Slow Going on the James:  The Bermuda Hundred Campaign

            General Benjamin Butler’s Bermuda Hundred Campaign has gone done in Civil War historiography as an utter failure which had serious consequences in lengthening the Civil War.  William Glenn Robertson’s Back Door to Richmond: The Bermuda Hundred Campaign, April—June 1864 is an attempt to reexamine this campaign, demonstrating its various success.  Robertson’s goal is to remove some of the blame for its limited success from General Butler, as well as extend some of the blame for the failures to his subordinates and his superiors.  Robertson also praises the skillful Confederate defense with the frustration of Federal aims, especially by General Pickett and General Beauregard.  Finally, Robertson aims to show that “Bottled-Up” Butler was never bottled up and had largely completed his objectives.  This is a readable campaign book with excellent maps to guide the reader through the action and inaction.

            As General Grant assumed command over the eastern theater, he looked for a way to increase the pressure against Lee by drawing away Confederate forces into other areas.  A plan for moving up the James devised by Major General Benjamin Butler seemed a favorable proposition.  Unfortunately for Grant, his choice of officers for the campaign led to the ultimate limitations and perceived failure of the mission.  Butler had considerable success for a political general, and proved to be an excellent administrator.  The two corps commanders placed with Butler proved to be less than excellent.  Major General William F. “Baldy” Smith and Major General Quincy A. Gillmore both were West Pointers, but both proved to be incapable of acting successfully with regards to this campaign.  As such, Butler conducted some portions of the campaign with skill, but never with speed and aggression.  Grant had placed Baldy Smith with Butler in order to provide competent field assistance, but Baldy Smith proved to be extremely weak throughout the campaign.  Moreover, Gen. Gillmore proved incompetent repeatedly, as well as the source of many of the delays on the campaign.  The initial deployment advanced up the James River and seized a peninsula between the James and the Appomattox rivers.  Having secured and fortified this position, Butler first timidly advanced toward Petersburg, then toward Richmond.  Even though he possessed overwhelming forces throughout most of the campaign, he acted as though his force merely served as a diversion from Grant’s onslaught, rather than a potential for ending the war.  Butler failed to act decisively or aggressively throughout the campaign, showing his relative inexperience.

            Southern resistance checked the inexperienced and dilatory Butler.  Initially, General Pickett defended Petersburg with vastly inferior forces.  General Beauregard, department commander, quickly organized the movement of forces to support Pickett in his defense by smoke and mirrors.  The Confederate forces were perplexed when Butler withdrew his Army from the Petersburg front.  Butler had learned of Grant’s advance toward Richmond and wanted to move to support him.  Butler decided his army needed a day of rest, during which time Beauregard sent substantial reinforcements to Drewry’s Bluff.  Beauregard then took over direction of the defenses, eventually leading towards a substantial battle at Drewry’s Bluff, where Baldy Smith panicked, causing the Federal forces to retreat back to their base.  Finally, Gilmore managed to bungle a last ditch offensive strike at Petersburg, retreating without reason, leaving Federal troops already in the middle of the city.

            Robertson blames Gilmore and Smith for most of the failures of the Army of the James, with Grant receiving some of the blame as well.  Petersburg was never the explicit objective of the Army of the James, but always a possibility.  As such, when Grant approached Richmond, Butler abandoned his attempt to take Petersburg and moved in support.  Grant never ordered Butler to take Petersburg, which the Army of the James could have done numerous times during the campaign.  It is the failure to take Petersburg which became the major recrimination of the Army of the James. 

            Robertson notes that Butler succeeded in his official objectives:  establishing a secure base up the James, disrupting the Confederate transportation network, distracting Confederate units, and threatening Richmond.  However, his defense of Butler is not convincing, given Butler’s timid nature in conducting offensive maneuvers.  While he was ill-served by Smith and Gillmore, Butler himself never seemed to possess the necessary faculties to become even a second-rate field commander.  While this may not have been the worst-managed campaign in the Civil War, it was one of the slowest and least aggressive offensives of the war.

Peter Pratt