Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!  By George C. Rable.  (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, c. 2002.  ISBN 0-8078-2673-I).

 

            George Rable’s opus covers the Fredericksburg campaign to the mud march. Rable is a professor of the American Civil War at the University of Alabama, and he is the author of Civil Wars: Women and the Crisis of Southern Nationalism, The Confederate Republic: A Revolution Against Politics, and most recently God’s Almost Chosen People: A Religious History of the American Civil War. Rable not only focuses on the decisions of politicians and generals, but he also concentrates on the daily military life of Civil War soldiers. He describes what they did in their spare time, and also gages their feelings and attitudes of military life. In particular, he examines the religious revivals that pervaded the campsites. Religion was an important motivational tool that many historians seem to leave out when writing about the Civil War.

            Rable believes many historians neglect the significance of the battle. In fact, he contends that the battle represented the nadir of the Union army. Furthermore, the Federals’ defeat at Fredericksburg would continue to resonate through their minds, and this was clearly seen when the Confederates made a similar advance toward Cemetery Ridge during the Battle of Gettysburg. After the Union victory, many soldiers rejoiced with shouts of “Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!”

            Rable’s work is not meant to please military historians. He devotes only 75 pages to the battle out of more than 400. Rable argues that perhaps Burnside was not the best man for the job. He had low self-esteem and often did not get enough sleep. For a time, many believed that the soldiers of both armies were going to settle down into winter quarters. However, Burnside felt the outside pressure to attack and began to plan a campaign. Burnside devised a strategy to move out of his position in northern Virginia, move through Fredericksburg and hopefully take the Confederate capital, Richmond.

The campaign started off on the wrong foot from the beginning. He began to move out of his position but never took the pontoon bridges that were necessary to cross the Rappahannock River. Lee moved much quicker than Burnside, and he took the town of Fredericksburg along with the surrounding heights. In the meantime, the Union general occupied the Stafford heights, an area which commanded the town. He placed several cannons on the heights, including 4.5” artillery pieces. The Union army began to fire on the town, but it had little impact. In fact, Burnside would have to send in the 7th Michigan and 20th Massachusetts to push Barksdale’s men out.  In fact, a rare fight did ensue in the town of Fredericksburg. With the town at last secured, the rest of the army crossed the bridges unimpeded. On December 13, Burnside ordered Sumner’s grand division to take Marye’s Heights. At the same time, Franklin’s grand division would take the marshy land of Prospect Hill. The attack did not go as planned, and Burnside’s men were slaughtered. However, Burnside remained determined and ordered Hooker’s reserves to take Marye’s Heights. Fortunately, Burnside’s subordinates persuaded him to call off the attack.

            Rable’s following chapters discuss the retreat and carnage of the battle. Moreover, he examines how the news was received in Washington and continues with Burnside’s disappointing mud march. Overall, Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg is recommended for anyone vaguely interested in the battle and is bound to please the palate of any Civil War student.

Shawn Devaney

 

Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!  By George C. Rable.  (Chapel Hill & London: The University of North Carolina Press, c. 2002.  ISBN 0-8078-2673-I).

George C. Rable’s description of the battle of Fredericksburg is most impressive.  This vastly detailed study of the battle contains almost every aspect that one could think of.  Rable covers generals and soldiers on both sides, and their reactions to the campaign and the battle itself.  Their morale, health, training, drilling, attitudes towards their generals and foes, religious views, political views, and pretty much anything that could be found, Rable covers quite effectively.  Newspaper editors and their effect on the campaign is also portrayed, as Rable conveys that Union commander Ambrose E. Burnside felt pressured by these editors.  Due to this, he felt the demand to march on Richmond in order to bring the war to a quick end.  Burnside’s plan was to march into Fredericksburg and cross the Rappahannock, and then move on Richmond.  This plan actually had potential, if executed effectively and efficiently.  Yet, as often seen in the Army of the Potomac, efficiency and quickness were always far away, and this was no different in the Fredericksburg campaign.  Union forces under Burnside numbered around 120,000 while Confederate forces numbered around 80,000.  Therefore, Burnside had a sizeable troop advantage, yet this was common in many battles in Virginia. 

Although Rable’s book covers many aspects of the battle of Fredericksburg, he pays greatest attention to Burnside and his actions as well as his emotions throughout this campaign.  Burnside is portrayed as a man who is not up to the task of leading a major Union army, and he even stated this fact himself.  Throughout this book, Rable depicts Burnside as a man lacking the emotional strength and stability to effectively lead his army into battle.  Due to a lack of sleep  and confidence, Burnside failed to take advantage of several opportunities that could have dramatically changed the outcome of the battle, and the war.  For example, although there was a significant delay in the arrival of the pontoon bridges that would be used for the crossing of the Rappahannock, Burnside still had a chance to be victorious.  There was only a single brigade of Confederate infantry that delayed the further building of the bridge.  This Confederate brigade could have been easily swept aside had Burnside committed more troops to protect those constructing his bridge.  Burnside did not do this, which allowed General Robert E. Lee to unite his army.  Lee, who was in many ways the opposite of Burnside was able to take advantage of the situation.  Lee excelled in staying calm and inspiring his generals and men, which was a trait that Burnside lacked. 

The biggest blunder of the campaign came on the third day of the conflict, December 13, 1862.  Burnside, who was exhausted by this point, stubbornly refused to call off the assault on Mayre’s Heights.  This assault was one of the bloodiest blunders of the entire civil war according to Rable, as the Union lost over 6,000 men due to this assault, and over 12,000 throughout the battle.  The Confederates on the other hand, lost over 5,000 during the Fredericksburg battle, and over 1,000 when the Union troops assaulted Mayre’s Heights. General Lee, who witnessed this massacre from the center of the Confederate line was quoted as saying, “It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it.” Fortunately, many of Burnside’s generals persuaded him from launching any more assaults, or the battle may have been even more lopsided than it already was.  Rable analyzes many of the Confederate letters to convey that many Confederates actually respected the Union soldiers who made this brave charge, knowing that it was utterly hopeless.  Union letters meanwhile conveyed that many men and officers did not blame Burnside for this assault, as they believed he was pressured by the media and government to act quickly and decisively.  Following the attack on Mayre’s Heights, both armies remained in position on December 14th, 1862.  The following day, Burnside and the federal forces retreated across the river bringing the campaign to an end.  Following the battle, Confederate morale in Lee’s army was at an all-time high, as they had defeated yet another Union army under another different commander.  On the flipside, morale was very low in the Army of the Potomac, as they again had been defeated at the hands of Robert E. Lee. 

            Although this work is quite detailed, it is enormously useful for not only historians, but anyone with an interest in the Civil War.  Rable effectively depicts how the battle of Fredericksburg unfolded.  This book might be too dense for some, but for those with an active interest in the Civil War, it is an insightful book.

Albert Cox

Texas Christian University

 

 

Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg!  By George C. Rable. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002.  671pp. 

            As the author candidly states in the acknowledgements, this examination of the Battle of Fredericksburg emerged after ten years of research and writing.  Exhaustive in its incorporation of diaries, letters, memoirs, newspapers, archives, and secondary literature, George C. Rable’s book Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg! offers a comprehensive account of the tragic battle, framed within a larger political and social context.  Accepting the critique of some historians that military history is often long on strategy and tactics, but short on the human and personal aspects of war, Rable seeks to find a middle ground between the “old” and “new” military history. 

            The result finds Rable presenting a careful analysis of the political climate in Washington, as well as the North and South in general.  The closing months of 1862 demonstrate an upward surge in the North for support of the Democrats (reflecting a growing indifference toward the war), an increasing frustration in Washington at General McClellan’s notorious slowness and obstinacy following the barely recognized victory at Antietam, and an emerging over-confidence in the Confederate ranks.  Rable deftly correlates the poor performance of Republican candidates in the November elections, the ire of radical Republicans, and the diminution of morale among Union troops in the Eastern Theater.  In short, the Northern political climate in the autumn of 1862 demanded a clear Union victory before the close of the year.  Lincoln’s response to this atmosphere, the replacement of General McLellan with General Burnside, along with explicit instructions to move toward Richmond, illustrates the inseparability of politics and military endeavors.    

            The author gives considerable effort to the social and cultural elements surrounding the Battle of Fredericksburg as well.  Never losing sight of the personal vicissitudes of war, Rable provides countless anecdotal commentaries and reflections upon the hardships of this, though applicable to most every, military campaign of the Civil War.  Detailed and descriptive accounts of the hunger, cold, sickness, fatigue, emotional and physical challenges, and stoicism of the Union and Confederate soldiers permeate the book.  Even more so, the author makes a concerted attempt to vividly portray the horrific gore and tragic heroism that resulted from the multiple Union frontal assaults on the entrenched Confederate forces.  The wounded and residual disabilities and innumerable amputations also receive Rable’s consideration and sympathy.

            Equally important to any examination of the Battle of Fredericksburg is a critical assessment of the military encounter itself.  Burnside’s decision to forge a massive frontal assault on Longstreet’s advantageously entrenched men, the inarticulate nature of Burnside’s orders, and the logistical failure of Washington in delivering the pontoons to the Union forces on time, all combine to help bring about tremendous loss of Union life and a dispiriting defeat.  Here, too, Rable displays admirable skill in cogently demonstrating such foibles of leadership along with the other costly mishaps such as Franklin’s failure to capitalize on Meade’s breakthrough on the Confederate’s right.  Though the author’s main focus tends to be on the Union, the Confederate’s tenacity and Lee’s military acumen are given their due.  Rable particularly highlights the contrast in ability between Union and Confederate generals to adapt to changing conditions during the battle.  Burnside’s guilt and remorse at the outcome of his strategy, his decision to retreat, and the arduous return march through horrific mud, illustrate the emotional and physical trials of the conflict.  Concerning the aftermath of the battle, the scope of the Union defeat at Fredericksburg, according to the author, instills a visceral reaction in the soldiers and citizens of the North that will later embolden and energize the Union’s performance in the Eastern Theater.

            Finally, the home front provides ample material for Rable’s historical inquiry.  The physical plight and mental perspectives of the citizens of both the Union and the Confederacy receive examination.  Rable carefully articulates the urban aspects of this battle and its inherent destruction of property.  The refugee status of innumerable Southern citizens further emphasizes Rable’s understanding of war as an incredibly human experience.  By incorporating the social, cultural, and political elements that characterized the months surrounding the Battle of Fredericksburg, a far more holistic understanding of the Union nadir and the concomitant Confederate confidence during this period of the war emerges.  Furthermore, the author’s attention to the strategic and tactical aspects of the battle deepens the historical analysis.  In sum, George Rable’s Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg! ranks high among those narrative and historical accounts of Civil War battles, yet also provides a wider understanding and assessment of the equally significant non-military context in which the battle was fought so valiantly.       

Bryan A. Cupp

          

Fredericksburg! Fredericksburg! By George C. Rable. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 671 p.

           George Rable constructs a thorough and well-written albeit, from a somewhat Union perspective, account of the battle of Fredericksburg which occurred between December 11 and December 15, 1862.  Along with examining the battle itself, Rable discusses smaller contexts of the campaign such as soldier motivation, morale and loyalty among the Union chain of command, the religious piety displayed by the armies, and many other factors.  Rable contends that while the victory at Fredericksburg provided a huge boost in morale to the Confederate cause, Lee and his army suffered irreplaceable casualties and second guessing allowed a total defeat for the Union army to slip from Lee’s grasp.  The author’s focus on the Northern issues and participants seems in better detail and generally, more prevalent throughout the work.  Rable’s intent was to examine Fredericksburg by fusing “old” military history with “new” military history.  He successfully achieves this on many levels.

          The battle of Fredericksburg was perhaps, at least at that point in the war, the culmination of all the intricacies and horrors war produces.  The ineptitude of commanders, the petty differences between commanders, and the ability of the soldiers to carry on the fight amongst unbelievable odds were displayed during this fight.  The battlefield is a perfect, as far as the defender is concerned, killing zone.  The Confederates used this to their full advantage.  Yet the Confederates had help from the dogged determination of Burnsides, the commander of the Army of the Potomac at this time, to attack the strongest part of the Confederate lines at Marye’s Heights.

          The Federals had to cross the Rappahannock River to get into the town itself.  From the town they had to cross a large undulating open field that rose towards Marye’s Heights.  At the top of the Heights was a four foot stone wall behind which the Confederate infantry stood, in some places, four men thick.  The Confederates’ artillery also had a clear view of fire on the field itself.  Thus, the Federals had to advance on an open plain that rose uphill within plain sight of artillery and infantry fire.  Plagued by indecisiveness and waiting on pontoons to come to help with the river crossing, Burnsides delayed his attack, which allowed Lee’s full army to arrive and form around good defensive positions.  The result was a slaughter and a morale boost for the Confederacy.  Lee’s miscalculation in believing that Burnsides might attack once more allowed the Union army to escape and might have cost the Confederacy an even greater victory.

          Rable goes on to examine the aftermath of the battle and this proves extremely interesting.  The author focuses on the hardships incurred by the hospital surgeons, nurses, and ambulance corps.  He discusses the reaction amongst the press and civilians upon hearing of the debacle.  Rable likewise details the Confederate reaction to the battle and the political incriminations of the battle on both sides.  Also detailed are the tempered hopes by the Confederacy and the fears by the Union of foreign intervention once news of this great battle reached foreign shores.

          Rable contends that the military importance of Fredericksburg looked huge at the time but was eventually overshadowed by other engagements.(432) He argues that although the results created powerful political reverberations, the battle was strategically insignificant.(433)  A very thorough and at times focused too much upon the social aspects of the battle, Rable constructs an intriguing look at the battle of Fredericksburg.  This text is well worth a look for anyone interested in all of the aspects that come into play in warfare.

          Halen J. Watkins