Lee and His Generals in War and

Lee and His Generals in War and Memory. By Gary W. Gallagher. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998. Pp. 298).

American History often becomes enshrouded in the public mind as a mixture of myth and hagiography. For example, events such as the Battle of the Alamo become legend where many accepted facts may or may not be historically true. Individuals such as George Washington become larger than life with experiences such as the cherry tree fable that have been distorted or outright fabricated. When considering the American Civil War, a large number of myths and misconceptions exist about many of the key events and personalities. Historians are challenged to approach the subject objectively and try to avoid undue glorification of either side. Dispelling myth is particularly hard for many historians when trying to refute the Lost Cause interpretation of Confederate History that still pervades popular culture today. In Lee and His Generals in War and Memory, historian Gary Gallagher offers a collection of essays that examine aspects of Robert E. Lee and his lieutenants that have become distorted by Lost Cause advocates.

The first couple of essay sections examine Lee and some principal subordinates that loom large in Lost Cause hagiography. According to this school, Lee was one of the greatest generals in American History and he made no major mistakes in his battles. When the Confederates suffered defeat, the fault did not lie with Lee but some subordinate who failed to execute his orders or with overwhelming Northern numbers. Some historians have refuted this view and criticized Lee heavily for wasting lives in offensive operations spawned by his aggressive nature. Gallagher strikes a more moderate pose where he rates Lee as a great general but one who did make mistakes that cost the Confederacy battles. During the Antietam campaign, Gallagher argues that it made sense for Lee to launch an offensive in order to retain the initiative but that he erred in conducting the battle against McClellan’s forces and needlessly risked his entire army. At Gettysburg, Lee’s decision to launch offensive attacks on the second and third day of the battle proved to be the wrong decisions but they were not wholly unjustified. Lee had gambled in the past at Chancellorsville and Second Manassas and scored impressive victories. At Gettysburg, he believed that the momentum and morale of the Confederate troops would overcome the strong Northern positions. Although the attacks failed, Gallagher believes Lee based his decisions on logical principles.

Gallagher also analyzes some of Lee’s subordinates. General James Longstreet endured heavy criticism for supposedly moving his troops too slow in battle. During Second Manassas, critics claimed he endangered General Thomas Jackson’s wing by not committing his troops in a timely fashion. Instead, Gallagher argues that Longstreet performed very well during the battle showing both the proper initiative and by executing Lee’s orders efficiently. Longstreet became a favored scapegoat for many Lost Cause writers because he became a Republican and supported many of President Grant’s policies. General John Magruder also had his share of critics. After the Seven Days Battles, accusations of insobriety, cowardice, and poor handling of troops plagued his career. Overall, Magruder performed well during many stages of the Peninsula Campaign and committed no more errors than other commanders during the Seven Days Battles including the vaunted Stonewall Jackson. In addition to Magruder and Longstreet, Gallagher also included essays on General Jackson and Confederate corps commanders at Gettysburg.

In the last couple of sections in the book, Gallagher examined some lasting legacies of Lee and his lieutenants and a couple of key debates within the academic community about Civil War battlefields and Ken Burn’s documentary on the Civil War. One particularly interesting essay centered on Jubal Early and his contributions to Lost Cause historiography. Although dismissed by some contemporaries as a cranky Southern partisan, Early’s postwar writings helped lay the foundation for many Lost Cause myths including the overwhelming importance of the Eastern Theater, near sainthood for General Lee, and the demonization of certain generals including Longstreet. Because these myths have some underlying truth behind them, they remain potent parts of the public perception of the Civil War still today. As for the academic debates, many historians question the importance and relevance of battlefield preservation to current historiography and criticized Burns’ documentary for placing too much emphasis on military affairs at the expense of political and social factors. Gallagher argues that battlefields make wonderful tools in teaching both the actual progression of the battles as well as illustrating the political and social factors behind them. Although critiquing Burns for missing some opportunities to refute certain myths, Gallagher defends the emphasis on military action because the Civil War, being a war, demands attention to military events that had direct bearing on related social and political factors.

Overall, Gallagher’s book offers an interesting, fair, and insightful analysis of issues surrounding Lee and his commanders in current historiography.

Johnny Spence Texas Christian University

Lee and His Generals in War and Memory. By Gary W. Gallagher. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998, Pp. xi-283.

In Lee and His Generals in War and Memory, renowned historian Gary Gallagher takes General Robert E. Lee to task. Gallagher contends that historians and enthusiasts continue to illustrate Lee as a man who led his men with his use of firm strategies. After the Civil War, the “Lost Cause” mythos developed and with it came a large body of literature, which stated that the South lost the war in part because of the ineptness of Lee’s subordinate generals. Lee’s character though remained unscathed. Throughout Lee and His Generals, Gallagher demonstrates that Lee’s subordinate generals were not entirely to blame for the Confederacy’s losses. Generals, such as, Richard S. Ewell, have been criticized, because they did not follow all of Lee’s orders. Gallagher believes that these generals were only partly at fault. Gallagher also lays some of this responsibility on Lee. Lee and His Generals seeks to challenge and to correct the views of the “Lost Cause.”

The battle at Antietam Creek served as a huge disappointment for the Confederacy. Lee went into Maryland to pursue an offensive battle within the North’s borders. By the end of this campaign, Lee’s army was depleted of men and vigor. Gallagher notices that historians tend to regard Lee favorably, since many scholars believe that Lee always had the esteem of his men. Gallagher seeks to counter this view. After Lee initiated his plan to raid the Union, many soldiers became runaways and were not at the battle. According to Gallagher, “Lee’s army [at Antietam] lacked the self-confidence, devotion to its commander, and profound willingness to do anything he asked of it that would be trademark by the time it set out for Gettysburg in June 1863. Because of these problems …, Lee and his army … lacked the capacity to achieve a decisive victory” (35). Although Lee’s soldiers and subordinates were later known to praise him as an able general, this acknowledgement was not at first present. For many soldiers and civilians, Lee’s early Civil War campaigns were not significant. Previously, Lee was considered an incompetent general, who usually retreated. Others praised General Joseph E. Johnston as a great commander. Scholars now tend to hold the reverse as true. Academics see Johnston as a general who abandoned ground to preserve his army. Historians usually paint Lee as a tactical commander (1-46).

In July of 1863, Lee again sought to attack the North offensively at Gettysburg. This campaign again proved to be a disappointment for the Confederates. Gallagher notes that many historians and enthusiasts of the “Lost Cause” blame Lee’s subordinate generals for this defeat. Gallagher contends that Lee also should receive some blame. On July 1st of the Gettysburg campaign, General Lee informed his subordinate Richard S. Ewell that it would be in the South’s favor if he took Cemetery Hill. However, Lee did not press Ewell to comply and allowed Ewell to use his best judgment. Because Ewell was unable to take Cemetery Hill, historians present this as one of the major mistakes of the Gettysburg campaign. Scholars also tend to show how Ewell’s inability helped lead to the South’s defeat at Gettysburg. (158-81). Gallagher disagrees with these views. According to Gallagher, “Lee must shoulder at least some of the responsibility for Ewell’s failure. …. Lee knew that Ewell lacked decisiveness, perhaps [Lee] should have modified his method of command on the afternoon of July 1” (181).

An interesting work, Lee and His Generals abounds with many fascinating details and anecdotes. One learns that Lee’s horse was named Traveler. Gallagher also presents colorful sketches of Lee’s subordinates, especially the drunk John B. Magruder. Gallagher additionally takes filmmaker Ken Burns to task. Gallagher believes that enthusiasts, such as Burns, disregard the value of the North’s wins in the western theater. Gallagher wishes that Burns and historians would present both theaters equitably, instead of focusing only on Lee and his eastern campaigns.