Mountains Touched with Fire: Chattanooga Besieged, 1863. By Wiley Sword. 1995.

 

            Much like his previous work, Shiloh: Bloody April, Wiley Sword generates in Mountains Touched With Fire a well researched, though overly detailed, account of a Civil War battle. This work examines the Chattanooga Campaign which occurred in 1863. Sword draws from personal letters, diaries, and journals of the men involved in the campaign; Sword treats the sources from the rank and file with as much attention and respect as those from the upper command. Sword finds that battles in the West became decisive in the war, with the Chattanooga Campaign holding a special significance; it was a “disaster both actually and potentially worse than those the South had suffered at Gettysburg and Vicksburg.” The loss of Chattanooga would mean the loss of Tennessee and Georgia; these states together represented the heartland of the Confederacy.

            It is obvious that Sword finds much more endearing qualities in the rank and file than in the commanding officers. His contempt for the incompetent command extends to both the Union and the Confederacy. Union Major General William Starke Rosecrans is portrayed as “moody, nervous, and impulsive” as well as a “self-consuming eccentric.” He comes off much better than Ulysses Grant though. Sword sees Grant as a self-serving and incompetent leader. Though Grant’s plans fail again and again, he wins by sheer luck and the even worse planning of the South. Grant later claims his plans succeeded right on track, despite obvious examples to the contrary. Rosecrans, on the other hand, has admirable characteristics to match his over inflated ego. The Confederacy fares little better. Sword contends that Braxton Bragg is much hated by his generals and the rank and file do not trust his judgment.

            The battle for Chattanooga could have easily been a Confederate victory. Union forces found themselves cut off from supply lines with rations running low. The Confederates held the superior positions of Lookout Mountain and Lookout Valley, but failed to completely cut off the supply lines. Bragg blames the subsequent loss of Lookout Mountain on James Longstreet. Rather than listening to Longstreet’s concerns, Bragg sends Longstreet to the Knoxville Campaign. As Swords points out, this is an emotional response, not a military strategy. Rather than face those who disagreed with him, Bragg sent competent generals away to avoid personal conflict. Grant chooses to rely on his generals; they are able to flank Bragg and press their advantages. Grant is decidedly dependent on General William Sherman; he delays far too long waiting for Sherman’s arrival. Grant’s victories are therefore less impressive than one might expect. He wins out of a combination of sheer luck and the unfortunate decisions made by Bragg. Interestingly, the Unions best generals had converged together at Chattanooga: Grant, Sherman, and Rosecrans.

            The results of the Chattanooga Campaign are more important than the actual battle or strategic mistakes. Most importantly, the failure of the Confederates at Chattanooga led to the removal of Bragg. Jefferson Davis gave into political pressures and removed Bragg, though he could not repair the fractionalization of the army. This removal might have aided the Confederacy, but Davis recalled Bragg within three months to serve as a military advisor. Sword contends that Davis refused to admit his mistaken judgment in Bragg. This appointment further weakened the Confederacy. For the Grant, his victory earned him high regard from President Abraham Lincoln. Within months, Grant became the most famous Union solider in the nation, though those under his command continued to regard the victory as a “fortunate” outcome. Some recalled that Grant’s decisions had been wrong as often as correct during the battle. The most important outcome of Chattanooga remains the opening of the Confederate heartland. The loss of Chattanooga opened the Confederacy for invasion and devastated morale in the South.

            Sword’s account of the Chattanooga Campaign is an interesting read, but unbalanced in his assessment of the various generals. His revisionist approach to Grant and Bragg is not completely supported. The maps are less than helpful and are sometimes confusing to readers. The real contribution of Sword’s work, both in this piece and his previous books, is his recognition of the importance of the Western Theater in the Civil War. The defeat of the South is inexorably linked with the battles waged outside of Virginia. This book is important for those studying the Civil War because it shifts the focus from the Eastern Theater to those battles in the West.

 

Misty Mehrtens

Texas Christian University

 

 

Mountains Touched with Fire: Chattanooga Besieged, 1863. By Wiley Sword. 1995.

 

            Filled with minute details and vivid descriptions, Wiley Sword’s Mountains Touched with Fire, attempts to recreate the detailed scenes of the Chattanooga Campaign of the Civil War.  Sword has brought in not only command-level discussions but also correspondence from starving, mud-covered soldiers.  He brings in such details such as unwritten battlefront truce where troops from both sides met for poker games.  This unwritten truce was used by Union commanders to gain position and ultimately led to the Southern defeat.  As such, it provides an entertaining window into the struggle which ultimately signaled the Rebel loss in the war.

            Sword goes into great detail to demonstrate how the Union almost lost the Chattanooga due to starvation, as over 10,000 animals died attempting to supply Chattanooga over a difficult and mountainous path.  The South occupied the heights of Lookout Mountain, as well as Lookout Valley, which prevented resupply by conventional means.  By the time the Union gained a foothold in Lookout Valley, only a few days left of even half rations remained.  Longstreet’s inability to prevent the Union movement broke the siege and set up the eventually battle of Missionary Ridge.

            The Battle of Missionary Ridge is used mainly to show that Grant’s battle plan failed.  General Sherman and the Army of the Tennessee failed in their attempt to take the north end of Missionary Ridge from General Cleburne’s troops.  Acting only on impulse, Grant sent forward General Thomas and the Army of the Cumberland to the rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge to attempt to relieve pressure from Sherman’s troops.  General Hardee’s misguided battle plan split his troops between the rifle pits and the ridgeline.  As such, his split troops ran up this hill in retreat, followed by the Union forces.  Hardee misplaced the ridgeline defenses so that the cannon could not fire directly into the Union troops, thereby allowing the Union troops to break through the lines and flank the Southern forces along the ridgeline.

            Sword spends much of his work attempting to disparage those he sees as villains and to build up those he sees as heroes, thereby creating an underlying filter through which the reader must view the information which Sword presents.  Sword’s work is obviously designed to redeem the Army of the Cumberland and its commanders, which Sword apparently thinks have been slighted in their own time and in history.  First, Sword attempts to redeem General Rosecrans, who Sword views as unfairly criticized for the defeat at Chickamauga, and the subsequent difficulties in the Siege of Chattanooga.  Then, he disparages General Grant throughout the work, making him into leader who wins by chance and over-relied on General Sherman.  Finally, he makes General Thomas into the true hero of the Chattanooga, when his Army of the Cumberland saved the day at Missionary Ridge, thereby protecting Grant’s legacy and reputation.

            Just as Sword attempts to redeem the Army of the Cumberland, he engages in the same effort to redeem and disparage the various officers of the South.  Bragg becomes a prima Dona who sees conspiracy in every part of his command and works more at removing his own subordinates than fighting the Union.  Bragg is presented as unreasonable, if not paranoid, in his criticism of generals such of Cheatham and Polk, ignoring their incompetence and numerous errors which had lead to Rebel defeats.  Bragg receives all responsibility for every error committed out by the Rebels.  Likewise, serious errors committed by Longstreet and Hardee which led to the Rebel defeat are discounted.  Sword views everything as Bragg’s fault and, by extension, President Davis’s fault, as Bragg is presented as a personal friend being protected by Davis.  Interestingly, Sword does not present Polk as a friend of Davis, omitting that personal relationship as well as Polk’s incompetence.

            While entertaining, Sword’s agenda driven book causes the reader to wonder what other choices Sword made in crafting the work to further his agenda.  Thereby, it can not be viewed as the definitive work on battle, especially considering the few maps which do not aid the reader sufficiently in grasping the army movements.  Overall, it provides an entertaining introduction to the campaign, accessible to anyone with interest in the subject.

 

Peter Pratt