Jubal's Raid: General Early's Famous Attack on Washington in 1864. By Frank E. Vandiver. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960.
By the summer of 1864 Robert E. Lee found himself and his army in a precarious situation. Ulysses S. Grant had the Army of the Potomac bearing down on Richmond, with the vastly outnumbered Army of Northern Virginia scrambling to keep the invading federals at bay. With Lee tied up in front of Richmond, Grant found use for General David Hunter in the Shenandoah Valley. Targeting Lynchburg, a Confederate supply point, Hunter received orders to first take Staunton and then move on to the city to destroy the infrastructure there. Upon the loss of the Confederate stronghold at Staunton, and its commander William Jones, Lee sent General Jubal Early to protect Lynchburg. Frank E. Vandiver’s book, Jubal's Raid: General Early's Famous Attack on Washington in 1864, covers this campaign and its subsequent raid on Washington D.C.
Lee chose Early because of his ability to act. Early had rejoined the army upon the onset of the war and proved himself able in Stonewall Jackson’s corps. Having a reputation as a reliable and competent commander, he had a quick temper and a foul mouth, but inspired his men as his mentor Jackson had throughout his tenure. Furthermore, Lee chose Jackson’s old army, the Army of the Valley – now the Second Corps – to carry out the campaign because of their hardness and familiarity with the region.
If successful in rescuing the city, Early received orders to move as he saw fit after Lynchburg. Lees plan, to create a diversionary campaign that would force Grant to take soldiers away from his push on Richmond, coincided with Lee’s general strategy of an offensive defense. Setting out on June 12th, Early’s army moved towards Chancellorsville. After impatiently waiting for more than a day for trains to arrive at Chancellorsville, Early’s men traveled by rail to Lynchburg where Hunter had closed within twenty miles of the city. Having a few hours to spare, defenses of the city were prepared and Early set his lines in front of the city to meet Hunter on the 17th. With the Confederates beating back the federal offensive on the first day, the second day left Hunter shaken from a rebel assault. In the early morning hours of the 19th, Hunter attempted to slip away in retreat. Early’s forces harassed Hunter sixty miles into West Virginia, where the Union general finally got away.
After driving Hunter from Virginia, Early awaited confirmation from Lee to cross the Potomac and march on Washington. Having around 15,000 men, Early received the permission to press on in early July. The Confederate strategy was twofold. First, Early tore up the B&O Railroad along his path, taking out a core federal support line while raiding Union supply posts. Second, the rebel commander marched on Washington to create panic within the capitol. Ideally with success, Lee knew that Grant would be forced to move troops away from Petersburg and to the capitol. Lee’s premonition would come true after the Battle of Monocacy Junction. With less than half the troops that Early commanded, General Lew Wallace was little match for the Confederates as they descended on Frederick, MD.
The Confederate triumph lay as a victory only in name, Wallace’s action of July 9th had cost Early a day – and with it the chance to take the capitol. The extra day allowed for Grant to shift forces to Washington. Still, Early marched to just outside Fort Stevens, inside the District of Columbia. Having come closer to the Federal capitol than Union troops had come to its Confederate equivalent, Early assessed that he could not take the city. Adding to two new Union corps hastily sent from grant, Henry Halleck had called out just about every able man in the city. After exchanging cannon fire (some of which happened while Abraham Lincoln surveyed the battlefield) and skirmishes between the two sides, Early turned back on the 13th and began a retreat to Virginia; with him $200,000 for the Confederate war coffers extorted from the leaders of Frederick to save the city from destruction.
Despite the successes of Early and his men, Confederate newspapers made the general a scapegoat for the dwindling rebel cause. Although defeating two federal armies, marching within sight of D.C., and firing on Lincoln, Early’s campaign garnered the reputation of a failed endeavor, one which cost men, material, and time. Vandriver does not believe this to be so, he points out that the confederate raid did what it set out to do – divert troops from Petersburg. His account of Early’s actions in the summer of 1864 is an enjoyable and informative read which can be utilized by any student of the war.
Dan Vogel Texas Christian University