Perryville

Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. By Kenneth W. Noe. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001. Pp. 394.

As the title suggests, Kenneth W. Noe’s account of the Kentucky Campaign in 1862, and more specifically its paramount battle Perryville, follows the normal pattern of tactical histories about Civil War battles. However, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, does excel in its narrative while adding many dimensions of newer military history. Perryville, an oft forgotten battle in terms of Civil War prestige and memory, was perhaps one of the most important, if not the most underrated battle of 1862. It was the actions at Perryville, despite the tactical victory by the Confederates, which saved Kentucky for the Union.

The Bluegrass state had flirted with Neutrality for around ten months before it declared for the Union. The importance of Kentucky was not lost to either side. Noe alludes to a few of the more suspect quotes by Abraham Lincoln concerning the state, but shows its strategic value as a key border state through industry, horses, and possible recruiting population. Of course, the Confederacy saw these same opportunities, and the split loyalties of Kentuckians called out to recruiters of both sides. Neutrality apparently meant little to both the Union and the Confederacy, as both occupied portions of Kentucky before the state made its decision.

Only after a boycott by secessionists during the elections of 1861 did unionists take control of the state’s government, which led to the governor’s forced resignation and the aligning of Kentucky with the Union. Despite this turn of events, Noe describes the “Kentucky dream” as a major motivation to reclaim the state for the Confederacy. Many southerners, including Jefferson Davis, believed that unionists had taken over Kentucky through subterfuge and were certain that more support existed for the gray than the blue. Noe points out two crucial factors that prove these southern strategists wrong. First, support lagged for the Confederates as they invaded further into Kentucky, and second, the Union successfully recruited about three to one over the Confederacy.

Despite the lack of support, Confederate triumphs at Mill Springs and Richmond during the early Kentucky Campaign were signal victories for General Braxton Bragg and Kirby Smith. As Union forces seemed to crumble under the seemingly more organized southern forces, Union General Don Carlos Buel took an indecisive defensive strategy. Noe does an excellent job describing the opposing commanders, especially their inadequacies which led to one of the most disorganized battles of the Civil War. Beul, often thought to be pro-southern by his men and disliked for the discipline he instilled, only became motivated to pick up his army’s pace after he realized that both Smith and Bragg had their armies in Kentucky. Bragg, also heavy handed when it came to discipline, may have suffered from physical and mental disorders that affected his judgments during Perrysville; although, Noe admits that this can never be proved so long after the fact. However, the inability of Bragg and Kirby to work together left Bragg’s forces to face the Union troops alone.

On October 8^th, 1862, the two forces finally met up outside of Perryville. A hot, drought-ridden summer had left the troops thirsty and weary. Both armies had moved to the region to secure needed provisions, but neither commander realized the enemy’s whole force was present. Whereas Bragg engaged the enemy with only a portion of his forces, Buel had no idea that the battle had commenced due to an atmospheric abnormally that stifled sound. The battlefield quickly became more about the individual men than the strategy that generals could command. As Noe details the individual men’s struggles, he finds that many believed some of the most brutal combat of the war happened at Perryville. The largest battle in Kentucky, and one of the most bloody (Union casualties amounted to one-fifth of its total force) of the Western Theater lasted for fourteen hours. At nightfall Brag, who had technically won a tactical victory, retreated. Buel, failed to follow up, and thus caused his eventual removal from command. Still, the Confederacy had been thwarted, and never again would have such luck in Kentucky.

Until Noe’s treatment of the subject there had been only one specific work on Perryville, compared to the volumes about other battles. Indeed, in Noe’s last chapter he looks at Perryville in memory; like many battlefields in the United States, Kentucky’s “high water mark” of the Confederacy became a struggle between the community, historians, and developers. Despite these same conflicts, Perryville has escaped the popular memory of the Civil War nationwide, thus a reason for so few books on the subject. Noe’s detailed account provides historians and the public alike with a vivid account of an important, yet sometimes forgotten, battle.

Dan Vogel Texas Christian University

Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle. By Kenneth W. Noe. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001. Pp. 394. Preface, appendices, biographical notes, index.

On October 8, 1862, Union and Confederate soldiers clashed near Perryville, Kentucky. While the Battle of Perryville remains largely unknown to the general public and many historians, the conflict proves significant to Civil War history for several reasons. First, this one day encounter was the largest battle ever fought in the Bluegrass state. Second, the mass confusion at all levels of command allowed for an astonishing slaughter to take place on the battlefield which often deteriorated into vicious hand-to-hand combat. Due to such disorder between officers and soldiers, sheer savagery consumed both Union and Confederate soldiers. Veterans of the massacre at Shiloh consistently described Perryville as the more brutal fight and some even viewed it the most ferocious battle of the entire war. Finally, the Confederate case for British recognition would have been seriously advanced had Confederate troops secured a decisive victory at Perryville.

Despite these significances, few historians have considered Perryville worthy of a focused study. Until Kenneth Hafendorfer’s publication of Perryville in 1981, the battle had only appeared briefly in biographies of officers such as Braxton Bragg or Don Buell. Kenneth W. Noe, the Draughon Chair in Southern History at Auburn University, began his inquiry into the battle as a graduate student at the University of Illinois. After years of research utilizing archives, manuscripts, letters, and diaries never before consulted, Noe has produced the definitive work on what is arguably the least understood yet major battle during the Civil War.

In Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle, Noe begins with a short overview of Kentucky’s stand, or lack there of, in the Civil War and the disastrous result attempts at neutrality had for the state. As Noe writes, “Kentucky paid very dear . . . for her neutrality.” After a forced vote officially placed the state with the Union, Kentuckians found their territory torn between civilian and military interests advocating Confederate and Union sentiments.

In the late summer of 1862, General Braxton Bragg led an offensive into Kentucky hoping to reclaim the state for the Confederacy. In theory, Kirby Smith’s forces would meet Bragg’s men in Lexington. But as Noe illustrates, complex personalities and competing egos among Confederate officers combined with Unionist Kentuckians created numerous problems for the Confederates’ coordinated attack. Like so many other engagements in the Civil War, the battle did not play out as the commanding officers planned

Union Major General Don Carlos Buell, supported by Major General George H. Thomas, met the Confederate army in Kentucky. Both Bragg and Buell led demoralized and undisciplined soldiers. Efforts by both commanding officers to improve their respective armies resulted in a growing hatred toward the officers. Noe spends the first six chapters of his book explaining the complicated nature of fighting in Kentucky and the lack of unity within the armies foreshadowing the terrible battle that lay before them. Noe briefly discusses alleged psychological problems faced by Bragg and the fact that Buell enjoyed the theory of warfare much more than the reality of war. As such problems plagued both Union and Confederate officers and soldiers, it is little wonder that such atrocities occurred at Perryville.

Prior to the conflict, Bragg and Buell both failed to realize they faced significant enemy forces. After fourteen hours of intense and bloody battle, Bragg’s army won a tactical victory against a much larger army. He later, however, abandoned the field to Buell who allowed the Confederates to retreat into Tennessee. Despite incredible criticism of both commanding officers, Bragg retained command for the time being while Major General William Rosecrans replaced Buell.

Noe’s narrative of Perryville is particularly valuable as he considers the aftermath of the battlefield for citizens forced to reconstruct their community. While the general public regarded the battle as a minor affair, local Kentuckians felt otherwise. Shortly after the battle, the people of Perryville built cemeteries to bury the deceased soldiers. Necessity demanded such efforts but subsequent commemorations have continued since 1862. Contemporary confrontations over the battlefield presents arguments between those who want the ground to be used to teach civic values such as patriotism and the like against those who wish to preserve the battlefield as is safe from the greedy eye of land developers

Rescuing a major engagement from archival shadows, Noe presents a narrative that is thoroughly researched and well-written. This book is easily accessible by both Civil War historians and the general public. Noe’s conversational style pulls the reader into the struggle to hold the line and the soldiers’ desperate search for water. Such vivid imagery makes this book an excellent narrative of Civil War military history.