From Winchester to Cedar Creek

From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864. By Jeffry D. Wert. (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: South Mountain Press, Inc., 1987. Pp. xiii, 325).

By 1864, the Confederacy’s prospects for independence looked grim. Union armies had conquered large swaths of territory and had severed the Southern nation in half by seizing control of the Mississippi River. Despite these victories, Confederate armies still remained a potent force in the field and Lincoln faced a tough fall reelection campaign in a North wearied by three years of war. Lincoln’s reelection was in effect a referendum on the conduct of the war. If he had lost, the war might have ended quite differently with a possible chance of Southern independence. Most historians agree that Sherman’s victories in the Atlanta campaign helped bolster Lincoln’s appeal and helped him win the election. Historian Jeffry Wert argues that Union victories in the Shenandoah campaign of 1864 also played a large role in Lincoln’s reelection. From Winchester to Cedar Creek recounts the Valley campaign from August to October when Union Major General Phil Sheridan and Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early fought a series of battles in the Upper Valley. Wert asserts that this campaign played a large role in the overall strategy of the war and significantly influenced the military situation at Petersburg as well as Northern politics.

Wert provides a well-written narrative of the Valley campaign including the background events that positioned Sheridan and Early in the area. Prior to August, General Robert E. Lee dispatched Early to the Valley in order to protect Confederate supplies in the area and to divert Union forces from the Overland campaign further east. Early drove Union forces from the Valley, advanced on Washington, D.C. and sent his cavalry on raids into Pennsylvania. Although his forces proved too meager to actually threaten the Northern capital, Early’s exploits aroused Northern anxiety and successfully diverted troops that could have been used against Lee’s forces around Richmond. General Ulysses Grant reorganized his forces in Maryland and northwest Virginia and placed them under the command of Sheridan. This move surprised President Lincoln and other officials in the army high command because Sheridan had little experience in commanding troops above the corps level. He had performed well in lower commands and had displayed aggressiveness and skill commanding the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry arm so Grant had great confidence in Sheridan’s abilities.

Throughout August, Early and Sheridan engaged in maneuvering and several relatively minor clashes. Troops referred to this phase as a “mimic-war” but a major clash loomed ahead. On September 19, Sheridan launched an attack against Early’s forces in the Third Battle of Winchester. Although fewer men participated in the fight and the total number of casualties remained lower than other battles, Third Winchester rivaled Gettysburg and Shiloh in intensity and percentages of casualties. Early’s outnumbered troops fought hard but a Union Cavalry charge on the Confederate flank forced the Southerners to retreat. A few days later, Sheridan outflanked Early’s new position at Fisher’s Hill. The Confederates withdrew from the Upper Valley and Sheridan enacted a policy of total war burning food stores, confiscating livestock, and destroying anything that might supply the Confederacy. After these depredations, the Shenandoah Valley could no longer support Confederate forces. Prodded by the need to keep Union reinforcements from Petersburg, Early attacked Sheridan once again at Cedar Creek on October 19. Despite being outnumbered, the Confederates almost won, but Sheridan rallied in troops and smashed the Southern attack. Although minor engagements continued until early 1865, the Confederates no longer posed any threat to the North in the Shenandoah.

Wert provides thoughtful analysis of Early and Sheridan. Both generals made tactical errors on the battlefield but they served ably and fought their armies well. Obviously, Early lost the campaign, but he faced superior Union manpower and had to conduct an aggressive campaign in order to divert Union forces from Grant’s campaigns against Richmond. He could not provide a diversion and sit safely on the defensive at the same time. For Sheridan, superior numbers negated his tactical mistakes somewhat but he also had the ability to inspire his troops and provided aggressive leadership at critical points in battle.

It would have been interesting had Wert written more about the effects of the fighting on the civilians in the valley. The Union strategy of total war played an important role in the campaign and more detailed descriptions of this aspect of the campaign would have dovetailed nicely with the battle narrative. Overall, Wert has written a key work on the Valley campaign and makes an excellent case that these events need to be ranked with Sherman’s actions in Georgia and Grant’s battles around Richmond as events crucial to securing Union victory in the Civil War.

Johnny Spence Texas Christian University

From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864. By Jeffry D. Wert. Carlisle: South Mountain Press, Inc., Publishers, 1987.

Jeffry D. Wert examines the severe defeat of Jubal Early’s Confederate army in From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864. Up to this point the Shenandoah Valley proved a symbol of Southern victory, but it would not remain unconquered. Union General Philip Sheridan would receive contemporary and historic renown from his accomplishments. This campaign in August through October 1864, shattered the stalemate in Virginia. Though historians in the past have, according to Wert, neglected the final campaign for the Shenandoah Valley, he argues that the campaign’s outcome ensured Southern defeat in Virginia. He also shows that although the number of troops engaged and the casualties they suffered did not rival other major engagements, the fighting in the Valley “was some of the bloodiest of the war in relation to the numbers engaged and casualties inflicted.” (vi)

The idea of the campaign into the Shenandoah Valley began with the gambling strategy of Robert E. Lee. He had refashioned the campaign led into the Valley by Stonewall Jackson two years earlier. The early success of the Confederates in the Valley during the summer of 1864 brought a response from Ulysses S. Grant as the political and military stakes became extremely high for both sides. “If the summer stalemate in Virginia were to be broken, it would be beyond the Blue Ridge Mountains in the Shenandoah Valley.” (13)

For the first time Union authorities brought a command in strength, leadership, and combat ability worthy of strategic value into the Shenandoah Valley. The Army of the Shenandoah exceeded any previous Union forces in the region in numbers alone and the Confederate Army of the Valley failed to compare in numbers of effectiveness to this new Union army. When Grant handed Sheridan his orders on August 6, 1864, he had determined to change the past and had created a new weapon for the task in the new Army of the Shenandoah. His orders meant a hard campaign in the Valley lay ahead. The constant shifting and counter shifting of troops into the region by both Lee and Grant showed how the operations at Petersburg and in the Shenandoah Valley were intertwined.

When Sheridan and Early first met at the Battle of Third Winchester it ended in a disaster for Early’s Confederate troops. The Yankees attributed the victory to Sheridan who overlooked a series of flaws and blunders that would have caused a disastrous defeat had he not held such superior numbers. Still, he could afford these mistakes because he held a three to one advantage. This battle showed characteristics of Sheridan that not only contributed to this victory but would also impact the remainder of the campaign. “He possessed a remarkable sense of ebb and flow of an engagement, grasping the key to changing situations and implementing new tactical arrangements for those circumstance.” (105) He also had a charismatic presence that inspired his troops. Jubal Early, on the other hand, had suffered the first loss in a major engagement for a Confederate general in the Shenandoah Valley. His soldiers realized this and doubts began to grow in the minds of Early’s men about the competence of his generalship.

At Fisher’s Hill, unlike at Winchester, Sheridan beat Early with superior generalship. In the span of one week Early’s army had been beaten at Winchester, routed at Fisher’s Hill, and almost pushed out of the Valley altogether. For three months of the campaign Jubal Early accomplished Lee’s risky designs through hard marching, tough fighting and daring bluff. Yet, in the end, this was not enough against the odds that faced the Confederates. Ultimately the Army of the Shenandoah conquered what had previously proved unconquerable. With the Confederate defeat at Cedar Creek, the Union army sealed the fate of the Army of the Valley. After this final defeat the Confederates finally retired from the Shenandoah Valley.

Wert gives a complete and detailed account of the Shenandoah Campaign in 1864. He chronicles the battles that ultimately ended in the expelling of the Confederate Army of the Valley from the region. Here he successfully argues that the campaign’s result ensured Southern defeat in Virginia and shows the desire of both Grant and Lee to use the Shenandoah Valley to end the stalemate in Petersburg.

From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864. By Jeffry D. Wert. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 1997, Pp. x, 324.

During the Civil War, the Shenandoah Valley was a highly valuable and contestable piece of real estate. Through this valley an army could march to either the Confederate capital in Richmond, Virginia or the United States capital in Washington, D.C., which made the land prized by both armies. Jeffry D. Wert states that the valor of the Vermonters in the 1864 Shenandoah Campaign is enough to merit this study. Wert’s book, From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864, elucidates the importance in the Union’s Army of the Shenandoah’s crippling victory over the Confederate Army of the Valley, which this campaign maimed.

Wert begins by introducing the reader to several of the important events before August 1864. He then explains how Federal General Ulysses S. Grant pooled together troops and created the Army of the Shenandoah and appointed Philip Sheridan at its head. Grant commanded Sheridan to drive south, assail Jubal Early’s army, and leave nothing “to invite the enemy to return” (p. 29). Maneuver and light skirmishing characterized the armies’ first encounter, which some dubbed the “Mimic War.” When the two armies fully engaged each other at Opequon Creek the Federals drove the Rebels south towards Winchester. The Union Army pushed the Rebels through Winchester down to Strasburg; Jubal Early suffered the first Confederate defeat in a major engagement in the Shenandoah valley, this aided the reelection campaign of U.S. President Abraham Lincoln. South of Strasburg, Early decided to make a stand at Fishers Hill, which ultimately ended in another Confederate defeat. Several weeks after the Union victories, Early launched a surprise offensive maneuver around Cedar Creek that almost wrested the advantage from the Federals. But later that day, Sheridan’s counter attack pummeled the Confederates and hurled them back. Wert explains that the South could no longer claim invincibility within the Shenandoah Valley.

Confederate Colonel John S. Mosby’s 43^rd Virginia Battalion had a spectral grip on the minds of the Army of the Shenandoah. Wert describes how Mosby’s Partisan Rangers harried the Federal’s wagon train. Confederate sympathizers maintained Mosby’s guerillas, aiding them whenever they could. Sheridan put numerous houses to the torch to thwart the aide Mosby received. Federals captured six of the Rangers and executed them in another attempt to stop the guerilla tactics. This infuriated Mosby and when he captured several enemy soldiers he had them draw pieces of paper out of a hat to decide their fate; he meted out justice for every soldier he lost. None should mistake Mosby’s impact upon the operations in the Shenandoah Valley. Mosby once seized a contingent of Union officers that carried more than one hundred seventy thousand dollars worth of Greenbacks. He plagued the Union so much that they organized a special division under the command of Captain Richard Blazer to combat Mosby’s guerilla movements. Ironically, Sheridan appreciated Mosby’s work because it kept his wagon trains closed and prevented stragglers; a task that could have required a provost guard and two regiments of cavalry. Though it is hard to assess his total contribution to the war, a Union officer felt that the Colonel’s group caused “more loss than any single body of men in the enemy’s service” (p. 155).

Wert’s well-researched book delves into the military and political significance of the 1864 Shenandoah Campaign. Uncorrupted by social history, this accessible narrative is a good basic campaign chronicle. He fairly characterizes the commanders and finds faults were they exist. Students and laypersons will enjoy From Winchester to Cedar Creek because the author does not solely trace the movements of brigades, but he contextualizes the army’s engagements by explaining problems in strategy and execution.