From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South.  By Henry Lumpkin.  (Columbia, SC:  University of South Carolina Press, c. 1981.  Pp. 3,341.  ISBN 0-87249-408-X.)

     The American Revolution may have begun with the immortal “shot heard round the world” at Lexington, Massachusetts, but it effectively ended with the Patriot victory at Yorktown, Virginia. The brutal struggle for American independence in the South is often overshadowed by the more celebrated conflict in the northern colonies, an omission that From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South amends. Henry Lumpkin’s revealing account of the war begins with early military encounters in the South, including the failed British attack on Charleston in 1776, and traces the conflict through the bitter battles of Camden, King’s Mountain, Cowpens, Guilford Courthouse, Eutaw Springs, and Yorktown. Lumpkin objectively analyzes the bold British gamble to transfer the war to the South in 1779 and the resulting campaigns that eventually ended in the surrender of Lieutenant General Charles Lord Cornwallis’s army at the siege of Yorktown on October 19th, 1781, which ultimately led to the British recognition of the United States in 1783.

     As Lumpkin notes, the British strategy to conquer the South initially presented a fair chance of success. With New York City and Canada securely in British hands, and the American coastline blockaded by the Royal Navy, the seizure of the southern colonies would fatally divide the new American nation and force an increasingly war weary population into submission to the Crown. The South contained a large number of Loyalists that might be induced to support the King’s standard and pacify their rebellious neighbors. Yet, divided command and incredible arrogance regarding the fighting abilities of their enemies cost the British dearly. Lumpkin observes that, “After the comparatively easy captures of Savannah and Charleston, the British thus committed one serious error after another. They overestimated the number of Loyalists who would flock to their aid. They antagonized thoroughly the very people on whose eventual support they must depend if victory were to be achieved” (252). The bitter civil war that erupted in the backcountry between Tories and Patriots gained notoriety for its savagery, as both sides burned property, plundered from enemy sympathizers, and at times, executed prisoners. At the famous battle of King’s Mountain, one American army fought against another American army, as the only British soldier on the field was the Loyalist commander Major Patrick Ferguson.

     In addition to his entertaining historical narrative, Lumpkin includes detailed chapters on Revolutionary war weapons, artillery, uniforms, and the celebrated and highly effective guerilla war leaders Francis Marion, Thomas Sumter, and Henry Lee. Despite repeated battlefield victories against Major General Nathaniel Greene’s Continental Army of the South, the Royal Army could never gain control of the Carolina interior and American partisans unleashed havoc against British supply lines and communications. The controversial British cavalry commander Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton is depicted with more fairness than might be expected in an American publication, but his notorious actions at the Waxhaws are described in detail, where his forces killed 113 Americans in the act of surrendering and “Tarleton’s quarter” became synonymous with cold blooded murder. Lumpkin also depicts the role of Native Americans in the conflict, most notably during the Cherokee War of 1776. The book contains a detailed chronology of the American Revolution and an appendix that lists the order of battle and estimated casualties for every major combat action in the South. While the book does not contain footnotes, it does include a selected bibliography of sources.

     The American Revolution may conjure up images of the Boston Tea Party and Paul Revere’s ride, but it was in the swamps and backwoods of Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia that Americans won their independence. As Lumpkin concludes, “When they failed to subjugate Georgia and South Carolina and win over by force or persuasion the majority of the people, the British lost not only the war in the South but the final and best chance to subdue the thirteen colonies”(252).

Steven Nathanial Dossman

   During the years 1775 to 1778 nearly all of the significant military campaigns of the American Revolution occurred in the North and Canada. There were several early battles in the South that were a factor in the War for Independence, but these must be considered secondary in the overall picture of this time. The initial hostilities in the South took place at Charleston, South Carolina in October 1775. This was followed by action in Virginia in December 1775, and a month later, in January 1776 in North Carolina.
 
   The War for Independence had additional complications for both sides in the Southern theater. The South had a greater concentration of Loyalists, those loyal to the British. Many of these were North Carolina Highlander Scots, who had received generous land grants from King George II when they came to America. Because of these grants the Highlanders had a strong allegiance to the Crown, and had even pledged an oath of loyalty to George II.

   Many of these Scots had previously been backcountry regulators. Prior to the Revolution they had chafed against the political power wielded by the planter and merchant classes along the North Carolina coast. The planter and merchants’ support of independence ensured many of these former regulators would oppose any Patriot war effort.

   The two major events in the South during the period of 1775 to 1778 were the attack on Charleston and the Cherokee War. The capture of Charleston and Savannah were considered paramount to the British because these were the two major Southern ports. Accordingly, on June 28, 1876 the British attempted to take Charleston and were repulsed in a poorly coordinated assault. It would be another four years before the British attempted to capture the town again.

   Three days after the British fiasco at Charleston, the entire Southern frontier came under siege from the Cherokee Indians. Many of the Native American tribes, such as the Creeks and Choctaws, had remained neutral during the Revolution.  The Cherokees did not. This tribe was infuriated over illegal white encroachment upon their lands. Many of those encroaching were American Patriots. The Cherokees looked favorably upon the British, who had treated them well. The tribe also saw King George III as their defender. The fact the Cherokees sided with the British says much about the sad state of relations between Indians and American settlers, whose “frontier attitudes towards most of their red neighbors” caused much strife. (p.20)

   Loyalist Captain John Stuart, in charge of tribal relations in the territories from Florida to Virginia, resolved to play on these Cherokee sentiments. Stuart met with a council of chiefs and on July 1, 1776, the Cherokee War was unleashed upon settlers from Georgia to Virginia. Loyalists also participated in these attacks, dressing up as Native Americans. Americans were appalled the British would employ such tactics against them.

   These Cherokee assaults often came without warning and were noted for their brutal savagery. Americans however, were equally capable of such atrocities. The militia would gouge out Indian captives’ eyes and scalp them while still alive before beating their brains senseless with a rifle butt.

   Finally, at Hiwassee on September 26, 1776, a combined Carolina militia laid waste to the Cherokee homelands “with fire and sword”, killing the murderous “heathen”. (p.25) The troops felt themselves in a holy war, fighting with a “grim, self-righteous Calvinism prevalent in the Southern backcountry.” (p.25) With 2,000 dead, a large proportion of Cherokee manpower devastated and tribal lands decimated; the Cherokee chiefs signed a peace treaty giving up large sections of their lands in South Carolina.

   There were significant unforeseen consequences for the British as a result of the Cherokee campaign.  By launching a war upon the backcountry settlers, many of who would have been pro-British or remained neutral, these people were now driven firmly into the American camp. The attacks sharply cut into the very Loyalist base the British were trying to cultivate.

   Some historians have claimed that of the three million people in the colonies in 1776, one million supported independence, one million were loyal to Britain and one million did not care.  During the Revolution, 25,000 men served in Loyalist regiments. In comparison, Washington’s army never exceeded 36,000 at any single time, and during some harsh winters he had trouble fielding even 5,000 men. Thus the number of Loyalists fighting with the British “often equaled and sometimes exceeded those serving in the Continental Army.” (p.52) Because of this the conflict became a vicious civil war, especially in the South. The “18th century South was a wild, harsh and violent land inhabited by a hard and violent people. Loyalists fought their former friends, cousins, and neighbors who supported the Revolution.” (p.52)

   A second result of the Cherokee war was the invaluable training it gave the militia. The “fight to the death” tactics used by Cherokees changed the way Americans would wage war. The militia soon moved away from the formal British 18th Century style of engagement, toward a more guerilla style warfare, featuring hit and run tactics.

   For the next 16 months the Southern theater was relatively quiet, during which time the British adopted a new strategy. With Canada secure, Northern ports blockaded, and Northern American armies at a standstill, the British felt the time was ripe to move the war to the Southern states. They knew they would have to move quickly. In February 1878 Ben Franklin helped arrange an American alliance with France, and  the British now faced the very real threat of French involvement at any time by land or sea.

   The British Southern campaign commenced in November 1778 with the capture of Savannah, Georgia, one of two major Southern ports prized by the British. Ten months later a joint French-American assault to retake the city failed.

   The tide in the Southern war continued to swing toward the British, with victories at Charleston (the other major Southern port) on May 12, 1780 and Camden on August 16, 1780. The only bright spot for Americans during this period were the heroic efforts of backcountry partisans like Francis Marion (“The Swamp Fox”), Elijah Clarke, Thomas Sumter and William Davie. These guerilla fighters constantly and effectively harassed British war efforts in the South during 1780-1781.

   The Battle of King’s Mountain, South Carolina on October 7, 1780 was a crucial victory for the Patriots, and helped swing the momentum back to the Americans, where it would stay. Guerilla tactics (learned in the Cherokee War) were a key factor in the American success at King’s Mountain. Three months later the Americans scored another major victory at Cowpens, South Carolina, proving that British General Charles Cornwallis’ legendary, and widely feared cavalry commander, Banastre Tarleton, was not invincible after all.

   While Cornwallis did win the next battle at Guilford Court House on March 15, 1781, American General Nathanael Greene was able to regroup quickly. On June 5th, Americans recaptured Augusta, Georgia and the British abandoned their fort at the town of Ninety-Six the same month. The British line of Southern forts was rapidly collapsing.

   Cornwallis then moved his army north to Virginia to join forces with Major General Philips. Soon the British learned of the impending arrival of a French fleet, and Cornwallis was given orders to defend the Chesapeake Bay region. The British general chose Yorktown, Virginia as his headquarters, because it offered the best harbor for British ships. When the French ships arrived on September 5, 1781, the British Navy botched their planned attack upon the fleet. A second French armada soon arrived thereafter, sealing off the bay, and trapping Cornwallis at Yorktown.

   General George Washington, seeing an opportunity to deliver a decisive blow to the British, marched south to Yorktown, and with a combined Franco-American army of 16,000 men laid siege to Yorktown on September 28, 1881. Within two weeks Cornwallis had run out of ammunition and supplies and was compelled to surrender his force on October 19th, 1781.

   While much of the War for Independence had been carried out in the Northern theater, the decisive battles of the Revolution would take place in the South.
With the surrender of Cornwallis’ 7,100 men at Yorktown, Britain no longer had an army it could field against the Americans. The war would go on for more than a year, but a peace treaty was finally signed on September 3, 1783.

   By failing to consolidate their victories in Georgia and South Carolina and establishing a base of operations to expand from, the British squandered their important Southern victories. The British campaign also lacked a “unity of command and command planning.” (p.251) In addition, they failed to learn the lessons of guerilla warfare and as a result, were unable to contain the partisan raiders. The British never subjugated or won over the Southern people. They alienated many Loyalist backcountry settlers, whose support they had counted on, with their vicious and brutal Cherokee War.

   This book is well written and lavishly illustrated. The author includes an excellent chronology of the War for Independence and an appendix containing all pertinent information about the regiments and commanders involved in the battles. A chapter on the weapons and uniforms used by the Americans and British gives the reader a realistic insight into the military technology of the period. With its attractive leather and cloth binding, compelling narrative and beautiful visuals, this book is a collector’s item as well as an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the Southern battles of the American Revolution.

Glen Ely

From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South.  By Henry Lumpkin.  (Columbia, SC:  University of South Carolina Press, c. 1981.  Pp. 3,341.  ISBN 0-87249-408-X.)

 In From Savannah to Yorktown: The American Revolution in the South, Henry Lumkin provides a narrative, military history of the battles in the south during the American War for Independence.  This book follows a chronological order with some diversions and includes a chapter on the weaponry and dress of the period.  From Savannah to Yorktown provides a chronology and a listing of military forces of the War for Independence.  Lumkin does not provide any footnotes or endnotes, although a respectable bibliography is provided.

 The author deals exclusively with the war in the south and most of the serious fighting in the war occurred in the north for the first several years.  Lumkin devotes an entire chapter to the abortive British assault on Charleston in 1776.  In this chapter the author examined the British failure and noted the changes the British made in their strategy when they successfully conquered Charleston in 1780.  The only other real fighting in the south prior to 1778 (Savannah) concerned the Indians on the frontier in the South.

 Lumkin devotes a chapter to the viscous warfare between the British-backed Cherokee and the American frontier settlers.  The brutality on both sides reached new heights and while the British engaged the south on this front, the use of Indians in the war irritated many colonials who may have remained neutral or loyal otherwise.  The issue of Loyalism may be the only real controversial aspect of the book.  As if he wished not to offend anyone still born of a loyalist family in South Carolina, he pays tribute to the loyalist cause, though not as often as he does the patriot cause.  Lumkin continues the use of the somewhat controversial one third, one-third, one-third distribution of patriots, loyalist and neutrals within the south during the war.

 Whatever the distribution of the various divisions, the south in the War for American Independence exhibited signs of viscous internecine conflict bordering on civil war.  The literal fighting of neighbor against neighbor created such animosity that the war in the south became much more brutal, not just for the military forces involved, than the war in the middle or northern areas.  The author notes this trend initially and continually throughout the work.  This brutality existed in some British units as well, specifically Tarleton’s Legion.  Led by Banastre Tarleton, this light infantry and light cavalry unit committed atrocities the equal of any Indian or colonial unit.  After Tarleton killed several patriot soldiers who asked for quarter (to surrender), few patriot units took prisoners citing “Tarleton’s quarter.”  His methods proved so brutal that the author often described him as sanguinary and bloody.  His brutal methods of repression of the revolt typified younger officer’s reaction to the war.  British generals tended to view the struggle similar to a typical European war of gentlemanly battles.

 The fortunes of loyalists and patriots flowed in direct proportion to the presence of British military forces in any given area.  The existence of these forces in the south came from sound British strategy, which attempted to box in the middle and northern colonies by Indian forces to the west, naval forces to the east, and British army forces in northern cities, Canada and the southern states.  The author notes that the plan nearly worked and the reasons why the plan failed leading to the eventual surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown.

 One of the biggest reasons for the British defeat, according to Lumkin, revolved around the population of the south.  The British had been led to believe that the area would provide many loyalists to the cause.  While the southern loyalist fought for the crown, they were far fewer than the British military had anticipated.  Those who initially remained neutral in the conflict usually chose to assist the patriots, except when the British were physically present in their area.  The use of Indians greatly angered many southerners that eventually joined or assisted the patriot cause.  The presence of the British army in a given area often burdened and irritated the local population and caused their defection.

 The author notes several other reasons for the British failure.  Southerners tended to come from rural areas and exhibited formidable individual martial skill, especially with firearms.  The backwardness of much of the south contributed the success of guerilla warfare and continually confounded the British.  The British simply did not have the manpower to occupy the entire region.  Because of active patriot guerillas and the comings and goings of the British army, loyalist often could not and did not stay loyal.  British generals understood this but could do little about it.  The command structure of the British in the war complicated matters as well.  Without a clear chain of command British generals prosecuted the war as individuals and eventually failed due to poor cooperation, not poor strategy.

  Lumkin follows a chronological description of the major and many minor battles in the south.  He also describes many of the exploits of patriot guerilla leaders and military officers.  Marion, Greene, Morgan and Lee all typify not only southern military exploits and mirrored Washington’s continual struggle to fight, but also to avoid overwhelming defeat in the field.  The patriot forces won few battles, like Washington, but like British forces in the north, British forces in the south could not compel an end to the fighting.  When Cornwallis moved north from Georgia and then north again from South Carolina he finds he cannot defeat the Americans and continues his advance north to Virginia.  By the 1780s the British suffer very few defeats, but find themselves retreating toward the coast under pressure from patriot forces.  Cornwallis continued into Virginia where he eventually surrendered to a combined patriot and French army assisted by the French navy.

 Lumkin states that the eventual surrender at Yorktown stems from Cornwallis’ flawed assumption that the Virginia invasion would end the war.  The author notes several times that the Virginia invasion was doomed from the start and that the entrapment of Cornwallis was inevitable.  The author notes a lack of light infantry brought on by several small defeats by subordinates and the poor coordination overall of the British military as the main reasons for the British surrender at Yorktown.  Lumkin devotes two chapters to the battle, but plays down the role of Washington and the French in the overall American victory in the war if not at Yorktown.

 As noted the author fails to utilize notes of any kind and the siege of Yorktown chapters come almost exclusively from Douglas Southall Freeman’s multivolume biography of George Washington.  Lumkin uses a plethora of primary sources in several other sections of the book, especially when describing the exploits of individuals.  The book provided a useful overview of the War for Independence in the south with only a slight tinge of southern pride.  Its lack of citations and its coffee-table book feel hinder its recommendation as a serious scholarly work.

Scott Cowin