Freehling

Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836. By William W. Freehling. New York: Harper & Row, 1965.

The renowned historian William Freehling provides the Nullification Crisis with the in-depth attention it deserves in Prelude to Civil War, offering an insightful narrative which treats it as a momentous historical event in its own right as well as fully integrates it into America’s path to Civil War.

Among Freehling’s key arguments is that South Carolina’s unsuccessful nullification campaign was not caused merely by economic grievances over the 1828 “Tariff of Abominations,” which ironically had been shepherded through Congress by John C. Calhoun and his allies, who assumed it would never be passed. Fundamentally, the nullification represented an “expression of South Carolina’s morbid sensitivity to the beginnings of the antislavery campaign” (xii). South Carolina emerged from the slavery debates surrounding the Missouri Compromise relatively unshaken, but what followed was a decade of paranoia marked by the Denmark Vessey plot (1822), the Charleston Fire Scare (1826), and Nat Turner’s Rebellion (1831), all of which served to arouse South Carolinians’ fears of threats to the institution of slavery from without and within. In retrospect, South Carolina was the state ripest for a controversy like the Nullification Crisis. Domestic fears and economic pressure united upcountry and lowcountry planters against the tariff (the latter whom were not substantially burdened by the tariff itself), while South Carolina’s strongest unionists, Charleston merchants and yeoman farmers, had too little common ground to unite statewide as a strong opposition to nullification. In addition, Freehling minimizes just how drastic the shift from nationalism to sectionalism supposedly was on the part of Calhoun and his fellow Carolinians. South Carolina’s nationalist fervor, he suggests, was mostly limited to national defense and the only most nationally beneficial internal improvements.

Freehling also adeptly addresses the significance of the Nullification Crisis’ aftermath. In South Carolina, the “Great Reaction” was marked by new calls for a stronger militia, a Southern convention system, and loyalty oaths for office holders recognizing absolute state sovereignty. Growing fears of threats to slavery led to Congress’ gag rule and the restriction of antislavery literature in U.S. mail, a measure which placed Calhoun and his implacable unionist foe Andrew Jackson on the same side. Perhaps most significantly, Freehling argues the controversy spurred the rise of militantly proslavery rhetoric and ideology, replacing slaveholders’ previous “necessary evil” arguments and refusals to discuss the institution of slavery at all.

Freehling handles the key players in the nullification drama with nuance. Arch-nullifier John Calhoun emerges as an intellectual giant ostensibly dedicated to preservation of the Union yet a political thinker who “created a revolutionary doctrine in the name of conserving the Union.” That doctrine deeded state conventions power to nullify federal laws because the Union (theoretically) had been created by state conventions in the first place, yet such “crabbed logic” created the anti-federal specter of absolute state sovereignty. Among its “manifold inconsistencies,” nullification “protected national minority rights and then permitted state majority tyranny;…defended the consent of the governed at the expense of destroying the power to govern; [and] proposed conserving the Union with principles which would have destroyed it” (172-73). Freehling praises the stereotypically hotheaded Andrew Jackson for restraint in handling the crisis, avoiding a military showdown and outmaneuvering the nullifiers by transferring customs collections to U.S. warships. Only Jackson’s idea of arresting leading nullifiers en masse with civilian posses does he dismiss as overly rash, a measure shot down by Martin Van Buren. Freehling also effectively dismisses any number of myths relating to the crisis, such as the notion that Calhoun’s and Jackson’s fundamental opposition to one another could be attributed to their differences over Florida or Peggy Eaton.

William Freehling handles a complicated historical event with sophisticated analysis and his reliably readable prose, providing an essential account for understanding the Nullification Crisis and its role in the antebellum era.

Jonathan Steplyk

Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836. By William W. Freehling. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.

William Freehling attributes the Nullification Controversy to more than just the declining income of cotton planters. The crusade of 1832, although aimed at lowering the tariff, was an attempt to check the abolitionists as well. In this book Freehling shows this controversy as an impulse that revealed South Carolina’s sensitivity to the beginning of the antislavery campaign. The confrontation between the South Carolina nullifiers and Andrew Jackson shows a transition of the state from the “enthusiastic nationalism of 1816 to the extreme sectionalism of 1836.” (p. xi)

An increasing social intimacy in South Carolina came with important political effects. Close friendships led to unified political parties and more importantly intimate social conversation resulted in understandings of separate political problems. As a result, by the 1830s their mutual sensitivity had developed so that the mood of one aristocracy influenced the political reaction of the other. All types of slaveholders and yeoman farmers who hoped to become slaveholders hoped to protect slavery, raise cotton prices, decrease their cost of living and ease relationships of debtors and creditors. Impoverished red-necks also gained much satisfaction through joining with the planters in a crusade for South Carolina.

Freehling discredits the hypothesis of simply an economic depression leading to the Nullification Crisis. Upcountry cotton producers, Charleston mechanics, and retailers all proved victims of the depression and were advocates for nullification and the Charleston merchants and mountain yeomen who had escaped economic distress opposed such radicals. Still lowcountry rice and luxury cotton producers who remained prosperous in the 1820s and 1830s became strong supporters of nullification.

During the 1820s, nationalists from South Carolina did not believe that their opposition to higher tariffs caused conflict with their commitment to American nationalism because they believed that the tariffs did not seem “truly national.” (p. 96) They originally felt that the antislavery fervor would blow over. This attitude changed after the Denmark Vesey Conspiracy in 1822. This led to the tidewater gentry having great concern about the slavery debates in congress.

Freehling describes the congressional session of 1827-8 as the beginning of the evolution from South Carolina’s nationalism to sectionalism. During this session debates on slavery broke out in the House, the American Colonization Society stepped up a campaign for federal aid and worst of all, the highest pre-Civil War tariff was enacted. In 1830 the presentation of the first Colonization Society bill, Calhoun’s defeat and McDuffie’s forty bales theory all contributed to an increased militancy of South Carolina radicals as the congressional session progressed.

During the years after 1832 the “Great Reaction” took place in South Carolina. With abolitionists rising and nullification defeated the South Carolina fire-eaters began to prepare the state for the direct encounter which they had dreaded for a long time and now believed they could not avoid. At the time most South Carolinians seemed very susceptible to the guilt and fear that threatened to undermine their defense of slavery. This reactionary period surprisingly took place during a time of economic prosperity in the state. Yet by 1860 the proslavery argument along with the tighter shackles it had imposed on the bondsmen proved to lighten the guilt and fear which had troubled many slaveholders. Still the Great Reaction could not let up so long as slavery still existed and despite the successes in resolving crisis in South Carolina, it only intensified the antislavery movement in the North.

William Freehling has written a great book on the nullification crisis and the influence that slavery had on it. He presents a well thought out argument and proves his theory that more than just economics contributed to this crisis. This book is well written, easy to follow and offers a great overview of the Nullification Crisis in South Carolina.

Prelude to Civil War: The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 1816-1836. By William W. Freehling. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, c. 1966, Pp. xi, 395, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 66-10629)

William Freehling in Prelude to Civil War seeks to link the 1830s “Nullification Controversy” to the causes of the American Civil War. He divides the work into three parts dealing with the background, crisis and reaction of South Carolina’s attempt to nullify the tariffs of 1824 and 1828. Freehling’s argument centers not only on the economic questions of tariff resistance, but also how slavery and the defense of slavery factor into the nullification theory. The author provides numerous footnotes and a bibliographical essay.

In the first three chapters the author discusses the background of the South Carolina economic, social and political scene after the War of 1812. In examining the diversity of the state, the author notes the various sectors of society and the economy and wonders why they supported nullification. Some of them had obvious reasons, but others did not overtly benefit from supporting nullification. Various merchants, yeoman farmers, poor whites and other sectors of South Carolinian society liked tariffs and did not overtly support planter-class ideals. The author sets out in the next two parts to answer that question.
Freehling states, “A society reveals its deepest anxieties when it responds hysterically to a harmless attack.” (49) This statement represents the heart of the author’s thesis. He believes that the southern extreme reaction to a slight attack indicates the measure of guilt and fear over slavery in the South. The nullification crisis caused a reaction all out of proportion to the establishment of new tariff rates. Freehling states that the South feared that the North may interfere with or eradicate slavery and that the South suffered from the guilt of owning slaves. These fears combined to cause the nullification of the tariffs by South Carolina and constituted an extreme reaction to a slight external attack.

The author begins part two by showing the movement of South Carolina from nationalists into sectionalists from the end of the War of 1812 to the end of the 1820s. Chapters four and five recall the political career of John C. Calhoun and the development of his nullification theory. The political history centers on South Carolina and Calhoun’s national aspirations. The nullification chapter delves into the evolution of Calhoun’s theory of nullification. The discussion often assumes knowledge and lacks clear linear explanations that results in a confusing examination of the theory.

Chapter six, seven and eight relate the nullification convention and the defeat of nullification. As South Carolina negated the tariffs, opposition from various avenues emerged. Slave owners feared what would happen if a Federal army invaded, especially with respect to slave insurrections. Other southern slave states failed to join South Carolina for fear of disunion and war. President Andrew Jackson proved more determined to enforce the tariff than previously thought. His ignoring of the Georgia/Cherokee land problem encouraged nullifiers. The Union proved much more important to Jackson than legal fights over Indian lands. Unionists within South Carolina proved more determined and organized that initially perceived.
In the third part of the work, the author gages the reaction of South Carolina to the defeat of nullification. Freehling calls the few years following nullification the “Great Reaction” period. He sees the political survival and gains made by proslavery nullifiers as a consequence of several factors. The increased assault of abolitionists on the South’s peculiar institution caused an increasing fear of emancipation. The fact that the Federal Union proved more powerful than states rights only heightened southern fears. This fear galvanized South Carolina’s increasing sectionalism and provided new motivation for increasing the repression of the slave population. The real reaction came in reaction to abolitionists who felt buoyed by the defeat of nullification and focused on slavery not on constitutional issues.

The author ties the emerging slavery issue to the nullification crisis. Fear and guilt drove many sectors of society into the increasingly sectionalist, proslavery nullifier camp. This near unity becomes apparent in the mid-1830s. In 1835 abolitionists mounted a postal campaign aimed at making slaveholders see the evil of their ways. South Carolina and the rest of the South reacted violently. In 1836, southerners instituted the gag-rule in Congress concerning antislavery petitions. These reactions prove the intense fear and guilt of the South concerning slavery.

The author provides convincing evidence of the growing defense of slavery within southern circles and ties them to nullification. His economic arguments hold merit and are quite compelling. The fear of antislavery elements infiltrating the South caused many southerners that may have been moderate supporters of the Union before the crisis to support the radical nullifiers after the crisis. Freehling’s arguments over antislavery fears work better than his arguments of southern guilt over slavery. Proving and discussing fears is easier than proving guilt especially societal guilt. Freehling almost imposes the guilt that he is trying to prove caused southerners to react so violently to mild attacks.

Freehling’s economic arguments and discussion of South Carolina politics tends to eat away at some of his conclusions, which focus on slavery. His examination of nullification does, like all close examinations, dispel some myths but his economic arguments leading up to nullification prove more difficult to dispel until the later abolitionist “attacks” on the South. The narrative concerning Calhoun provides interesting political context, but distracts from the slavery argument. The overreaction of southerners to mild northern attacks on slavery provides an interesting hypothesis for nullification, but the author only links the two after the coming of the abolitionists.

Texas Christian University

Scott Cowin