Decision in the Heartland: The Civil War in the West. By Steven E. Woodworth. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. Pp. ix, 138.)
Steven Woodworth’s Decision in the Heartland gives an in-depth analysis of the Civil War in the western theater, and he persuasively argues that the war was won in the west. This analysis remains unpopular among amateurs and places like Gettysburg continue to dominate the Civil War landscape today. Moreover, Woodworth sees Lee’s efforts in the east as a morale builder for the Confederates but “almost militarily irrelevant in the end.” (x) He contends that the heartland (the area between Appalachians and Mississippi) was important because “it had a more generous agricultural output than the east and was populous enough to sway either elections or civil war.” (x) The heartland was also beginning to develop an industrial base.
Decision in the Heartland begins with the capture of forts Henry and Donelson in 1861. The Union victory became the “greatest actual turning point of the war” because it opened the way for the exploitation of the heartland. In fact, the Confederates would spend the remainder of the war trying to regain the loss of the two forts. (18) The following chapters describe the battles of Shiloh and the Confederate raids into Kentucky. Woodworth’s interweaves politics into his opus and shows how it negatively impacted military affairs in the western theater for both antagonists. There were many political generals that did not have a standing in military affairs but were appointed anyway. Both President Davis and Lincoln were forced to make several command changes throughout the war. Many of the Union generals were slow and unwilling to fight, but unlike the Confederacy they did have a bright spot: Ulysses S. Grant. Many of the Confederate generals did as they pleased and blatantly disobeyed orders. Moreover, there were issues over the rankings of several commanders, in particular, Joseph E. Johnston. Johnston and Jefferson Davis could not come to an agreement on how the war should be won and caused much strife. In the end, much of the blame should be placed on Davis’s shoulders.
The book continues with the failure of the Confederate raids into Kentucky and Grant’s impressive Vicksburg campaign. The victory at Vicksburg was arguably the most “decisive” battle of the war. (66) The Confederates had lost a 30,000-man army, and it had completely divided the Confederates from the western and trans-Mississippi theaters. At the same time, the victory also gave the North free reign over the Mississippi River. That same year the Union forces struggled against the Confederates in Tennessee, but in the end they had successfully moved them out of the Volunteer State. The Union army’s success allowed them to pursue the Confederates into Georgia and eventually to Atlanta. The year was a success, and it was evident that the war was being won in the west. The Union army had pushed the Confederates back and was ready to further exploit the success they had gained the following year. However, the Army of the Potomac did not advance any further and remained in a similar position from the previous year. Woodworth’s last chapters discuss Sherman’s Atlanta campaign, which ultimately helped secure Lincoln’s reelection against McClellan in 1864. Moreover, Sherman’s March to the Sea crushed the Confederate will to fight in the heartland and culminated at Durham Station. Woodworth argues that the March to the Sea proved that the Confederates could no longer protect their homes, and desertion rates rose especially in counties where Union soldiers traveled. Overall, Woodworth’s work is a quick read and well written. It is not a detailed synthesis of the war in the west but rather a superficial overview. It was joy to read and is recommended to anybody with an interest in the Civil War.
Shawn Devaney
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Decision in the Heartland: The Civil War in the West. By Steven E. Woodworth. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008. Pp. ix, 138.)
In Decision in the Heartland: The Civil War in the West, Steven Woodworth surveys the Civil War in the eponymous heartland of America (defined as all territory east of the Mississippi that drains into the Gulf of Mexico). Woodworth compellingly argues that events in this western theater decided the result of the war. This is not a completely new argument, but is one that many non-historians still do not accept, and therefore is worth making. Woodworth’s case contributes to the growing literature promoting this understanding of the war. His thesis is that the western theater featured a combination of accessible geography, a variety of strategically valuable targets, and aggressive generals, which together helped make it the decisive theater of the war. He concisely narrates the war, supplemented by limited biographical information on major figures and brief summaries of contemporaneous events in other theaters of the war.
From the beginning of the war, Confederate President Jefferson Davis had problems with finding effective generals for the west (an issue that plagued Confederate forces in the west throughout the conflict). Generals Gideon Pillow and Leonidas Polk committed a major political blunder by idiotically bringing troops into then-neutral Kentucky, prompting that state’s legislature to turn against the Confederacy and cast its support with the Union. The first strategically significant military victories came when Ulysses S. Grant captured Forts Henry and Donelson, effectively opening the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers as highways for Union advance. The Battle of Shiloh represented an unsuccessful Confederate attempt to reverse the Union momentum, and Braxton Bragg’s 1862 invasion of Kentucky was another attempt to roll back Grant’s success at Henry and Donelson. The flawed Confederate command structure, coupled with outright conflict among Southern generals, foiled this attempt and other Confederate efforts (as did overestimating the extent of pro-Confederate sympathies in Kentucky).
Davis’s choice of Joseph E. Johnston to command the Confederate west was another serious mistake. On the other hand, Grant’s capture of Vicksburg, finally establishing Union control of the Mississippi, was yet another decisive step toward Union victory. In Tennessee, William Rosecrans delayed for months before effectively maneuvering the Confederates out of that state. The Confederates’ ability to resist foundered due to pernicious infighting between Bragg and his subordinates (plus a bizarre unwillingness on the part of Johnston to replace Bragg). Still, the Confederates won at Chickamauga thanks to an accidental gap in the Union line and a complete loss of nerve by Rosecrans. Rosecrans not only retreated, he also gave up the high ground around Chattanooga, permitting Bragg to besiege the Army of the Cumberland. However, acrimony among the Southern generals plus the superior generalship of Grant and other Northern generals prevented the Confederacy from making any lasting gains.
Following the effective loss of Tennessee, Davis finally pushed Johnston into replacing Bragg as commander of the Army of Tennessee, but no amount of effort could persuade Johnston to go on the offensive. Some campaigning in the winter of 1864 weakened the Union forces with minimal strategic gain, but not enough to prevent William T. Sherman’s drive on Atlanta (Sherman became senior Union commander in the west after Grant went east). Preeminent above other events of 1864, Sherman’s capture of Atlanta provided an incomparable morale boost to the North, which guaranteed Abraham Lincoln’s reelection, and that in turn assured the doom of the Confederacy. The subsequent march across Georgia and South Carolina crushed Confederate morale, prompting desertions and hastening the end of the war. The compact nature of this overview means that Woodworth left out many details of the war, but this study still provides a highly effective demonstration of the true significance of the western theater in the Civil War and the factors that made it such.
Jonathan T. Engel