have known only that the issue was being deliberated. As the author points out, Bulloch’s own war time diary does not mention that he had been tipped off. Moreover, the new chronology indicates that the Alabama escaped by a few hours rather than a few minutes, challenging Merli’s own argument in his 1970 work. Though his criticisms of Adams and Owsley “and their disciples” are well founded, Merli’s text continually harps upon the mistakes of these authors to the extreme even to the point of pointing out misspellings (42).

In addition, Merli also discusses larger foreign relations issues between the Confederates and the British. He argues that Jefferson Davis made poor choices in those he chose to represent the South in Europe. These men were unable to sell their cause of the war to English or the French. Moreover, they failed to create foreign support based upon a broad base of mutual interest. This reflects the failure of Davis and others to recognize the important international ramifications of the war. Merli also chides the Southern leadership for placing too much confidence in King Cotton diplomacy which failed to align European powers with the Confederacy. In the concluding chapter, Merli relates the little known events surrounding the attempt of the Confederacy to purchase an entire fleet of warship known as the Lay-Osborne Flotilla from the British which were originally ordered by the Chinese government to aid in the squashing of the Taiping Rebellion. Merli ultimately argues that although the Confederate attempts to purchase sea craft was technically not covered in the Foreign Enlistment Act, Russell concluded it required extra-legal effort to deny the Confederate purchase of ships to preserve diplomacy with the United States.

Jacob W. Olmstead