The Bermuda Hundred Campaign: Operations on the South Side of the James River, Virginia–May, 1864. By Herbert M. Schiller. 1988                     

In his book, The Bermuda Hundred Campaign: Operations on the South Side of the James River, Virginia – May, 1964, Herbert Schiller attempts to recount a major element of the Union effort to destroy Lee’s army and capture Richmond during the spring of 1864.  One of the battles resulting from Ulysses S. Grant’s grand strategy occurred at Bermuda Hundred, which lies south southeast of Richmond along the southern banks of the James River.  The adversaries at Bermuda Hundred involved Benjamin F. Butler’s Army of the James, and a “pick-up team” of Confederate forces brought up from North Carolina and various local units in the Richmond-Petersburg vicinity.  P. G. T. Beauregard commanded these forces in his first major combat action since the battle of Shiloh.  He commanded the successful defense of Charleston, South Carolina during much of the intervening time. 

The drive on Richmond by Butler’s Army of the James was a critical element of Grant’s master plan for defeating Lee and ending the war in 1864.  In Schiller’s words:

The simultaneous movement of Butler’s army up the James River and of the Army of the Potomac through central Virginia were just two components of Grant’s overall strategy for that year.  In conjunction with these movements, General Franz Sigel would lead a third Virginia army up the Shenandoah Valley toward Staunton.  General William T. Sherman at the same time would lead the other major Union advance from Chattanooga toward Atlanta.  In addition to attacking a major Confederate rail and supply center, Sherman’s thrust would prevent General Joseph E. Johnston from reinforcing Lee in Virginia.  The final phase of Grant’s spring offensive would be the movement of Major General Nathaniel Banks on Mobile and then on to Atlanta; however, on March 12, 1864, Banks unsuccessfully invaded western Louisiana and his portion of the grand operations came to nothing.[1]

Butler was to move his army up the James and offload at City Point[2] and Bermuda Hundred for an advance on Richmond.  Depending on the success of operations by the Army of the Potomac, Butler would either invest the city or join with Grant for subsequent actions.  On May 4, 1864, Grant’s offensive began and Butler began moving his force of 33,000 up the James River. 

During April and early May, the incredibly complex task of assembling and relocating large forces and supplies proved taxing for the Union leadership.  It is a tribute to the professionalism of both the army and navy that they met the established goals and launched the massive offensive in a coordinated and timely manner.  As the Union forces conducted this flurry of intense activity, the Southerners conducted extensive reconnaissance activity in an attempt to discern Yankee intentions.  Despite excellent intelligence work, the Confederates had not identified Bermuda Hundred as the landing and concentration point for the Army of the James.  The shuffle of forces to support both Lee and Beauregard had temporarily weakened Richmond’s defenses.  An immediate Union advance as conceived in Grant’s master plan held good prospects for success.  But upon landing at Bermuda Hundred, the Union army chose to entrench rather than move directly into the attack, and lost a good opportunity for early success.  As Butler concentrated his forces at Bermuda Hundred, Confederate leadership hurried to play catch-up by moving troops from the Carolinas to support Lee and Beauregard. 

While entrenching his army, Butler pushed out forces to cut the Richmond & Petersburg railroad located only a few miles from his cantonment.  This brought about the first significant fighting of the campaign at Port Walthall Junction.  Although Union forces enjoyed initial success and did some inconsequential damage to the railroad, the Rebels ultimately forced them back into their defenses.  Butler also ordered a cavalry raid under command of August V. Kautz, which caused damage to the Weldon & Petersburg railroad south of Petersburg and created consternation among Confederated leaders.  It also disrupted the flow of troops and provisions from North Carolina.  On May 9, Butler pushed out a strong force under Quincy A. Gillmore, which got astride the Petersburg and Richmond railroad and began destruction efforts, which included the bending of hot rails.  Simultaneously, William F. Smith moved his corps toward Port Walthall Junction and Swift Creek where he began to meet Confederate resistance.  Several minor engagements resulted form these maneuvers in which the Union forces had held the upper hand.  On the evening of May 9, Butler met with Gillmore and Smith and ordered an advance the next day to drive the Confederates south across the Appomattox River and continue destroying the lines of communication between Petersburg and Richmond.  Subsequently, Butler apparently remembered his objective was Richmond and not Petersburg and on May 10 ordered a withdrawal from Swift Creek back toward Bermuda Hundred.  This caused conflict between him and his corps commanders as well as between Gillmore and Smith themselves. 

During much of this early activity, Beauregard was absent due to illness.  Command of Confederate operations near Petersburg and Bermuda Hundred fell to George E. Pickett who acquitted himself with greater competence than his superiors expected.  On May 8, Beauregard returned to duty and arrived at Petersburg on the morning of May 10.  In the words of Schiller:

By the close of May 10, Beauregard had organized a creditable defense of Petersburg.  Federal indecisiveness allowed him to do this.  At Drewry’s Bluff, another Confederate force was also being assembled and would attack Butler’s rear that same day.[3]

None other than Jefferson Davis himself had instigated creation of the Drewry Bluff force built around the command of Robert Ransom.  The result was an engagement at (near) Ware Bottom Church in which the Union forces repulsed Confederate attacks.  Nonetheless, the Federal forces left the field and returned to their entrenchments with little to show for their efforts.  The most successful effort during this phase was Kautz’s cavalry raid south of Petersburg, which disrupted the Weldon & Petersburg railroad lines. 

With his army concentrated in a defensive enclave near Bermuda Hundred, Butler issued on May 10 the orders he should have issued on May 6 or 7, a move against Richmond.  Unfortunately, for the Union army, Beauregard now had a force in place to contest his movement.  On or about May 12, Butler’s Army of the James was again in full motion, this time toward his primary objective of Richmond.  This forced the corps of Smith and Gillmore to move against Drewry’s Bluff while Kautz set off on another cavalry raid.  Kautz reeked havoc on the Danville & Richmond railroad and the Lynchburg & Petersburg railroad before again visiting damage on the Welden & Petersburg.  In addition to substantial damage, Kautz’s raids had the effect of deceiving Confederate leaders as to the real objective of Butler’s force.  Butler reinforced this confusion with a renewed advance against Petersburg from City Point by Edward W. Hinks’s division.  Sheridan’s raid from the Army of the Potomac and the associated Battle of Yellow Tavern also created substantial pressure against Richmond.  Taken together, all this activity created uncertainty in the minds of some Confederate leaders. 

On May 13, Butler’s army engaged Confederate forces along the Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike and the Richmond & Petersburg railroad line.  During the afternoon, Gillmore’s corps turned the Confederated right flank and drove them into inter defense lines around Drewry’s Bluff.  For two days, the armies eyed each other from their opposite positions.  During this time, Beauregard moved his headquarters to Drewry’s Bluff and began to reinforce for a counterstroke.  In the early morning of May 16, Beauregard attacked all along his line with the primary objective of turning the Union right flank.  The overall intent was for Robert F. Hoke’s division to engage the enemy left and Alfred H. Colquitt’s division to engage the center while Ransom’s division turned the Union right flank.  William H.C. Whiting’s division was to strike the Union rear from the vicinity of Petersburg.  Initially, the plan worked as intended when Ransom turned the Union right early in the fight.  But his lines got confused and the Yankee defenses stiffened.  By mid morning, the Union right flank was holding firm in new positions.  Beauregard shifted his focus to the Union left as Hoke launched vicious attacks without breaking the enemy line.  The expected strike against the Yankee rear from Whiting never occurred.  But, the combined pressure from the Confederate attacks coupled with a lack of clarity about battlefield conditions caused Butler to order a retreat, which the army conducted in good order.  By the end of the day, the Yankees were back in their familiar entrenchments at Bermuda Hundred.  In the way of summation, Schiller tells us:

Both sides faltered in the May 16 battle.  Confederate results, although falling short of Beauregard’s elaborate plan, did force Butler to withdraw into his lines and abandon his advance on Richmond.  Ransom’s disorganization in the fog resulted in Confederate failure to gain Butler’s rear and seize Proctor’s Creek bridge on the Old Stage Road.  Hoke’s offensive, although creditable, gained little until Gillmore ordered the withdrawal of the X Corps.  Whiting’s failure was abysmal by any standard.[4] 

But Schiller saves his most severe criticism for the Federal leadership. 

Aside from the tactical oversight and errors, the Federals were the real losers from a strategic viewpoint.  Once Butler fell back to Bermuda Hundred he lost the initiative and the usefulness of his army evaporated.  The Army of the James was no longer a threat since Beauregard had been able, in the ten days Butler allowed him, to assemble a creditable opposing force.  Butler’s only usefulness now was to tie up Beauregard’s men and thus prevent them from reinforcing Lee.  In the following days even this proved illusive.[5]

On May 20, Beauregard attacked Butler’s positions along Gillmore’s front and then generally all along the line.  In the course of the fighting, the Confederates drove the Yankees about one mile all along their front.  In so doing, Beauregard reduced the number of forced needed on the peninsula by occupying the shortest possible defensive line necessary to contain the Army of the James.  This permitted him to free forces to reinforce Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia while detaining as many as 25,000 Federals.  Beauregard attempted to further press and isolate Butler by taking Forts Powhatan and Pocahontas but Union gunboats on the James frustrated these attempts.  Nonetheless, the Army of the James ceased to be a threat to the Confederacy.  In the words of U.S. Grant, Butler’s army was “in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked.”[6] 

In balance, the Bermuda Hundred campaign was a failure for the Army of the James.  Although it tied down Confederate forces needed elsewhere, the same is true of the more numerous Union soldiers.  The objective of the campaign was to invest Richmond, a feat that Butler never came close to accomplishing.  This was due primarily to a lack of competence and cooperation among the highest commanders (Butler, Gillmore, and Smith).  Butler and his generals missed many opportunities, and when they did act, it was often too late.  Beauregard’s superb organizational skills were invaluable to the Confederate success.  He also developed well conceived—if somewhat grandiose—plans, but execution proved erratic.  Had Whiting and Ransom performed according to expectation on May 16, the Confederate success may well have been much more complete.  Gradually, both of the armies detached elements to the decisive theatres of war.  For Butler, this campaign marked the beginning of his decline as a Civil War general.  For Beauregard, it was one of his better moments.  Even so, success at Bermuda Hundred did not lead to greater opportunity and achievement.  This probably marked the upper limit of the Cajun general’s ability and his superiors were wise enough to recognize it. 

Herbert Schiller’s book is an excellent account of an interesting and important Civil War event.  His description of the operational and tactical actions is superb and often enticing.  He also does an outstanding job of explaining the strategic and policy context in which the campaign occurred.  His ability to organize complex material is noteworthy and his writing skills engaging.  The Bermuda Hundred Campaign is a valuable contribution to the literature of warfare.   

Gary J. Ohls

Timelines – May 1864 – The Bermuda Hundred Campaign

Grant and Butler Meet to Discuss Operations…………………....April 1

Capture of Forts Pocahontas and Powhatan………………………May 5

Surprise Landings at Bermuda Hundred & City Point……..……..May 5

Port Walthall Junction Recon………………………………..…....May 6

Deployment to Port Walthall Junction………………………........May 7

Fighting at Port Walthall Junction..………………………….........May 7

Federal Advances….……………….……………………….…......May 9

Confederates Driven into Drewry’s Bluff Positions.…….………..May 13

Counterattack Drives Union into Bermuda Hundred Positions.......May 16

Attack Drives Union Forces, Adjusts Confederate Line……….....May 20

Confederate Attack against Fort Powhatan Repulsed……………..May 21

Confederate Attack Against Fort Pocahontas Repulsed………......May 24