The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern

The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern, May 7-12, 1864. By Gordon C. Rhea. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997. Pp. xii, 483).

Following his promotion to commander of all Union forces, General Ulysses S. Grant decided to take the battle to the Army of Northern Virginia and invade the Confederacy to destroy Lee’s army. On May 4, 1864, Grant attacked Lee in the Wilderness campaign. In The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern, Gordon Rhea tells the story of the aftermath of the Wilderness, the importance of the race to Spotsylvania Courthouse, and the engagements which took place there had on the Civil War and future military strategy.

Suffering large losses during the Battle of the Wilderness, Grant nevertheless pushed on, determined to destroy Lee’s army. Attempting a quick night march to Spotsylvania Courthouse, Grant decided to interpose his army between Lee and Richmond. However, Lee chose to move to Spotsylvania on his own. Rhea skillfully details the logistics of the two armies’ marches and problems they faced. Wet roads, darkness, and poor coordination allowed the Confederates to arrive at Spotsylvania before Union forces and create earthworks. A haphazard attack on these works on May 8 proved costly for Union troops, and the Confederates were able to maintain their lines and create better earthworks. The following day, Phil Sheridan is loosed with his cavalry corps to menace around Richmond and attack Confederate cavalry while Grant maneuvers for position. In the following days, small-scale battles ripple along the lines, culminating in the massive assault by Union forces on May 12. Rhea’s book takes the reader from the outcome of the Battle of the Wilderness, to the aftermath of the Battle of Spotsylvania and offers the reader takes on Lee Grant, and the changing nature of warfare.

Rhea deftly comments on the positive and negative points of both armies and gives a balanced view of Lee and Grant. Grant was at odds with his corps commanders because he did not believe they wanted to fight, and the Battle of the Wilderness encouraged these thoughts. His corps commanders believed Grant did not make enough preparations in order to make a good fight. While the move to Spotsylvania proved very sound tactically, the logistics of the march proved daunting. In addition, communication between commanders proved abysmal as the army lacked coordination. Sheridan’s cavalry did not complete the mission assigned to it, and Meade did not attempt to communicate with Sheridan over the particulars. When General Warren arrived at Spotsylvania, Confederate forces already manned earthworks. Warren, not wanting to be too cautious, threw regiments at the works in piecemeal fashion, allowing a single Confederate division to hold an entire corps at bay. Before the assault on May 12, Grant allowed Sheridan to take his entire cavalry corps to menace Richmond, leaving him blind. Most of the commanding officers had not seen field before the assault, and Grant did not stay near the front, preferring to receive communication by wire and giving orders. Despite all this, Grant’s overall tactics proved sound, and he did not hesitate to keep trying when he blundered. Lee, too, faced obstacles. He was forced to replace Generals Longstreet and Hill temporarily due to injury and sickness, and although sustaining fewer casualties than Union forces, Lee still suffered from the lack of troops. He almost misjudged Grant’s pull-out of the wilderness, leaving Spotsylvania open to Union forces, and prior to the main Union assault on May 12, Lee had pulled his artillery back from the front. However, during the hardest fighting, Lee rode the lines, directing troops and offering a major boost in morale to shaken Confederate forces. Rhea offers a strong look into the attitudes of both armies.

Finally, Rhea offers a commentary on the changing nature of warfare. Grant wanted to be extremely aggressive and take the battle to the enemy. By the time battle is reached at Spotsylvania, Lee’s army has mastered the art of creating earthworks, giving a glimpse into what was to come in World War I. Rhea mixes personal accounts very well into his overall narrative and is able to offer commentary without distorting the facts. Rhea points to the change in the Army of the Potomac when Grant takes command as a turning point, in addition to the Confederacy’s loss of J.E.B. Stuart. Though some readers may find lists of names and regiments difficult, Rhea has produced a well thought-out and researched work.

Texas Christian University Blake Hill

The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern. By Gordon Rhea. Louisiana State University Press Baton Rouge LA. 1997.

Gordon Rhea’s The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern examines the battles between Ulysses S. Grant’s Federals and Robert E. Lee’s Confederates during first week of May in 1864. This is the second installment of Rhea’s work on the Virginia campaign; his first work The Battle of the Wilderness took a very favorable stance towards Grant. In this work he presents a much more balanced look at both Lee and Grant. Two major battles occurred during these six days, and Rhea makes an interesting case as to why this particular battle was so important. The Battle of the Wilderness pitted Grant’s vastly superior numbers against Lee’s rapidly devolving army

Rhea points out that the Battle of the Wilderness marked a change in Civil War tactics and “spawned a burst of innovations.” The engagements brought a new appreciation of technology; before this battle, the Civil War more closely resembled Napoleonic Warfare than modern war. Both sides began valuing rifled muskets that fired with greater and greater accuracy. Technology became more important than the old military doctrines. At Spotsylvania, Lee’s army in particular mastered the art of fieldwork. They resorted to mounds of earth and timber as protection, a tactic that would eventually evolve into the trenches of World War I.

Rhea’s battle narrative takes readers from the first shots all the way through the battle in a nearly minute to minute account. Grant begins by driving his army South to Richmond, Virginia, the capital of the Confederacy. Grant knew that this was as likely to end in failure as success. This battle is one that helps earn Grant’s reputation as a “butcher.” Rhea believes that this reputation is “unavoidable;” he kept trying despite the setbacks. Grant is criticized for his army’s structure; Rhea finds that leadership was confused and conflicted. Lee’s army is spared this criticism.

Before reaching Richmond, the Northern Army would come to the Spotsylvania Court House, hence the name of the battle. The Confederates were able to gain superior positions and hold off the Union army. For two days, the armies faced each other without much success on either side. The Union army would not leave; the Confederate army gave up little ground. On the third day, fighting shifted to the Yellow Tavern road, which was just north of Richmond. It was at this battle that Lee lost one of his most important officers, J. E. B. Stuart. Much like the loss of Johnston, Lee knew this would be a major blow to any future efforts. The battle shifted back to the Court House for the final day of fighting.

Rhea’s work is detailed and incredible well researched. He spends an equal amount of time between the Confederate and the Union forces. He is not biased towards neither Grant nor Lee; he finds praise for both and faults both in the battle. Rhea believes this battle is an important turning point in the war for several reasons. The decision by Grant to move South changed the landscape of the Civil War. He needed to real strike a blow to the Confederacy and he succeeded a the Spotsylvania Court House. Rhea points to the loss of Stuart as the major blow this campaign brought to the Confederacy. It seems that every time Lee finds a competent officer or general, the Union kills them. Grant suffered an equally disappointing loss when John Sedgwick was killed in fighting. He also makes much of the Confederate use of digging fieldworks, as this enabled them to make the most of their firepower and hold onto their positions. The maps included are very helpful to readers, and there are a large number of them. Rhea’s work is interesting; it is military history at its best.

The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow Tavern. By Gordon Rhea. Louisiana State University Press Baton Rouge LA. 1997.

In the spring of 1864 Abraham Lincoln appointed Ulysses S. Grant Lieutenant General and commander-in-chief of the United States armies. Grant decided on a multiple-pronged offensive to keep pressure on the Confederates on all fronts at once. In Virginia, Grant designated the Army of the Potomac to march south against Robert E. Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia. Though George Meade would retain nominal control of the army, Grant would accompany the advance south, making him the de-facto commander. On May 5, Grant and the army crossed the Rappahannock River into the Wilderness of Virginia. Lee was there waiting for them and there ensued a bloody two-day conflict on May 5-6 known as the Battle of the Wilderness. The battle ended in a tactical stalemate, with both armies bludgeoning each other into inaction.

Rhea begins his narrative in the Wilderness with the smoking fire from the battle and burning underbrush still swirling around the participants. With a virtual hour-by-hour account of the action, Rhea succeeds in following the action in detail from both sides. On the morning of May 8 the history of the Army of the Potomac and the entire Civil War took a sharp turn. On that morning, Grant began moving his columns south toward Richmond. Every other thrust toward the Confederate capital had ended with a withdrawal, but despite the losses he had sustained, Grant was determined to proceed south. Grant’s next objective was Spotsylvania Court House, a crossroads on the route to Richmond. Lee divined his opponents’ intentions, but Grant had the inside track toward the small community. On May 8, Confederate cavalry fought a masterful delaying action that, coupled with a lackadaisical performance on the part of Grant’s corps commanders, allowed Confederate infantry to take position along Laurel Hill, blocking the Federal advance. The V Corps under Major General Gouverner Warren attacked piecemeal and was bloodily repulsed by the Confederates.

That night the Confederates frantically dug in behind earthworks constructed from logs and dirt. By the morning of May 9 Lee’s army was in place behind strong breastworks that extended from Laurel Hill east to the ridge that ran north of the McCoull residence. The right flank of the Confederate position formed a muleshoe that would play prominently in the battle ahead. The same day Phillip Sheridan started south on a cavalry raid toward Richmond. His goal was to draw away J. E. B. Stuart and his Confederate cavalry where Sheridan could destroy him.

The next day, May 10, Grant probed for weak spots in Lee’s line along the Po River and at Laurel Hill. Hancock’s II Corps probed around the Confederate flank but was repulsed by a fierce counterattack from Harry Heth’s division. Warren’s V Corps assaulted Laurel Hill, only to be bloodily repulsed by Richard Anderson’s Confederate corps. That evening Grant planned another series of attacks all along Lee’s line.

Grant’s plan involved three assaults to be carried out simultaneously at 5 p.m. However, because of a series of misunderstandings, only one of them got off on time. Grant ordered Mott’s division to attack the northeastern side of the muleshoe salient while Colonel Emory Upton attacked the salient from the northwest. Upton’s attack involved a highly concentrated group of handpicked regiments from the VI Corps, designed to punch a hole in the Confederate line. The third attack was Hancock’s II Corps that was to hit the Confederate defenses around Laurel Hill. Mott’s assault went ahead as scheduled; only to have Confederate artillery beat back the advance in short order. Upton’s attack went forward at 7 p.m. and promptly punched a hole in the Confederate line. But without Mott’s backing, Upton was forced to withdraw. Lastly Hancock’s II Corps attacked the Confederate left only to be bloodily repulsed. This ended the fighting on May 10.

The next day Sheridan’s cavalrymen approached Richmond. J. E. B. Stuart moved his rebel troopers in place to resist Sheridan at Yellow Tavern north of the Confederate capital. In the subsequent fighting Stuart was killed, an irreparable blow to Lee and the army. Grant spent May 11 planning a renewal of the attack for the next day. Upton’s assault had given him an idea; to move Hancock’s entire corps into position on a grand scale to accomplish what Upton had failed to do, smash the muleshoe salient. Simultaneously, Grant elected to send Ambrose Burnside and his IX Corps against the eastern side of the muleshoe to catch the Confederates in a pincers movement.

At 4:30 a.m. on May 12 Hancock’s Federals swept over the muleshoe. Fierce fighting ensued as Jubal Early’s Confederates were forced from their positions by death or capture. At 5 a.m. John B. Gordon counterattacked with his reserve division and restored part of the line. Both commanders funneled reinforcements into the carnival of death as Federal assaults by Warren and Burnside met with failure against both of Lee’s flanks. The northwest angle of the muleshoe salient became known as Bloody Angle as bodies piled up in and around the breastworks. The Confederates finally succeeded in erecting a new defensive line across the base of the muleshoe during the night. Lee had held his ground, albeit just barely, against Grant’s attacks.

The next day, May 13, Grant decided to again bypass the Confederates and slip around Lee’s right flank toward Richmond. This ended the bloody fighting around Spotsylvania Court House.

Throughout the volume Gordon Rhea is a masterful storyteller. He succeeds in bringing these six days during the overland campaign alive like never before. He focuses primarily on the rivalry between Lee and Grant as well as the implications for the battles around Spotsylvania. He points out that it is the first time that breastworks and trenches are used to a large degree in the Civil War, foreshadowing later conflicts such as World War I. He also points to the death of J. E. B. Stuart as a major turning point in the campaign for Richmond. In all, it seems that Grant’s decision to move south after the Wilderness, the extensive use of breastworks and bloody fighting and Stuart’s death all mark these six days as a major turning point on the Union path to victory.