Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring 1862. By Robert G. Tanner. (Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1996. Pp. xix, 599, ISBN 0-8117-2064-0.)
Robert Tanner’s Stonewall in the Valley dispels the romanticized mystique surrounding Jackson’s overwhelming successes while commanding the Army of the Valley. Tanner’s hefty narrative describes in detail virtually every aspect required to understand the tactical situation facing Jackson including: the region’s history, the tactical value of the Shenandoah Valley, the limited resources at Jackson’s disposal, the character and quality of the men under his command, the biographies of key personalities, and the changing disposition and goals of enemy forces arrayed against him. Unlike many narratives, Stonewall in the Valley consistently weighs Jackson’s failures and shortcomings as a commander against the results he achieved on the battlefield. The author revised an earlier work on the subject to include newly uncovered sources, and the added research shows in both the force of his argument and the heft of his evidence.
Tanner examines such a large length of time with such precision that even a brief overview of the chronological sequence of military actions in the book becomes unwieldy. However, while these individual combat narratives are important in and of themselves, Tanner uses them to reveal the true nature of the man too often remembered mythically as “Stonewall,” a kind of Achilles for the Confederate cause. Tanner determines that Jackson’s chief defining characteristic in military service was his limitless ambition. Substantial evidence confirms this point that so commonly was obscured by the spectacle of Jackson’s religious fervor. Tanner further identifies that Jackson was as taciturn as he was insightful, and that his inability to communicate directly or clearly with his subordinates often hampered the execution of strategically sound plans. Tanner also shows that Jackson had problems similar to many of his contemporaries in moving from command of a relatively compact unit to that of an army; this particular component of the narrative dismantles the legend surrounding Jackson more than any other as Jackson’s purposeful growth into a competent and successful general shatters the notion of “a rendezvous with fate.” The work also identifies his greatest flaw: his inability to master the strengths and limitations of his own forces. Jackson continuously strove to break the Confederate’s of their irregular tactics rather than bend them to his will. The stringent requirements he held himself to also made it difficult for him to see value in fellow officers.
The deft comparison of Jackson to his cavalry commander Turner Ashby subtly undermines any romantic notions readers may have held concerning the infantry commander. By paralleling them throughout the text Turner shows how the reality of Jackson lined up far more with the diligent professional and veteran than the idealized notions of Southern élan and recklessness better attributed to Ashby. Their mutual effectiveness combined with the increasing dissonance between their styles throughout the narrative highlights the complete otherness of Jackson to the generic Confederate tropes. The Valley Campaign reveals Jackson’s mortality the whole way through and disperses the fatalism surrounding his death at Chancellorsville.
Tanner’s greatest strength lies in his ability to align every scrap of information with the overall purpose of his work. Many anecdotes or biographical backgrounds might distract in other works, but the author continuously turns them back to his ultimate goal of better describing Jackson’s character and the Valley Campaign’s nature. Furthermore, the extended period of time, diverse cast of characters, and vast landscape makes such a long narrative unwieldy, but at the end of every major section Tanner both analyzes the outcome of events and identifies their significance to the region and the war at large. In this manner the author merges the telling of a good story with a steady eye to scholarly contribution and historiographical relevance.
Fort Worth, Texas Andrew L. Klooster
Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring 1862. By Robert G. Tanner. 1976; Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996.
Gen. Thomas J. Jackson’s operations in the Shenandoah Valley rank as one of the Civil War’s most remarkable campaigns. Having already earned the sobriquet “Stonewall” for his performance at First Manassas, Jackson found himself in spring 1862 tasked with defending the strategically vital region, decoying three separate Union commands, and diverting as many Union soldiers as possible from George McClellan’s drive on Richmond. Between March and June 1862, Jackson successfully bedeviled his opponents through a combination of deft maneuvers, hard marches, and sharp battles, and in so doing established his reputation as a wily foe and forged his Army of the Valley into his elite “Foot Cavalry.” In Stonewall in the Valley, practicing attorney and VMI graduate Robert G. Tanner offers a remarkable volume chronicling and analyzing the campaign. Told primarily from the Confederate perspective, Stonewall in the Valley presents the campaign as an operational success, one which saw Jackson come into his own as a commander and his raw Valley soldiers mature into veterans.
Confederate forces in Virginia found themselves hard pressed in early 1862, with a 150,000-man strong Army of the Potomac closing in on Richmond from the James River in the east and from Fredericksburg to the north. It fell to Jackson and his Army of the Valley to prevent scattered Union forces in western Virginia from crossing the Blue Ridge to reinforce this drive. Jackson attacked Nathaniel Banks’ retiring force at Kernstown (just south of Winchester), unexpectedly facing an army more than twice the size of his own. Driven from the field, Jackson suffered his only defeat of the campaign but by taking the offensive convinced the Union high command it was too dangerous to divert troops from the Shenandoah. Jackson retreated far south up the Valley, joined forces with Richard Ewell, then marched westward to repulse Robert Milroy at McDowell and drive him back into the Alleghenies. Faced with conflicting orders from Lee and Johnston, Jackson opted to resume the offensive and marched north, first pouncing on the Union garrison at Front Royal and then successfully attacking Banks and sending his troops running north through the streets of Winchester. Jackson pursued Banks as far north as Harpers Ferry, at which point Abraham Lincoln personally directed Frémont and Shields to converge on the Shenandoah from the west and east in a pincer move intended to trap Jackson in the Lower (northern) Valley. Jackson ordered his troops south in a grueling forced march through torrential rain and managed to escape the trap. Managing to keep the two pursuing armies separated by the South Fork of the Shenandoah River, Jackson occupied Port Republic and the last standing bridge while Ewell repulsed Frémont’s attack at Cross Keys. Jackson then turned on Shields, attacking and defeating the Union force in a bloody affair outside Port Republic. With his Union foes reeling, Jackson and his army left the Valley by rail, speeding eastward to the embattled Confederate capital.
Tanner manages to cogently chronicle the 1862 Valley Campaign, no easy task for a war of maneuver which witnessed march and countermarch up and down the length of the Shenandoah. The narrative is handsomely augmented by fourteen maps, quite essential for following the complex campaign. Tanner also provides substantial analysis of the campaign’s conduct and consequences. The updated 1996 edition includes correct usage of the military terms strategy, operations, and tactics, adding to the book’s academic sophistication. Tanner makes a strong case that the campaign represents “a textbook example of the operational level of war” (305), praising Jackson’s cooperation with superiors Lee and Johnston which successfully derailed Union plans to launch a second attack on Richmond from the Rappahannock and pinned down numerically superior Union forces. Tanner, however, is no Jackson sycophant, offering meaningful criticism which demonstrates Stonewall was still learning on the job. He faults Jackson’s notoriously prickly relationship with his subordinates, poor tactical performances at Kernstown and Port Republic, habit of leading dangerously close to the front, and penchant for driving both his troops and himself to almost complete exhaustion. Jackson managed to inflict 5,400 Union casualties while incurring only 2,750 losses in battle, though Tanner also estimates that Jackson’s punishing marches cost his army 25 percent non-battle casualties. Tanner turns his attention to the experience of the Valley soldiers who slogged through those marches and fought the battles. Just as Stonewall grew as a commander over the course of the campaign, his army transitioned from green, unruly, undisciplined, and often reluctant summer soldiers to hard-marching, hard-fighting (though never quite disciplined) veterans.
Faults in Stonewall in the Valley are few and far between. Although Tanner expressly tells the story primarily from the Confederate perspective, he remains attuned to the operational vision and conduct of the Union high command. Early in the book he repeats the myths that Jackson continually sucked on lemons and that he successfully tricked the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad into channeling its traffic into a two-hour bloc in order to capture scores of locomotives, but he is otherwise careful with his sources. Overall, Tanner’s Stonewall in the Valley offers an incisive and accessible account of a complex, momentous campaign, one waged by a flawed yet talented commander who has passed into legend.
Jonathan Steplyk
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Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign Spring 1862. By Robert G. Tanner. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996.
Stonewall in the Valley was first published in 1976, but twenty years later Robert G. Tanner felt the need to revisit his research and publish a new edition. He intended the original to answer questions about the misunderstood and misremembered Shenandoah Valley Campaign in 1862. Tanner believes that the Valley Campaign was one of the most important campaigns of the war. When new sources became available in the late 1970s, including diaries, letters, personal papers, infantry records, tactical studies, and memorandums. Tanner returned to his work in order to incorporate this new information into his account of the battle. Tanner’s work examines the “War Between the States” from the Confederate view point; he finds high praise for their tactics, strategy, and operational art despite the end outcome of the Civil War.
The Valley Campaign evaded serious study until Stonewall in the Valley. Though Tanner acknowledges Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson as the hero of the Confederate army, he attempts to keep the focus on the Valley army. These men seem follow Jackson almost blindly, trusting in his tactical skills to keep them alive. As the work progresses, the Valley army develops from a “drunken mob” to a fairly successful professional army. Jackson receives much of the credit for this, due to his high standards in training, drilling, and military expectations. Tanner points out several times that Jackson’s victories are as much from his own genius as from Union miscalculations and failures. Jackson’s spectacular demonstration in the Campaign Valley is the result of favorable circumstances, rather than brilliant military strategies. Jackson reacted to circumstances, showing a willingness to adept his plans when necessary.
Despite these qualities, Jackson is not without criticism from Tanner. Jackson’s penchant for flanking the Union forces in criticized, as is his desire to be on the frontlines. Tanner says that even though most Civil War generals were in the thick of battle, few would have scaled a wall on a first charge. His actions are described as “unimaginable and inappropriate.” Told almost entirely from the Confederate perspective, it is not clear what the intentions of the Union Army are at any given moment in the battle. Tanner believes that this battle was the first in which President Lincoln truly had to act the part of commander in chief. He feared that the Valley army might be able to march into Washington, if not stopped. Tanner finds no evidence that Jackson ever seriously considered continuing on to Washington. Though Jackson’s leadership is praised, the Confederates are not without losses in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign. Four of the six brigades changed leadership during the battle, some more than once. Tanner credits the army for learning valuable lessons during this time; in this campaign they learned when and how to use resources and when to accept losses. The Shenandoah Valley Campaign allowed for Confederates to gain valuable time. They forced the Union back and used the Spring of 1862 to plan new attack.
Tanner’s work is a well researched and well written account of the Valley army. He focuses enough on both the rank and file and the commanding officers, making the battle understandable. Tanner celebrates the Shenandoah Valley Campaign as one of the most important Southern victories, but it seems that he finds another reason to explore this battle. Shortly afterward, Jackson is killed in Chancellorsville. The appendix is also very helpful to readers. He presents the organization of the army command, the Union response, and Jackson’s future plans. Tanner’s work is appropriate for those interested in the Confederate saga of the Shenandoah Campaign, but those interested in the Union should look elsewhere.
Misty Wilson
Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign Spring 1862. By Robert G. Tanner. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996.
Within Civil War studies, many campaigns stand out for their operational brilliance and tactical execution, but perhaps no other campaign has been so romanticized as Major General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s 1862 triumph in the Shenandoah Valley. All historians agree that it was one of the most masterful and successful campaigns waged during the entire war, but many question whether the outcome of this struggle relied more on Stonewall’s innate talent or his opponent’s numerous errors. In Stonewall in the Valley, noted Civil War scholar Robert G. Tanner delivers the definitive account of this campaign from the Confederate perspective, arguing that Jackson’s victories, while certainly aided by Union blunders and miscalculations, did indeed succeed largely due to Jackson’s superior aptitude for discipline, training, maneuver, and leadership. This campaign is the foundation of Stonewall Jackson’s reputation as a military genius, and Tanner presents an entertaining and well researched narrative of Stonewall’s operations in the Valley from his appointment in November 1861 until his exit in June 1862
Tanner’s work goes into incredible detail regarding the soldiers that comprised the Valley Army and its leadership, utilizing an exhaustive research of primary sources, including several diaries, letters, reports, newspaper accounts, and other postwar recollections ranging from the men in the ranks up to the officer corps. The second edition, published in 1996, includes further research and new interpretations for several uncertain episodes during the campaign, such as added details of the battle of Kernstown, which was Stonewall’s first and only tactical defeat of the entire war. Tanner also provides an extensive description of the terrain, geography, climate, and transportation network of the Valley, that native Confederates, most notably self-trained cartographer Jedediah Hotchkiss, used so effectively to counter the Union invasion. Tanner examines each battle of the campaign in an exciting operational and tactical analysis, explaining just how the Valley Army outgeneraled and outfought their opponents in a series of brutal engagements in the spring of 1862 that completely disrupted the Union’s Virginia offensive and distracted President Lincoln and substantial reinforcements from the conquest of the Confederate capital
While the book paints an incredibly accurate portrait of Jackson and his Valley Army, descriptions of the Federal forces opposing Stonewall are far less detailed, and Tanner’s work undoubtedly centers on the Confederate perspective of the campaign. However, he does not engage in uncritical hero worship of Jackson, and does not hesitate to describe Jackson’s occasional operational mistakes, or more often, his total inability to communicate effectively with subordinates or even maintain harmonious relationships with them. For example, Tanner does not fail to relate the unfortunate arrest and replacement of General Richard Garnett following the battle of Kernstown, and the countless other cases of Jackson’s aggressive use of court martial. Also, Tanner does highlight the crucial weaknesses of command and control in the Valley Army, perhaps best exemplified in the frequent ineffectiveness of Turner Ashby’s cavalry throughout the campaign.
In the end, Tanner concludes that Jackson’s 1862 Valley campaign “should be seen as a shrewd example of how and where to concentrate resources and accept losses. Confederate resources were used in the right way and at the right time in the Shenandoah” (435). Jackson’s victories were invaluable to Confederate morale during the otherwise disastrous first half of the year, and perhaps saved Richmond from Union General George McClellan’s vast Army of the Potomac, which had reached the outskirts of the capital just as Jackson’s campaign was reaching its climax. As Tanner states in his conclusion, Jackson “bought time in the spring of 1862, time in which McClellan was stalled, and time in which the South massed for a deadly counterattack on the Peninsula” (435).
Than Dossman