Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns. By Steven E. Woodworth. (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, c. 1998. ISBN 0-8032-4778-8).
This volume by Steven Woodworth was the first part in the 16-book series, the Great Campaigns of the Civil War. Throughout this work, Woodworth illustrates the ineptitude of Army of Tennessee’s officer corps, particularly its high ranking generals. Due to this, such men as Rosecrans and particularly Grant were able to take advantage of their inability to communicate. Woodworth effectively shows the relationships between the generals on both sides, as well as their faults and weaknesses. In addition to this, he illustrates the importance of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga campaigns, and their importance in the larger context of the war. An example of this was the beautifully crafted Tullahoma campaign, which was a military work of genius on the part of Rosecrans. Yet it did not receive much acclaim because according to Rosecrans, it “was not written in letters of blood.” The author conveys that although Rosecrans plan was brilliantly executed, much of the success lay at the Confederates unwillingness to fight or make a stand. Although much territory had been gained for the Union, little damage had been done to Braxton Bragg’s army, which means that a decisive battle still needed to be fought. One of the primary reasons that Rosecrans and the Army of the Cumberland were able to push the Confederates back, was the ineffectiveness of Bragg’s officer corps.
Much of this volume conveys that the Union was able to gain control of Tennessee for this very reason. Such men as Leonidas Polk and James Longstreet continually blundered throughout the Chickamauga and Chattanooga campaigns. The author illustrates the difficulty in destroying a Civil War army, yet there were several chances that Bragg’s Army of Tennessee could have accomplished this feat, had Polk acted more decisively, or acted at all. Unfortunately for the Confederacy and fortunately for the Union, Polk was a highly incompetent general who Jefferson Davis held in the highest esteem. Therefore, despite Bragg’s urging, he was not removed or relocated. Polk, like many high-ranking officers in Army of Tennessee believed Bragg to be an incapable commander that needed to be replaced, and many of Bragg’s generals hoped that some of their initiatives or actions would lead to his removal. One man who particularly wanted his job was James Longstreet as Woodworth illustrates, as he strongly desired an independent command of an army. Following the Chickamauga and Chattanooga campaigns however, the last thing Davis and his advisors wanted to do, was put Longstreet in charge of more men than he already commanded. While the Army of Tennessee was plagued by ineptitude and a lack of communication among its officers, the Army of the Cumberland was plagued by slowness.
Rosecrans and officers like George Thomas believed in a scientific manner of war, where everything needed to be perfect in order to advance, which greatly troubled Lincoln and those in Washington. Despite his intelligence, Rosecrans was quite methodical in conducting war, which was something that many in the North grew tired of. By 1863, Lincoln began to appreciate the value of men such as Grant, who believed in hitting the opposing army quickly and with strength. As Woodworth states, Grant “made war Lincoln’s way,” which is why the battle for Tennessee served as a final piece of evidence that Grant was the man who needed to be the overall commander of the Union army. Although during the contest for Tennessee, Sherman did not have his best performance, he still performed admirably in the eyes of Grant given the circumstances.
In Six Armies in Tennessee, Woodworth illustrates the importance of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga campaigns, as both sides clearly wanted control over the state. The Union committed parts of four armies in the contest over the state, while the Confederacy committed parts of two armies. The result was a resounding victory for the North and a crushing defeat for Southerners and their morale. Following the loss of Tennessee, Braxton Bragg’s military career was over, and his army never regained its strength. Many of his men who survived this campaign no longer had the resolve to keep fighting, while men in Grant’s army felt the exact opposite. In their minds, there was a job to be done, and they intended to carry it out. It was exactly this attitude which made Grant and the Army of the Cumberland so successful. Throughout this volume, Woodworth effectively shows that the contest of the Tennessee could have had various outcomes had generals acted differently. But in the end, it was the Union generals who trusted each other more, and worked better with one another. Unsurprisingly, it was the Union that was victorious in the clash for Tennessee.
Albert Cox
Texas Christian University
Six Armies in Tennessee: The Chickamauga and Chattanooga Campaigns. By Steven E. Woodworth. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.
In Six Armies in Tennessee, Professor Steven E. Woodworth presents the Union’s attempts in 1863 to liberate Middle and East Tennessee, while the Confederates hoped to secure these regions. Woodworth focuses mainly on the Tullahoma, Chickamauga, and the Chattanooga campaigns. When presenting the events that led up to the battles and the skirmishes themselves, Woodworth masterfully brings forth details about the men fighting, the feelings of military men and politicians, the weather, geography, and the geology of the locations of the battles. After Chattanooga fell into Union hands, the lives of Confederate General Braxton Bragg and Union Generals William Starke Rosecrans and Ulysses S. Grant were forever changed. Along with the wins at Forts Henry and Donelson, the Union now rejoiced in gaining more Tennessee territory and Union sympathizers for their cause (xi-217).
1863 was a remarkable year for the Union. President Abraham Lincoln’s generals arose victorious at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. After these two battles, Lincoln urged his generals, in the Western Theater, to liberate East Tennessee from the Confederacy. General William Starke Rosecrans headed the Army of the Cumberland. Although Lincoln and Major General Henry W. Halleck advised Rosecrans to engage General Braxton Bragg and his Army of the Tennessee, Rosecrans refused to be swayed. He was a tactical leader, and he only sought to progress if he believed his plans would yield favorable outcomes. After gentle nudging from Lincoln and constant threats from Halleck, Rosecrans finally agreed to make a move against the enemy (19-46). In a nine day campaign, known as the Tullahoma campaign, which began on June 23rd, Rosecrans made Bragg retreat from the Cumberland foothills and later from Tullahoma. Bragg and his men fled to Chattanooga. Rosecrans hoped that Lincoln would perceive the Tullahoma campaign as a Northern victory, especially since this campaign lacked all the carnage that the wins at Vicksburg and Gettysburg had produced. The War Department urged Rosecrans to once again engage Bragg in combat. Rosecrans refused to budge until he had more supplies and the assistance of the Army of the Ohio. Rosecrans later had Bragg and his men retreating from Chattanooga (19-78).
Although these engagements produced positive outcomes for the Union, Braxton Bragg sought to use successive campaigns to tip the scale in the South’s favor. Bragg deviously sent pretend Southern absconders to Rosecran’s army to convince him that Bragg’s army was defeated and sought to withdraw. With more men and few more supplies, Bragg sought to fight Rosecrans at Chickamauga. After two days of fighting, Confederates gained the advantage, when Rosecran’s army sought to fill a hole in their line that did not require filling. By doing this, Rosecrans created an actual break in his defenses. The South had the upper hand, and the Union army later retreated to Chattanooga. According to Woodworth, “[After the battle] Lincoln …retain[ed] confidence in Rosecrans, for the moment at least, but he was sorely disgusted with Burnside” (131). Even with the urgings of Lincoln, Burnside saw little importance in reinforcing Rosecrans, which helped lead to Rosecran’s defeat (129-49).
For the sake of Northern morale, Lincoln, his cabinet, and the War Department realized changes had to occur. Thus, Lincoln gave General Ulysses S. Grant complete control over the campaigns in the Western Theater. Under the command of Grant in Chattanooga, he established a new supply line, known as the “Cracker Line” (150-68). Grant pooled the resources and the men of the three important Union armies: The Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Potomac. Grant also sought to get rid of Rosecrans and to promote General George H. Thomas. At Missionary Ridge, near Chattanooga, the Northern army successfully defeated the Confederates (139-217).
Woodworth argues that the Union win at Chattanooga led to many changes on both sides. The state of Tennessee was now in Northern hands. This battle allowed Lincoln to put his trust in Grant and in Grant’s subordinate Sherman. Finally, the Southern loss at Chattanooga convinced Jefferson Davis that Bragg was no longer the man to command the Confederate Army of the Tennessee. Southerners, at that time, believed the Confederacy and its cause were doomed (213-17).
Andrea Ondruch Texas Christian University