Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy. By Richard M. McMurry. Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2000.

            Richard M. McMurry, author of Two Great Rebel Armies and John Bell Hood and the War for Southern Independence, contributes a history of the decisive Atlanta Campaign to Brooks Simpson’s and Anne Bailey’s “Great Campaigns of the Civil War” series. Chronicling how the Union’s western armies battled and outmaneuvered the Army of Tennessee of the strategic but increasingly symbolic city of Atlanta, McMurry describes the campaign as marked by William Sherman’s failure to destroy the Confederate army in the field, Joseph Johnston’s failure to block Union armies’ turning moments, and the failure of John Bell Hood’s imperfectly planned counterattacks to thwart the Northern offensive.

            The opposing forces in the Western Theatre readied themselves for the 1864 campaigning season, with William T. Sherman stockpiling supplies for his drive on Atlanta and Joseph E. Johnston strengthening and repairing the battle-worn Army of Tennessee. That May, Sherman put his three armies—the Army of the Cumberland, the Army of the Tennessee, and the Army of the Ohio—into motion against awaiting Confederate forces in northwestern Georgia, in coordination with Ulysses Grant’s orders for multi-pronged strikes into what remained of the Confederacy. Rather than throwing his men against Johnston’s heavily fortified ridge-top positions, Sherman fixed his opponent while launching turning movements intended to cut Johnston’s Atlanta rail links and render his position untenable. James McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee successfully seized Snake Creek Gap, which Johnston had unwisely left undefended. Although McPherson withdrew after coming tantalizingly close to cutting Johnston’s rail lines and possibly trapping his army, his maneuver successfully compromised the Confederates’ defensive line, a move McMurry identifies as the true decisive moment in the campaign rather than Atlanta’s fall. In the ensuing pursuit, Sherman ordered several small-scale, unsuccessful assaults, culminating in a multi-corps attack bloodily repulsed at Kennesaw Mountain. Johnston sought an opportunity to pounce on an isolated portion of Sherman’s forces but was frustrated by Union forces’ increasing proclivity for protecting their gains with field fortifications. Seeking to sever Sherman’s own supply route to Chattanooga, Johnston requested cavalry reinforcements from beyond his own department. Jefferson Davis, displeased that Johnston had retreated more than half the distance to Atlanta without substantially offering battle, instead replaced him with corps commander John Bell Hood, a decision McMurry praises but argues came too late in the campaign.

            John Bell Hood, schooled in the successful flank attacks of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, planned to strike back at Sherman, first as his troops advanced south across Peachtree Creek. Hamstrung by a dysfunctional high command and inadequate staff personnel, Hood’s poorly reconnoitered attack failed. The same fate met the attacks Hood launched as Sherman drew closer to Atlanta. The opposing armies settled into siege warfare for most of August, but Sherman, realizing the 1864 elections drew close, launched a new flanking movement around Hood’s left. Union troops successfully cut Hood’s remaining rail line at Jonesboro, then repulsed and drove off Confederate forces, forcing Hood’s evacuation of Atlanta.

            McMurry’s Atlanta 1864 brings considerable sophistication to the study of the campaign, keeping it in the perspective of the key presidential election campaign and the blunted Northern offensives in Virginia and along the Red River. His appendix essay on the Election of 1864 persuasively argues that Johnston’s summer withdrawal tipped the political scales in Lincoln’s favor even before Atlanta’s surrender. McMurry also narrates the maneuvers of the campaign with notable clarity, supplemented by several detailed maps reprinted from Albert Castel’s Decision in the West. He also brings a critical eye to the generalship of both Sherman and Johnston. Sherman he praises for his substantial logistical skill in the planning stages of the campaign but faults him for lacking offensive tactical skill and an operational killing instinct that would have enabled him to seize opportunities to destroy the Army of Tennessee. McMurry highlights Johnston for successful building back up his army but criticizes his proclivity for retreat and mutually antagonistic command relationship with Jefferson Davis. Notably, he contrasts Confederate postwar accounts (embittered by Hood’s sanguine handling of his army during the subsequent Nashville campaign) which claimed high morale and absolute confidence in Johnston with contemporary evidence that Confederate troops were genuinely dispirited his characteristic retreats.

            McMurry presents both Sherman and Johnston as possessing certain strengths but glaring faults, yet much the same could be said for his own analysis at times. While he accurately describes imperfections in Sherman’s martial abilities, McMurry brings an often overt hostility to Sherman, writing, “Success and victory…are like spackling paste. All three can cover up a multitude of mistakes and false starts and hide errors. In so doing, they create a misleading picture of what lies beneath the surface appearances. So it has been with Sherman’s Atlanta campaign” (181). He resentfully insists Grant erred in passing over George Thomas for command of western forces in favor of loyal subordinate Sherman, claiming Thomas would have successfully trapped and destroyed Johnston even though he had scarcely ever demonstrated any martial aggressiveness. McMurry mainly credits Union victory to Johnston’s timidity and oversight, the long odds faced by Hood, and Union numerical superiority (by a supposedly daunting ratio of 1.35 to 1), effectively glossing over all but Sherman’s most obvious positive contributions. Oddly, he also takes exception to Grant’s strategy for coordinated strikes on the Confederacy, with its emphasis on preventing Confederate forces from shuttling troops to embattled sectors, a goal McMurry attributes to “Chickamauga fever.” Supposedly, any major transfer from one of the main Confederate armies would actually have enabled a Union breakthrough in the depleted theatre and ended the war sooner. The problem with this reasoning is that, followed to its limit, Grant should have divined that Lee’s and Johnston’s armies were perfectly proportioned to delay his own forces as long as possible, and thus he should have allowed one theatre to stalemate in hopes of unbalancing Confederate defenses. Furthermore, it overlooks the limits of Grant’s own authority, unable to redirect Banks’ misguided Red River Campaign or to nominate better commanders for secondary operations in Virginia than political appointees Franz Sigel and Benjamin Butler.

Jonathan Steplyk

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Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy. By Richard M. McMurry. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, c. 2000. Pp. xvi+229).

            For Richard McMurry, the Atlanta campaign represents an important victory for the Union as Lincoln tried to bring the war to its conclusion.  His book, Atlanta 1864, provides a narrative that covers the background, advance and aftermath of Sherman’s campaign through northwest Georgia.  Looking at a larger strategic picture, McMurry narrates the Union advance towards Atlanta, analyzing and criticizing the strategic blunders of both Union and Confederate command.  For McMurry, Sherman’s capture of Atlanta becomes the last great Union victory, setting up for the war’s eventual outcome.

            Recently given command of the entire war effort, Grant wanted to press the Confederates on all fronts.  He planned simultaneous campaigns in Northern Virginia, inland towards Richmond, up the Shenandoah Valley, north from New Orleans to the Red River, and southeast towards Atlanta.  By pressing on all sides, the South would not have the manpower to effectively counter.  Grant placed trusted subordinate Sherman in command for the Atlanta campaign.  Grant appointed Sherman on the basis of personal trust, though Sherman’s own record was not especially impressive.  In planning the campaign, Sherman showcased his command of logistics, appropriating as many supplies as possible for his men.  Sherman’s plan involved maneuvering the Confederates out of Atlanta by cutting off their supply lines.  Sherman preferred to avoid a large confrontation if possible.

            The Confederates named Joseph Johnston to oppose Sherman’s advance.  Along with his other flaws as a commander, Johnston hurt his own chances of success through constant quarrelling with Jefferson Davis.  The two Southerners had a contentious relationship, but Johnston exacerbated the problem by refusing to explain his decisions to the President, constantly assuming Davis would undermine his authority.  As a result, Johnston refused to explain his actions and situation.  Johnston’s plan consisted of retreating towards Atlanta to control his supply lines and hope Sherman would attack his fortified positions.  Against a commander determined to avoid a direct confrontation, all Johnston’s plan served to do was yield mobile initiative to Sherman, potentially ending the campaign before it started.  McMurry characterizes the Atlanta campaign as “waged by one general who did not want to fight except in very limited circumstances...and by another who preferred not to fight at all,” (53).

            By the time Sherman began to move towards Atlanta, the other parts of Grant’s larger plan were suffering.  The other actions stalled, and lack of military success emboldened Lincoln’s political opponents, giving greater importance to Sherman’s campaign.  Union forces advanced towards the rivers between Chattanooga and Atlanta, taking position first along the Oostanaula, then the Etowah.  At these early stages, Johnston had several chances to provide some resistance to Sherman’s advance, particularly at Snake Creek Gap near Resaca.  Perhaps even a small stand would have slowed the Northern armies.  But Johnston, never feeling he had the proper manpower, continued to pull back towards Atlanta.  As the Union advance continued, Davis replaced Johnston with the more aggressive John Bell Hood finally fed up with his general’s constant retreat.  Hood, missing several limbs from previous battles, launched a counter-attack outside Atlanta in late July.  While the assault was initially successful, Sherman’s force was able to inflict damage to the Rebel army.  In early September, Sherman moved to cut the last of the rail lines into the city, the Macon & Western, which would either trap the Confederates in Atlanta, or force them to leave.  Hood evacuated, and Atlanta belonged to the Union.

            In the conclusion, McMurry hesitates to credit Sherman, Johnston or Hood for good generalship.  While McMurry is respectful of Sherman as a general in the grand scheme, he sees Sherman’s greatest contributions coming during the Georgia and South Carolina campaigns that followed, not Atlanta itself.  Sherman outmaneuvered the Confederates, but McMurry is unimpressed by doing so with a considerably larger force.  Johnston, through his lack of action and general paranoia, never gave the Confederates an opportunity to hold off the Union advance.  In the years following, “Lost Cause” historians would credit Johnston with making the best of a bad situation.  McMurry points out that the constant retreat weakened Confederate morale and conceded key points to Union armies where even some resistance could have damaged Sherman’s plans.  Hood’s attempt to strike back was ill-advised, but McMurry concedes that by the time Hood took command, the situation was likely too far gone.

            The Atlanta campaign represented the last real chance for Confederate success in the dysfunctional Western theater.  Combined with the lack of Union success in other areas, preventing Sherman’s capture of the city may have been enough to force Lincoln from office, bringing in a new Democratic president.  Instead, mostly through Johnston’s constant retreat, the South allowed Sherman to close in on the city, until finally breaking through for its capture in early September 1864, ensuring Lincoln’s re-election and the final conclusion of the war.

Texas Christian University                                                                                          Keith Altavilla