Lincoln and McClellan. By John C. Waugh. (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, c. 2010. Pp. xii, 252, ISBN 978-0-230-61349-2.)

            John C. Waugh’s Lincoln and McClellan examines the relationship between the president and his most adversarial general. Waugh tells a narrative that parallels McClellan and Lincoln’s lives up to and through the Civil War. The author consistently emphasizes the dramatically different backgrounds two of the primary historical actors in the early part of the war came from, moreover, he shows that as the two excelled into positions of power they consistently found themselves on opposite sides of central issues, political lines, and class boundaries. Waugh uses these intersections in their lives to examine the failure of two remarkable individuals to forge a successful partnership. Lincoln and McClellan also depicts a relationship between the two leaders of the north that suddenly inverts with Lincoln’s election to the presidency. Previous to this event Lincoln had struggled to make a name for himself as a lawyer or politician while McClellan’s could neither rise quicker or shine brighter than it already had. Waugh shows how Lincoln’s election placed a man McClellan had long thought inferior to himself in every conceivable way in direct control over him.

            Rather than a thesis driven argument, Waugh presents a narrative driven story about the two men. His analysis follows many of the key tropes of biography by examining their: childhood, education, family, home life, marriage, peers, work ethic, careers, key achievements, and personal habits. Although the book lacks a central, driving thesis, Waugh draws all the disparate facets of their lives and relationship to ultimately answer the question “Why did the Lincoln/McClellan partnership fail?” Waugh seems to come to the conclusion that, beyond the chance outcome of battle, the failure of the partnership primarily fell on McClellan’s shoulders. The general perpetually failed to achieve the results he promised and he thought so highly of himself that he could not value Lincoln’s admirable qualities. Waugh identifies the caveats concerning McClellan’s failures, but at the crux of his argument is the sense that at the end of the day Lincoln actually achieved what McClellan had so often spoken about. Lincoln could achieve both his personal goals to maintain consensus for both the war effort and his political leadership while achieving collaborative success with Grant militarily.

            Waugh thoroughly achieves his goals in writing Lincoln and McClellan. He weaves a thoughtful narrative of the two men’s relationship before and during the war. Readers can glean numerous facts and insights into their lives while observing how even the smallest details informed their interactions. However, Waugh’s book may effectively answer a burning question in the minds of Civil War historians, but neither Lincoln nor McClellan defined their lives in the context of the other. The structure of the work may clearly define the totality of partnership and interactions, but he may also place too much weight on the single point of contact between the two. Yet, this is only one small concern in a work that achieves its purpose with a fluid and enjoyable narrative.

            McClellan takes a beating throughout Waugh’s narrative, but much of the work is done by McClellan himself. An elitist and a braggart, Waugh’s McClellan fabricates an image of himself he can rarely live up to. Moreover, as McClellan moves from the battlefield to the ballot box he compounds his failures for all to see. Not only does McClellan fail to achieve a tangible military victory, but the majority of voters reject that he could have done any better from the White House. By bringing all of these facts and insights to the reader, Waugh crafts a convincing picture of the tumultuous relationship between Lincoln and McClellan.

Andrew Klooster